Shalom, friends.

The two-week US-Iran ceasefire that took effect on April 8 did not end the war. It moved it. The Islamabad trilateral collapsed overnight after 21 hours without an agreement — Vance announced the U.S. position as a "final and best offer" and the delegation flew home. Lebanon is now the central kinetic front, with IDF forces closing on Bint Jbeil. The disarmament framework Israel was holding over Hamas expired on April 10 without compliance. Every adversary that lost in March — Tehran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iraqi militias — is rebuilding, and the ceasefire window now has a hard expiration the diplomatic track failed to extend. April is the month the architecture of the post-Roaring Lion period gets built. Almost none of it is being built in Israel's favor.

Bottom Line Up Front

• Lebanon is the war now. Operation Eternal Darkness — 50 jets, 100 targets in Beirut and the Beqaa, executed inside ten minutes the moment Trump’s Iran ceasefire took hold — was the IDF’s largest single strike wave of the war and a pre-planned statement of intent. Six divisions are operating in the theater. Twelve Israeli soldiers have fallen since the renewed offensive opened. Northern Command now describes its earlier degradation estimates as “overly optimistic.” Probability the Lebanon front escalates to a sustained ground campaign north of the Litani over the next 30–60 days: 55–65%.

• Hamas did not disarm and will not disarm voluntarily — ever. The 60-day framework expired the night of April 10. Mladenov’s parallel Board of Peace deadline runs out this week. Some 20,000 armed Hamas operatives remain active. Roughly half the Strip is still under their effective control. Command-and-control is being reconstituted under cover of the Iran-front diversion. The framework is dead. The only question Jerusalem still has to answer is when reconquest reactivates and at what scale — and whether the IDF will be permitted to operate without the constraints that produced this outcome.

• Iran's reconstitution timeline is the next strategic crisis, not the last one — and the diplomatic track to manage it just collapsed. The Islamabad trilateral ended Sunday morning with no agreement after 21 hours. Vance described Washington's offer as "final and best." Tehran would not commit to forgoing nuclear weapons or surrendering control of Hormuz. The CIA's assessment puts roughly half of Iran's missile launchers intact along with thousands of drones and a large coastal cruise-missile inventory. China is staging MANPADs through cutouts — Trump warned Beijing publicly that any delivery means "big problems." Russia handed Tehran a 55-target Israeli energy infrastructure list. The probability that Iran reconstitutes a credible strategic threat to Israel within 24 months — which we put below 15% in March — is now closer to 25%, with the failed talks removing the diplomatic ceiling on what the next phase looks like. Khamenei is dead. The IRGC's procurement architecture is not.

• Trump's "completion phase" serves a calendar, not a strategy — and Islamabad just narrowed the calendar. The president is expected in Israel for Independence Day. The Israel Prize is reportedly on the table. The trip never came off the calendar during the run-up to or during the war. Vance's “final and best offer” framing on the way out of Pakistan is the public posture the next two weeks will be conducted inside. Trump's “we win no matter what” line on Saturday — delivered while talks were still nominally alive — is rather transparent. The “completion” language coming out of the defense establishment is the framing that lets both Jerusalem and Washington claim the ceiling was the plan all along. The risk is that Israel ratifies the calendar and stops short of the work the calendar interrupted.

• The coalition’s wartime concessions to the Haredi parties are a national-security failure dressed in budget language. The NIS 800 million overnight allocation that AG Baharav-Miara froze within hours of passage. The Bismuth “conscription” bill that exempts the population the IDF needs and is being marketed as Zamir’s request when Zamir refused to endorse it. At least sixteen thousand declared draft evaders. An army the chief of staff has formally warned will collapse without three pieces of legislation the coalition will not pass. Soldiers are dying in Lebanon while the coalition writes exemptions for the people the army cannot do without. There is no version of this that ends well.

The Iran phase is paused. The war is not over. The next phase will be decided by whether Israel uses the window or surrenders it.

War, Security & Force Posture

The IDF is operating at strength and at the edge of its sustainable force structure simultaneously. Six divisions in Lebanon. Active operations in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and the broader Iran target set. A reserve call-up ceiling raised to 400,000 by government order. The chief of staff telling the cabinet, on the record, that the army “will collapse and will not be fit to carry out its routine and security missions, certainly not in wartime” without the three laws the coalition is refusing to pass in serious form. Both things are true: the IDF has executed the largest combat operations in its history at extraordinary scale, and the force structure cannot sustain this tempo into the summer without legislative action that is not coming.

Unfortunately, the doctrinal posture this month is the buffer-zone-and-raids model the November 2024 ceasefire was supposed to render unnecessary. These are some of the more dangerous operations the IDF undertakes. Northern Command has internalized that the November agreement was a mistake the army has now spent fourteen months reversing. Katz’s “Gaza doctrine” framing for southern Lebanon — systematic demolition, long-term IDF positioning — is the current operational concept, with disarmament language as the diplomatic packaging Beirut requires for a negotiation it has no intention of honoring.

Northern Front / Hezbollah

Lebanon is the central war and will remain so until Iran resumes center stage. The IDF’s strike package on April 8 — Operation Eternal Darkness, 50 fighter jets, approximately 160 munitions, 100 Hezbollah targets across Beirut, the Beqaa, and the south, executed inside ten minutes — was timed to land at the precise moment Trump’s Iran ceasefire took hold. The Lebanese Health Ministry put the toll at 203 killed and roughly 1,000 wounded. The 98th Division joined the 91st, 36th, 146th, 162nd, and the 210th Bashan in active operations. Six divisions in theater. Bint Jbeil is on the verge of falling. Lebanese sources opposed to Hezbollah report IDF forces close to completing the capture, with Merkava tanks operating within sight of the stadium where Nasrallah delivered the May 2000 "spider's web" speech that defined a generation of Hezbollah triumphalism. Zamir conducted his "central arena" assessment from inside the encirclement on April 10. The symbolic weight of taking the city Hezbollah turned into a shrine to the IDF's 2000 withdrawal cannot be overstated — and Naim Qassem will have to explain it in his next speech, if he is alive to give one. Speaking of Naim… he is now publicly named as a target — Katz’s direct line after the Hezbollah Pesach Seder fire was that Qassem will be “deep in hell with Nasrallah, Khamenei, and Sinwar.”

The IDF’s running tally since Roaring Lion began: approximately 1,400 Hezbollah operatives killed, including hundreds from the Radwan Force, ~250 artillery operators, fifteen artillery sector commanders, more than 200 launchers and ~1,300 launch tubes destroyed, and 4,200+ infrastructure sites dismantled. Hajj Youssef Ismail Hashem, southern front commander, killed in Beirut March 31. Mahdi Vafaei, Quds Force Lebanon Corps engineering chief, eliminated. Maher Qassem Hamdan, Lebanese Resistance Brigades commander, killed in Sidon with eight others. Ali Yusuf Harshi, Naim Qassem’s nephew and personal secretary, killed in Beirut. The three Hezbollah operatives directly responsible for the Beit Lif killings of Capt. Madmoni z”l, SSgts. Cohen z”l, Antis z”l, and Harel z”l — eliminated in close-quarters combat by IDF troops on April 7. Staff Sgt. Touvel Yosef Lifshiz z”l, 20, of Beit She’an, Golani 13th Battalion — killed April 8 in a Golani firefight. Twelve Israeli soldiers fallen since the offensive resumed. The cost is borne by a force whose chief of staff has already warned cannot sustain the current pace.

Northern Command’s “overly optimistic” line on earlier degradation estimates is the closest the IDF will come to publicly acknowledging the November 2024 mistake. Hezbollah retains hundreds of launch platforms north of the Litani and the assessed capacity for ~200 attacks per day for up to five months. The casualty-generation capacity has not broken. The ambulance networks, the journalist cover, the anti-tank cells reported in the Beit Lif engagement — these are adaptations under pressure, not collapse signatures.

Bibi opened direct Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on April 10 at Beirut’s request, focused on Hezbollah disarmament and a peace agreement. Israel refused French inclusion. The negotiations are useful — but we should be honest about what they are. Beirut has never been a good-faith disarmament partner in any prior framework, and Israel knows it. Resolution 1559. Resolution 1701. The November 2024 ceasefire. Each was sold as the moment Lebanon would assert sovereignty over Hezbollah’s arsenal. Each delivered the opposite. The current talks will produce diplomatic optics Beirut needs to maintain its international standing and Israeli leverage to be applied selectively when Hezbollah breaks the next understanding.

Three scenario paths.

First and most likely: the negotiations produce a framework Beirut signs and Hezbollah breaks within 60 days, the IDF treats the framework as a list of pre-approved retaliation triggers, and the buffer-zone-and-raids doctrine becomes the de facto post-war architecture across southern Lebanon. Probability: 50–60%.

Second: the IDF expands operations across the Litani in a sustained ground push aimed at breaking Hezbollah’s launch infrastructure north of the river, accepting the casualty cost and the political cost in Washington. Probability: 25–30% over the next 30–60 days, rising sharply if Qassem is eliminated and Hezbollah’s command structure attempts a coordinated retaliation.

Third: a real Lebanese sovereignty assertion with LAF deployment that materially constrains Hezbollah movement. Probability: under 10%, and almost entirely a function of whether the United States is willing to underwrite a Lebanese government that visibly defies Hezbollah — which Washington is not currently doing.

Beirut and Washington jointly requested Israel pause Hezbollah strikes ahead of the Lebanese negotiations track, and that the White House is pressing Jerusalem to accept. Netanyahu has not decided. The request is the structural problem in miniature: the same Washington whose Independence Day visit Israel is preparing to leverage is asking Israel to surrender the operational tempo that gave the leverage its weight. Saying yes makes the negotiations look serious to Beirut. Saying no preserves the only mechanism that has ever produced Lebanese movement on Hezbollah.

The political point that matters for the next election cycle: any Israeli politician with serious aspirations after this war is going to have to credibly answer one question — how do you get the north back? A stalemate is flatly unacceptable. And the public is tired. Of war. Of inadequate politicians. Of siren failures. It still has much love and support for the IDF. The political echelon? Not so much. Securing the north is the threshold question of Israeli electoral viability.

Iran

The Iran phase is paused on a clock that just got shorter. The two-week US-Iran ceasefire took effect April 8, conditioned on Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz — a condition Iran has not met and reportedly cannot meet, having lost track of some of the mines it laid. The Islamabad trilateral that was supposed to convert the pause into something durable collapsed Sunday morning. Vance left after 21 hours without an agreement. The three irreducible disputes: Hormuz reopening, the fate of Iran’s remaining enriched uranium, and Tehran’s demand for release of approximately $27 billion in frozen overseas assets. Iran would not commit to abandoning a nuclear weapons program or the infrastructure to build one quickly. Vance called Washington’s offer “final and best.” Ghalibaf blamed the United States for failing to “gain Iranian trust.”

Washington is not waiting for Tehran to agree on Hormuz. CENTCOM announced Saturday it has begun establishing the conditions for mine-clearing operations. USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy crossed the strait — the first U.S. Navy transit since the war began — and operated in the Persian Gulf. CENTCOM said a new maritime corridor is being established and will be shared with the shipping industry. Two Chinese-linked tankers transited the strait after waiting at its entrance since last week. Trump: “The Strait of Hormuz will be reopened in the not-too-distant future.” The U.S. is unilaterally dismantling Iran’s central remaining leverage point without paying for it at the negotiating table — a posture that compounds Tehran’s strategic problem and leaves the regime with the choice of escalation, climbdown, or reconstitution in silence.

The closing 36 hours of the active phase included US strikes on more than fifty targets at Kharg Island, IDF strikes on eight bridge segments and ~10 rail sections across Tehran, Karaj, Tabriz, Kashan, and Qom, and the destruction of the Asaluyeh and Mahshahr petrochemical complexes — together responsible for some 85% of Iranian petrochemical exports, both now offline. Katz puts IRGC petrochemical revenue at approximately $18 billion over the past two years. The funding pipeline that built the proxy network has been severed at the source.

The eliminations through April 7: IRGC Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Majid Khademi in Tehran on April 6. Quds Force Unit 840 commander Asghar Bagheri (”Yazdan Mir”) on April 7. CENTCOM confirms Operation Epic Fury produced approximately 13,000 strikes on Iranian regime infrastructure in under forty days. The chemical weapons R&D center under the IRGC’s Imam Hossein University compound — wind tunnels for ballistic missile testing, the chemistry center, the engineering shop running ballistic and weapons development under civilian academic cover — destroyed.

Mojtaba Khamenei is reportedly unconscious in Qom, in “severe” condition, unable to participate in any decision-making. The regime is publishing AI-generated video of him surveying a map of Dimona to fake the line of succession. Burial preparations are underway for a multi-grave mausoleum next to his father. The man inheriting the regime cannot run it. Pezeshkian told the IRGC the fiscal wall hits in three to four weeks. The Dehdasht reports during the F-15E search-and-rescue operation — residents physically blocking roads to prevent IRGC units from reaching the downed pilot’s location — are the political signal that matters more than any of the ballistic numbers. When civilians block IRGC convoys without expecting to be shot, the regime’s coercion premium has collapsed.

The Iranian diaspora answered Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's call on Saturday with coordinated rallies in at least 34 cities across Europe, Asia, and North America — London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Stockholm, Seoul, Vienna, Toronto, Los Angeles, Washington. Hundreds of thousands turned out. The unified message to the failed Islamabad talks: do not deal with the regime, stay the course. The internet blackout inside Iran has now stretched past 40 days. The diaspora is operating as the regime's external political voice while the street inside is severed from the world — a configuration that historically precedes either consolidation by the security services or the moment they lose the will to enforce.

What we got wrong, in part, in March: the probability that Iran reconstitutes a credible strategic threat to Israel within 24 months. We put it below 15% then. We are revising it modestly upward. The CIA’s running assessment puts roughly half of Iran’s missile launchers intact, with thousands of drones and a large coastal cruise-missile arsenal still operational. China is preparing to deliver shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems to Iran via cutouts in third countries — a Beijing decision that should reframe how Jerusalem and Washington weigh the China file in every adjacent conversation. Russia handed Tehran a 55-target Israeli energy infrastructure list including the Orot Rabin power station. UK Defence Secretary Healey separately confirmed Russian drone-tactics and electronic-warfare training. The IRGC’s distributed financial architecture survived the decapitation strike. The next tranche depends on whether the successor regime can execute international financial transfers under maximum sanctions pressure with degraded banking infrastructure — but cryptocurrency, yuan settlement, and the 15-vessel Hormuz throughput Iran is now charging transit fees on are all early indicators that the answer is yes, slowly, at degraded volume. Revised 24-month reconstitution probability: ~20%, climbing if the ceasefire becomes a permanent pause.

Regime change is still possible. That said, don’t let any pundit fool you. It is not imminent. The January protest movement remains a real political force — the largest demonstrations since 1979 — and the street calculus has changed materially since March. The IRGC’s coercion infrastructure is degraded. The coercion premium is collapsing in places like Dehdasht. But the protest movement does not have a unifying political vehicle outside the diaspora figures — Pahlavi, the NCRI’s Provisional Government — and the IRGC’s remaining ground forces are still armed and still deployable. The probability that the protest movement produces regime collapse in the next 60 days is in the 15–20% range. Over six months, with sustained external pressure and a worsening fiscal picture, it climbs into the 25–35% range.

The doctrine that flows from this: Israel and the United States cannot bomb the regime into collapse, and the strikes are not designed to do so. The strikes are designed to keep the regime degraded and the fiscal pressure compounding while Iranian civil society decides whether to finish the work. That is a longer timeline than anyone in DC or Jerusalem is comfortable saying out loud, and it is the realistic one.

Three scenarios from here.

First: the failed Islamabad talks freeze into a de facto cold pause without a written framework. The April 8 ceasefire holds past its two-week expiration through mutual exhaustion rather than agreement. Iran reconstitutes through cutouts and crypto under degraded conditions, and the next strategic crisis lands in 12–24 months — earlier than the managed-cessation timeline because there is no diplomatic ceiling to slow the rebuild. Probability: 40–50%.

Second: the fiscal wall and the protest movement converge inside Pezeshkian's three-to-four-week window — accelerated by the failed talks, the diaspora mobilization, and the visible U.S. dismantlement of Hormuz leverage — and the regime enters terminal political crisis without an organized successor. Managed transition into something the IRGC can survive in altered form. Probability: 25–30%

Third: regime collapse and replacement by something materially different — a Pahlavi-aligned transitional structure or NCRI coalition arrangement — within 6–9 months. Probability: 20–25%.

Fourth: the ceasefire collapses inside the two-week window. Iran tests U.S. resolve on the Hormuz corridor, the IDF resumes strikes on the petrochemical and missile targets that survived the first phase, and the war re-enters its kinetic phase under conditions less favorable to Tehran than April 8. Probability: 15–20%, rising sharply with any Iranian move against the new U.S. maritime corridor.

The third scenario is the one Jerusalem and Washington both want and neither knows how to engineer in a way that is acceptable.

Gaza / Hamas

Hamas is degraded. Hamas is also not going to disarm. Both are true and both have to be held simultaneously, because the policy that flows from holding only one of them produces failure. Hamas’s military wing has been bled. Its senior command is largely dead. Its tunnel network is being progressively dismantled. The April 8 elimination of Mohammed Wishah (”Muhammad Samir Muhammad Washah”) — head of weapons production HQ for drones, rockets and transfer operations, killed in central Gaza while operating under cover of an Al Jazeera journalist — is a representative example of the campaign’s continued effectiveness against the production architecture.

The Feb. 16 framework gave Hamas until April 10 to fully disarm, including handover of approximately 60,000 AK-47s and the destruction of the tunnel network. Hamas did not disarm. No one really expected it. Mladenov’s parallel Board of Peace track — the five-stage, eight-month “Steps to Complete the Implementation” framework under the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza — gives Hamas until the end of this week to accept a slower version of the same demand, and Hamas will not accept that one either. Some 20,000 armed Hamas operatives remain active. Roughly half the Strip is under their effective control, mostly beyond the Yellow Line. Command-and-control is being gradually restored. The kite-with-camera tactic — small children flying surveillance kites in front of IDF positions, the children chosen specifically to exploit IDF rules of engagement — is the current operational signature of an organization that knows where Israel’s constraints bind.

The honest read is uncomfortable for everyone: Hamas is degraded enough that the right amount of additional pressure produces results, and Israel is operating under enough self-imposed constraints that the additional pressure is not being applied. The constraints are familiar — humanitarian access requirements that Hamas exploits to move weapons and personnel, rules of engagement that Hamas designs around with kites and ambulances and hospital cover, target sets bounded by what Israel believes Washington will tolerate.

The constraints are not absolute. They are dials.

Jerusalem can turn them, and the coming month is the month to turn them — because the alternative is that the disarmament framework dies on the table while Hamas reconstitutes for the next round on the schedule of its choosing.

To be clear, we are not advocating for indiscriminate operations. We would, however, counsel for the specific loosening of constraints around humanitarian convoy inspection, hospital access, and the targeting of weapons-production cover identities — the constraints that Wishah’s “journalist” cover. Obviously, don’t kill children unless they pose an immediate threat. But stop letting press passes issued via terror-aligned regimes function as permits to be a terrorist operative. Without that loosening, the framework is theater.

The Day After governance battle is the parallel collapse. Hamas’s bureaucratic infiltration of the NCAG continues — al-Qassam commanders in civilian roles, district governors with military links, copies of all government files secured before any handover. The NCAG’s 5,000 Palestinian police concept remains without explicit Hamas exclusion criteria. Qatar and Turkey are the enforcement mechanism, and neither has any incentive to enforce. Quite the opposite, really. The probability that Hamas achieves an irreversible institutional presence in the NCAG within the next 60 days — which we put at 50–60% in March — is now closer to 65–70%. The window to contest the embedding has been consumed by the Iran campaign, and it is closing fast.

Two scenario paths.

First: Israel reactivates major ground operations in Gaza within 30–45 days, loosens the constraints described above, and accepts the cost — diplomatic, humanitarian, casualty — required to dismantle the reconstituting command structure before it solidifies. Probability: 35–45%.

Second: the disarmament framework is allowed to die quietly, the NCAG governance track absorbs Hamas, and the next round arrives in 12–24 months at a higher cost than the current one. Probability: over 60%, and rising every week the operational pause continues.

The third scenario — voluntary disarmament under international pressure — is not a scenario. It is a fiction the framework was designed around. Hamas does not disarm unless the guns are taken from its hands forcibly.

Judea & Samaria

The cabinet’s April approval of 34 new communities in one session — the largest single approval in Israeli history, raising the total of state-approved communities from 69 to 103 and effectively expanding the residential footprint by half in one vote — is the doctrine the October Annexation on the Table long brief sketched, executed at scale under the cover of the Iran campaign. Sovereignty by accumulation.

On Sunday morning the Interior Ministry issued formal locality designations to eight more communities, bringing the four-month total to 33 fully regularized. The list includes Ganim and Kadim — both evacuated in the 2005 Disengagement, both now reestablished. Smotrich named the strategic logic out loud: "We are advancing de facto sovereignty on the ground in order to prevent any possibility of establishing an Arab state in Judea and Samaria." The Disengagement reversal is now fully administrative.

The Tayaseer incident on April 8/9 is the test case the framing wars need: stones thrown at Israeli civilians first, one Israeli seriously wounded, gunfire returned, one Palestinian killed, and a Western press already drafting the “settler violence” lede before the police investigation has started. The actor sequence inversion — stones first, then return fire — is the standard template. The PA incitement architecture and the documented IRGC funding of Judea-and-Samaria terror cells get erased from the framing every time. PIJ’s $60–70 million annual Iranian pipeline is in question post-Roaring Lion but the cells already in motion remain funded. The Karmiel cell — four Israeli Arab citizens planning to shoot IDF soldiers, coordinating via WhatsApp with one minor supporting ISIS — is the internal-front signature. On Friday IDF forces destroyed an explosives manufacturing lab in Tulkarem — 200 pipe bombs, fire extinguishers and gas cylinders rigged as vehicle-borne charges, more than 50 kilograms of improvised explosive material. The lab predates the IDF's counterterrorism operations in northern Samaria. The production architecture is older than the response architecture, and continues to outlast it in the corners the operations have not reached. The Shin Bet’s dismantlement of the Mahmoud Radwan network, run from Istanbul by a 2025 prisoner-exchange deportee, is the Shalit-Sinwar pipeline still producing on schedule.

International Arena

United States

Washington this month is optimizing for one variable, and that variable is the Israel Independence Day trip. Trump is expected in Jerusalem. The Israel Prize is reportedly on the table. The trip never came off the calendar during the run-up to or during Operation Roaring Lion — which means that whatever else Washington was doing in March and April, it was doing while preserving the option for Trump to land in Israel and collect the accolades. Read the “completion phase” framing through that lens. Read the two-week ceasefire through that lens. Read the patient response to Iran’s Hormuz violations and the Amazon cloud strike in Bahrain and the cluster-warhead missiles that hit Petah Tikva, Bnei Brak, Ramat Gan, Givatayim, Haifa, and Kiryat Ata in the closing week through that lens.

Trump does not particularly care whether the war is over. He cares about being seen as having ended it strong. The two are different problems with different solutions. The first requires sustained pressure on Iran’s reconstitution and a credible mechanism to constrain proxy reactivation. The second requires a venue, a photo, and a narrative. Israel can lock in a great deal during a Trump Independence Day visit if it understands which problem the White House is actually solving. The risk is mistaking the photo for the policy.

Vance's Sunday morning posture coming out of Islamabad — "final and best offer," "we leave here with a very simple proposal" — is the language of a White House that has decided the diplomatic track is no longer the constraint on the kinetic track. Trump's "we win no matter what" framing on Saturday was the same posture in less polished form. The Iran ceasefire window expires around April 22. The Independence Day visit lands inside the next phase, whatever that phase turns out to be. Israel's leverage is highest in the days between the failed talks and the visit — the days the White House is most exposed to needing a deliverable.

The operational fusion that hardened in March remains real and is now layered into the institutional architecture. F-22s flew from Ovda. Tomahawks from the Ford and Lincoln carriers. HIMARS in first combat deployment. The CIA running parallel deception during the F-15E rescue, telling Iran the second pilot had already been moved while the 5th Fleet executed a 155-aircraft rescue operation. The Spanish removal from the CMCC in Kiryat Gat after Madrid refused overflight — the institutional cost-imposition mechanism Israel now treats as a default response to European obstruction. Trump’s NATO threat over the alliance’s refusal to support the campaign, with Germany and Spain mentioned as candidates for US troop withdrawal, is the leverage frame the next 12 months will be conducted inside.

What Israel should lock in now: a formalized intelligence-sharing architecture for post-ceasefire Iranian reconstitution monitoring; a written understanding on retaliation triggers for Hezbollah ceasefire violations; and the explicit removal of the April 6 energy-infrastructure restriction so the IDF can target what it needs to target if Iran moves.

None of these requires Trump to do anything he is not already inclined to do.

All of them require Jerusalem to ask while the photo is still available as leverage.

Europe & Institutions

The European response divides into the same three categories March identified, and the categories are now hardening into policy. The countries that will defend the operation legally and politically remain very few — Czech Republic as the standout. The countries that will oppose the operation but do nothing material remain most of Western Europe. The countries that will use the operation to advance institutional constraints on Israel are the active threat, and they are accelerating.

The UK Green Party’s March conference debated and is moving forward with Motion A105 — “Zionism is Racism” — under leader Polanski. Four seats. Minimal direct impact. Except. The normalization of eliminationist language in a mainstream Western party is the damage. The French-led Gaza flotilla departed Marseille, twenty boats heading to Italy to merge with a Sumud flotilla from Barcelona. Macron called any military operation to liberate Hormuz “unrealistic” — Paris’s standard contribution to a security crisis, which is to declare the response infeasible while declining to offer an alternative. The 35-state French-led maritime escort initiative for Hormuz, with France pushing for India and China inclusion while excluding the United States, is the structural attempt to build a European-led security architecture for the Middle East that does not require Washington — a project France has been pursuing for fifty years and that has produced no security and considerable theater.

Israel’s procurement break with France in March is the commercial instrument of a strategic divorce Paris initiated.

The argument that Israeli sovereignty and France’s standing institutional presence in Jerusalem deserves a closer look from the relevant ministries is, in our view, both warranted and overdue.

The Tehran synagogue strike on April 8 — heavy damage to the Rafi Niya synagogue when an IDF strike on a Khatam al-Anbiya commander caused collateral damage — and the disputed identification of Mohammed Wishah are both being staged for international amplification. Expect coordinated NGO and UNHRC reactivation around them. The UNHRC’s appointment of Zeina Jallad as Special Rapporteur, bypassing its own selection committee — an academic who has publicly justified the October 7 massacre and called for suspending Israel from international organizations — is the institution telling its members and the world that the rules do not apply when the question is Israel.

Arab States

The Gulf is now telling Trump publicly what it told him privately in March. MBZ and MBS pressed the president directly in early April that the war cannot end without meaningful constraints on Iran’s nuclear, missile, drone, proxy, and Hormuz capabilities. Their list is maximalist and longer than Washington’s stated war aims. White House press secretary Leavitt’s careful “working toward” language on Hormuz — rather than defining strait reopening as a core war objective — is what Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are reading as the warning signal.

Iran sharpened the Gulf’s leverage by destroying the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline — the primary Hormuz bypass — leaving only Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline as the sole remaining alternative. Aluminium Bahrain shut down 19% of production capacity due to raw material shortages. Brent crude hit $116.71. The Iraqi-militia drone barrage on April 9 — Kuwait intercepting 28 drones, US bases and Gulf Arab civilian infrastructure hit — is the proxy network executing pre-delegated authorization without IRGC central command guidance. The IRGC’s strike on Amazon’s cloud infrastructure in Bahrain on April 9 is the first publicly acknowledged Iranian retaliation against a US tech company and the precise kind of escalation Tehran is testing now to find the new ceiling.

Saudi Arabia’s dual-track operation — MBS privately pressing Trump to attack while publicly assuring Pezeshkian of Saudi soil and airspace neutrality — is now exposed and has not damaged Riyadh’s leverage. The opposite. The Gulf states have moved from quiet enablers to public conditioners of any settlement.

UN & Lawfare

The UN Security Council produced no Iran resolution. Russia and China vetoed the Bahrain-sponsored UNSC resolution on Hormuz. The IAEA Board is now consumed by competing demands — assess what remains of Iran’s nuclear program, or condemn the strikes that produced the remains. Russia is pushing the latter. The US is blocking both.

The institutional language to watch this month is the Tehran synagogue framing and the Wishah journalist-cover dispute, both of which are being prepared as the next lawfare lever and will land in NGO statements and HRC reports inside the week. The Israeli government’s position on the 37 NGOs facing licensing review remains factually grounded. The High Court will eventually decide how long it wants to take to say so. The injunction buys time. It does not resolve the question.

ECOSOC on Friday recommended Iran for the UN Committee for Programme and Coordination — the body that shapes UN policymaking on human rights, women's rights, disarmament, and counterterrorism. The same council elected China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan to the NGO Committee that controls accreditation and access for civil society groups across the UN system. The United States voted no. No other Western state opposed. UN Watch's Hillel Neuer named it: putting Al Capone in charge of fighting organized crime. The institutional rot is not new. The willingness of European democracies to ratify it without dissent is the data point of the week.

Inside Israel

The coalition’s wartime “unity” is now actively decomposing. The political spectrum closed ranks in March around Operation Roaring Lion. It’s already running on the same fault lines that defined every month before: Haredi conscription, budget conditionality, judicial confrontation, and the structural fact that the army cannot sustain operations without legislation the coalition is refusing to pass in serious form.

The numbers are not in dispute. Declared draft evaders: 16,880 as of February 15, up from 2,257 in July 2025. The IDF’s stated immediate need for combat soldiers: at least 7,000 to 8,000 of an estimated 15,000 additional personnel total. Reserve call-up ceiling raised by government order to 400,000. Six divisions in Lebanon, active operations in Gaza, sustained operations across Judea and Samaria, residual force commitment to the Iran target set, and an army the chief of staff has told the cabinet, on the record, “will collapse and will not be fit to carry out its routine and security missions, certainly not in wartime” without three pieces of legislation: a reserve service law, a law extending mandatory service, and a law that brings ultra-Orthodox men into military service.

What the coalition has produced instead is the Bismuth bill — the version drafted after the previous Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman was removed for attempting to penalize draft dodgers. The bill exempts the population the IDF needs. Enlistment targets can be met by “former ultra-Orthodox” recruits. Which is to say, they can count non-Haredim as Haredim. A neat trick. Or alternative service in ZAKA, MDA, and United Hatzalah. Criminal sanctions are imposed only after two years of failing to meet enlistment targets. Bismuth is marketing the bill as Zamir’s request. Zamir has explicitly clarified he did not request this version. Eisenkot called it “an official draft-dodging law.” Sharren Haskel, dissenting from inside the coalition, called it a betrayal of the soldiers. Both are right.

Netanyahu's Sunday morning filing to the Supreme Court on the Ben-Gvir dismissal petitions was the constitutional confrontation in compressed form. The court has no authority to dismiss a sitting minister. The petitions ask the court to take an active role in the political arena without legal basis. The cabinet and Knesset approved the appointment. The Prime Minister, accountable to the Knesset and the electorate, retains the dismissal authority. The argument is correct on the merits and the court will likely take it under advisement at length. Separately, judges partially approved Netanyahu's request to suspend his trial testimony this week, with a Thursday review on whether the same conditions justify suspension next week. The wartime cadence of the Prime Minister's calendar is being treated, for now, as a fact the judiciary has to accommodate.

The Haredi parties have used a wartime coalition to extract NIS 800 million in education funding (which the AG froze within hours), queued an exemption bill the army refuses to endorse, and constructed the Modiin Illit “Hostages Square” installation that equates yeshiva draft evaders with Israelis held in Gaza tunnels.

The Haredi political leadership has either endorsed that framing or failed to repudiate it. Both are choices.

The community needs to be in real schools learning the curricula that prepare children for adult economic life, in the IDF carrying its share of the security burden, and in the workforce earning the income that pays for the country it lives in.

Anything less is a transfer from the people who serve to the people who refuse, paid for by the army’s force structure and ratified at the funeral of every soldier the manpower shortfall produces.

The current coalition arrangement is not a religious accommodation. The IDF has managed Kashrut and modesty concerns. It has enabled serving while studying Torah and while living a religious life. No, the arrangement is a strategic vulnerability merely dressed in religious language.

The death penalty bill — passed 62–48 along coalition lines — has the right target. Convicted terrorists as currency is the most perverse incentive structure in the conflict, the Sinwar precedent is the proof, and the bill’s non-exchange provision is the only mechanism that directly attacks the kidnapping-for-prisoner-swap calculus.

The bill also has the mechanical problems we covered at the time: it excludes previously sentenced terrorists, provides no additional framework to secure convictions, leaves the presidential pardon mechanism untouched, and the 90-day execution window may violate the Geneva Convention’s 180-day mandatory period.

The logic is sound, the implementation is incomplete, and the High Court will almost certainly intervene. The Rothman-Malinovsky bill currently in committee does some of the procedural work this one skips.

The fiscal picture underneath all of this: NIS 850 billion in spending, a 5.3% deficit, a war costing $1.6 billion per week, and a Bank of Israel forecast that holds an optimistic view of the war’s timeline.

Tel Aviv Stock Exchange broke its all-time record for the 24th time this year on April 10. The shekel hit 3.05 to the dollar — a thirty-year high — as markets price in the Iran ceasefire holding. Ben Gurion is fully reopening. Outbound passenger caps lifted from midnight April 5–6, El Al announced ~30 destinations, with Wizz Air, Etihad, and Blue Bird returning. The economic signal is positive in the way markets are positive about the things they price in advance of confirmation.

If the ceasefire collapses, or if Lebanon escalates north of the Litani, the growth assumptions dissolve and the NIS 5+ billion in coalition payoffs become a line item in a budget that cannot cover the war it is financing.

The Iran-spying cluster inside Israel is the counterintelligence story worth looking at. Four active-duty combat soldiers in custody on Iran-spying suspicion. The Haifa-bay cell of five — lead defendant Ami Gaidarov, 22, recruited by an IRGC officer in August 2025, the intended target former Prime Minister Bennett, the explosive payload approximately thirty times the size of the Bat Yam bus devices. Gaidarov’s cell included a survivor of the Nova festival massacre. The Iran-linked Handala group’s claimed breach of former Chief of Staff Halevi’s phone — including images from a secret 1967-anniversary visit to Jordan — is the same play in cyberspace. Iran has been running social-media-and-crypto recruitment of Israeli civilians for years. What changed in early April is that the model breached the active-duty conscript pipeline. The damage assessment is still being run.

What to Watch Next Month

• Lebanon ground escalation north of the Litani. Watch the 98th Division’s deployment posture, the status of Bint Jbeil seizure, and any IDF strike on Naim Qassem. Each is a trigger condition for the next phase.

• Hamas reconquest decision. Watch for cabinet approval of expanded Gaza operations, the loosening of humanitarian-convoy constraints, and any movement on the rules-of-engagement framework around hospital and journalist-cover targeting. The decision window is the next 30–45 days.

• Bismuth conscription bill committee progress and IDF response. Watch for additional Zamir interventions, Haskel-style coalition defections, and the High Court timeline on the existing AG petition. Whether the IDF goes public with a revised assessment of force-structure collapse is a variable to monitor.

• The April 22 ceasefire expiration without a successor framework. With the Islamabad track collapsed, the two-week pause runs out into a vacuum. Watch for any U.S.-Iran backchannel signals, any IDF strike resumption posture, any Iranian move against the new CENTCOM Hormuz corridor, and the convergence with Pezeshkian's fiscal wall and the Mojtaba Khamenei succession question.

• Trump Independence Day visit logistics. Watch the Israel Prize question, the trip itinerary, and any pre-visit announcements on the Iran ceasefire framework. The visit will be the deal-locking opportunity Israel has a few days to prepare for.

• High Court rulings on coalition wartime spending and the death penalty bill. The Hiddush petition reports April 15. Labor’s death-penalty petition will follow. The judicial-coalition confrontation is the political subplot of the next 60 days.

Diaspora Front

The structural numbers from December’s Yale Youth Poll have not improved and will not improve under current institutional conditions. 18% of Americans aged 18–22 say Jews negatively impact the United States. 15% under 30 say Israel should not exist. The figures will intensify as the Tehran synagogue strike and the Wishah journalist-cover dispute reach campus. The Maine and Florida Gen Z polling — Graham Platner leading among Maine Democrats under 35 by 73 points, James Fishback leading among Florida Republicans 18–34 by 23 points — confirms what algorithmic radicalization analysts have been documenting for two years. Cross-party consistency rules out ideology as the explanatory variable.

NYPD Commissioner Tisch’s first-quarter 2026 hate-crime data — 55% of confirmed hate crimes in NYC were antisemitic, against a population that is approximately 10% of the city — is the operational consequence of the data the polls describe. Mamdani’s response in the press conference avoided naming Jews. The 182% spike in antisemitic hate crimes in January, his first month in office, is the trend line.

J Street’s endorsement of far-left calls to defund Iron Dome — a position that contradicts J Street PAC’s own published endorsement criteria — is consequential. J Street built its brand on the claim that pro-Israel and pro-peace could be combined inside the Democratic mainstream. That institution has now publicly endorsed defunding the missile defense system that has saved hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilian lives, during an active multi-front war. The brand is not pro-Israel. It is Iron Dome–neutral, which in the operational arithmetic of the past month is anti-Israel with extra steps. If you haven’t been doing it already, treat any J Street endorsement, statement, or advisory note from this point forward as a hostile-source artifact.

Trigger Scenarios

Lebanon ground escalation north of the Litani. The IDF strikes Naim Qassem successfully or in a near-miss that triggers Hezbollah retaliation against Israeli population centers. The 98th Division deploys forward of Bint Jbeil, and the buffer-zone-and-raids doctrine becomes a sustained ground push to break Hezbollah’s launch infrastructure north of the river. The window is 30–60 days, with the Qassem strike as the most likely trigger.

Probability of escalation to a sustained ground operation north of the Litani in this window: 25–35%, rising to 50–60% in the event of a successful Qassem elimination followed by Hezbollah mass-casualty retaliation. The constraint is manpower — the same 7,000 combat-soldier shortfall the conscription bill is failing to address.

Hamas reconquest reactivation. Cabinet approves expanded Gaza operations within 30–45 days following the formal collapse of both the Feb. 16 framework and Mladenov’s Board of Peace track. The IDF loosens constraints around humanitarian convoy inspection and journalist-cover targeting. The operation re-enters areas of the Strip currently under Hamas control. The complication is the framing war and the casualty numbers Iran-allied media will produce in the first 72 hours.

Probability of cabinet approval inside this window: 40–50%. The constraint is whether Trump’s Independence Day visit happens, acts as a brake, or is used as cover.

Iranian fiscal and political collapse converges with the failed diplomatic track. Pezeshkian's three-to-four-week fiscal wall hits inside the same window as the expiring ceasefire and the post-Islamabad strategic vacuum. Asaluyeh and Mahshahr remain offline. Petrochemical revenue collapses. The succession crisis remains unresolved with Mojtaba Khamenei incapacitated in Qom. The diaspora mobilization compounds the legitimacy problem the regime cannot answer with internet blackouts.

Probability of regime political crisis producing managed transition or terminal instability inside the next 60 days: 25%, up from 20%. The constraint remains the IRGC's residual ground-force capacity to suppress.

Iran reconstitution acceleration through China and Russia channels. Beijing’s MANPADs delivery via cutouts proceeds. Moscow’s 55-target Israeli energy infrastructure list moves from intelligence sharing to operational planning support. Tehran rebuilds missile production at the rate the IDF assessed before Roaring Lion (~8,000-unit target).

The probability that this acceleration produces a credible Iranian strategic threat to Israel within 24 months sits at ~20% under current conditions. It rises to 30–35% if the ceasefire becomes a permanent pause and the strikes do not resume. Trigger conditions: any movement on Chinese MANPADs delivery confirmation, any Russian operational deployment to Iran beyond the existing intelligence-sharing footprint, and any indication that the ceasefire is being formalized into a longer agreement.

Ceasefire Collapse Inside the Window The April 8 two-week pause runs out without an extension or successor framework. Iran tests the new CENTCOM Hormuz corridor with a kinetic action against U.S. or allied shipping, or accelerates a deniable drone barrage from Iraqi militias against Gulf or Israeli targets. The IDF reactivates strikes on the petrochemical and missile production sites that survived the first phase.

Probability of formal or de facto collapse inside the next 14 days: 20–25%, with the highest-risk window being the 72 hours on either side of the nominal expiration. Constraint: Trump's preference for the Independence Day photo, which is incompatible with renewed kinetic operations on the visit dates.

What Hardened

• Operational fusion with the United States, layered into combat doctrine. F-22s from Israeli tarmac, dual-carrier Tomahawk volleys, HIMARS in first combat deployment, the CIA-IDF coordinated F-15E rescue with parallel deception running on Iranian intelligence. This is the new institutional baseline—so long as it can be locked in before a new Administration takes over.

• Iran's existential threat degraded to historic lows but uncontained by any agreement. Khamenei dead. IRGC senior command decapitated. Asaluyeh and Mahshahr offline. Roughly half the launchers and a substantial drone arsenal still operational. China and Russia actively backfilling. The Islamabad collapse means the reconstitution will now happen without a written framework to slow it. The threat is severely degraded. The clock is running and there is no diplomat in the room.

• The U.S. Hormuz corridor as unilateral fact. CENTCOM mine-clearing operations begun, two destroyers transited, a maritime corridor declared and being shared with the shipping industry. Iran's central remaining leverage point is being dismantled by direct action, not negotiation.

• The doctrine of long-term IDF positioning in southern Lebanon. Katz’s “Gaza doctrine” framing for Lebanon. Six divisions in theater. The buffer zone several kilometers inside Lebanese territory. The November 2024 ceasefire is acknowledged inside Northern Command as the mistake the army has spent fourteen months reversing.

• Sovereignty by accumulation in Judea and Samaria. 34 communities approved in one cabinet session — the largest single approval in Israeli history. The Oslo-era diplomatic ceiling on residential approvals has been demonstrated to be enforceable only when Israel chooses to enforce it on itself.

• The Gulf states as public conditioners of any Iran settlement. MBZ and MBS have moved from quiet enablers to direct pressure on Trump, with Pakistan’s binding security commitment to Saudi Arabia adding structural depth Western analysts have not yet absorbed.

What Slipped

• The Islamabad diplomatic track as a pressure-relief valve. The talks were the venue Tehran could use to extract reparations, frozen-asset releases, and Hormuz recognition in exchange for paper concessions. Vance's "final and best offer" closes that venue. What replaces it is either tacit cold pause or a return to kinetic operations — both of which compress Tehran's options.

• Constraints on operational freedom in Gaza. The Iran-front diversion consumed senior decision-making bandwidth while Hamas’s bureaucratic infiltration of NCAG governance accelerated. The 60-day disarmament framework died on the table without enforcement.

• The IDF’s sustainable force structure. Zamir’s formal cabinet warning — the army “will collapse and will not be fit to carry out its routine and security missions, certainly not in wartime” without the three laws — and the coalition’s parallel response, which has been to draft an exemption bill marketed as a conscription bill. Twelve soldiers fallen in Lebanon since the offensive resumed.

• Counterintelligence integrity inside the IDF. Four active-duty combat soldiers in custody on Iran-spying suspicion. The Bennett assassination plot foiled with a thirty-times-Bat Yam payload. Halevi’s phone breached. The recruitment model has crossed from civilian to active-duty conscript, and the doctrine has not caught up.

• The political viability of J Street and adjacent “pro-Israel, pro-peace” Democratic infrastructure. The Iron Dome funding pivot is the institutional dropping of the mask. No one can pretend any longer that the brand can be operationally distinguished from anti-Israel positioning.

• European institutional cooperation. The UK Green Party’s “Zionism is Racism” motion, the UNHRC’s bypass of its own selection committee for Jallad, the French maritime escort initiative explicitly excluding Washington, the Macron declaration that any Hormuz liberation is “unrealistic.” Each is a small institutional move; the cumulative trajectory is a European architecture organized around constraining Israel rather than supporting it.

What’s Next

• Lebanon ground operation north of the Litani. Trigger: Naim Qassem strike and Hezbollah mass-casualty retaliation. Window: 30–60 days. The 98th Division’s deployment posture is the indicator to monitor.

• Hamas reconquest cabinet decision. Trigger: formal collapse of both disarmament tracks combined with continued Hamas reconstitution signatures inside the Strip. Window: 30–45 days. The variable is whether the Trump Independence Day visit becomes a brake or a cover.

• Iran reconstitution acceleration through Chinese MANPADs and Russian targeting support. Trigger: any confirmed shipment movement or deployment indicator. Window: 30–90 days.

• The April 22 ceasefire expiration in a post-Islamabad vacuum. Trigger: arrival of the nominal end date without a successor framework. Window: 10 days. Watch for backchannel signals, IRGC posturing on the Hormuz corridor, any IDF readiness signature on the petrochemical target set.

• Trump Independence Day visit as deal-locking window narrowed by Islamabad. Trigger: confirmed visit dates landing on or after the ceasefire expiration. The collapse of the diplomatic track raises the price of the photo and lowers the threshold for what Israel can ask for. Jerusalem should already have the asks drafted and the order of presentation decided.

• Bismuth conscription bill committee advancement. Trigger: Knesset summer session opening May 10, IDF response to the gap between Zamir’s warning and the bill’s text. Watch for additional intra-coalition defections and any Haskel-style public dissent.

• The High Court collision with the wartime coalition. Trigger: Hiddush petition April 15 deadline, Labor death-penalty petition, AG litigation over the NIS 800 million Haredi allocation. Window: 30 days. The judicial-coalition confrontation is the political subplot that will define the early summer.

The campaign that opened in the days before Purim and closed its first kinetic phase under the wing of Pesach has now entered the part after the Sea has parted — when the people who walked through it have to decide whether they are going to do the work or wait for the next deliverance. Khamenei is dead. Lebanon is the central war. Bint Jbeil is about to fall. Hamas did not disarm and will not disarm without force. The Islamabad track collapsed this morning and there is no successor framework on the calendar before the ceasefire expires. The army the chief of staff has formally warned will collapse without three laws is fighting on six divisions in Lebanon while the coalition writes the exemption bill. Trump is likely coming for Independence Day to collect his accolades, and the window for Israel to convert the visit into structural gains just narrowed by the length of the failed talks. Israel's choice this month is whether to stop kicking the can — on Hamas, on Lebanon, on Hezbollah's reconstitution, on the Haredi conscription disgrace — or to ratify the calendar and meet the same problems again next year at higher cost. The Iran phase paused. The diplomats went home. The work did not.

— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief

Tip? Share it securely via Signal (@Uri.30) or ProtonMail (Uri.Zehavi@Proton.me).

Shavua tov, friends.

Israel killed the Supreme Leader of Iran on Saturday morning. Operation Roaring Lion — the largest combat sortie in IDF history — struck more than 500 targets, decapitated the IRGC’s senior command, and collapsed Iran’s command-and-control infrastructure to 4% internet connectivity before the first missile landed. The regime is in succession crisis, firing what remains of its ballistic inventory in attritional drips while proxy networks activate on autopilot. The question animating March is what fills the vacuum — in Tehran, in Beirut, in Gaza, in the Gulf, and on the Israeli home front, where eight people are dead in Beit Shemesh and 150,000 Bedouin citizens have no shelters to reach.

Bottom Line Up Front

• Operation Roaring Lion has fundamentally altered the Middle East’s strategic architecture.
  The killing of Khamenei, at least seven senior security officials, and an estimated 40+ regime figures in the opening wave — timed to three simultaneous leadership meetings Israeli intelligence tracked in real time — is the most consequential targeted strike since Soleimani. The IRGC’s top command is dead. The nuclear program’s reconstitution timeline, already damaged by June 2025’s Operation Rising Lion, now faces a succession crisis layered on top of degraded infrastructure. Probability that Iran reconstitutes nuclear-weapons capacity within 24 months under current conditions: below 15%.

• Iran’s retaliatory missile campaign is real, lethal, and structurally constrained.
  A direct hit in Tel Aviv killed one woman Saturday evening. Eight were killed in Beit Shemesh Sunday. Gulf states — Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan — absorbed strikes on military bases, airports, and civilian infrastructure. But Iran is firing in drips, not volleys. Missile arsenals and production facilities are now under sustained bombardment. The IRGC’s “most intense offensive in history” announcement is an organization projecting force from a position of acute structural collapse.

• Hezbollah has not entered the fight.
  They condemned the strikes. But stopped short of pledging retaliation. With Khamenei dead, IRGC command fractured, and the patron that provided operational authorization in acute crisis, Hezbollah’s decision calculus depends on what emerges from Tehran in the next 48–72 hours. Probability Hezbollah enters the conflict in this operational phase: 20–30%. Probability if IRGC consolidates and demands activation: 45–55%.

• Iran’s succession crisis is the most consequential unanswered question in the region.
  An interim Leadership Council has formed — Ayatollah Arafi, President Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Ejei. The IRGC is pushing to name a successor outside constitutional procedures, within hours. Whether the military accepts the council’s authority — or operates independently — determines whether Iran’s response is strategic or convulsive.

• Israel’s home front has absorbed casualties and exposed structural gaps.
  Siren failure in Tel Aviv leading to death and injuries. At least eight dead in Beit Shemesh with a 10-year-old girl critically wounded. 150,000 Bedouin citizens without shelters. The gap between operational planning and civilian protection infrastructure is not theoretical.

• The 30-day window will determine whether this operation produces regime change, regime consolidation, or prolonged attrition across six countries.
  Cabinet ministers were briefed the operation is designed to last approximately a week. Netanyahu said if Iranians rise up, the timeline could shorten. The Iranian diaspora is celebrating. The IRGC still has guns, missiles, and proxy networks. March will answer whether this is a completion of June 2025 — or something else entirely.

We previously described two countdowns converging. Both expired on Saturday morning. The order was given. The supreme leader is dead. What follows is the harder question.

War, Security & Force Posture

Israel’s force posture shifted from “positioned for war” to executing the largest joint military operation in its history. February described preparations. Yesterday delivered 200 fighter jets, 1,200+ munitions in 24 hours, and a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.

Iran

Operation Roaring Lion. On February 28, approximately 200 Israeli Air Force jets struck more than 500 targets across western and central Iran in the largest combat sortie in IDF history. US warships launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. Army HIMARS batteries and Task Force Scorpion Strike drones — deployed in combat for the first time — joined the assault. The opening wave targeted Khamenei’s compound in Tehran’s Pasteur district with at least seven confirmed missile impacts and 30 bombs. Israeli intelligence had detected that Khamenei’s scheduled evening meeting with Larijani and Shamkhani had been moved to Saturday morning — and the strikes followed. Three simultaneous leadership meetings were identified. The decision to strike in daylight — against all Iranian expectations of a nighttime operation — was itself the deception.

The confirmed dead: Khamenei. Defense Council head Shamkhani. Defense Minister Nasirzadeh. IRGC Commander Pakpour. Intelligence Chief Asadi. Military Office head Shirazi. SPND chief Jabal Amelian. Chief of Staff Mousavi confirmed today. A senior Israeli security official told Fox News that 40 regime and security figures were killed in the opening wave. The cyber operation — reducing Iran’s internet to 4% of normal connectivity at the moment of maximum disruption — prevented IRGC regional commanders from coordinating, blocked internal regime communication during the succession crisis, and physically complicated organized response.

Defense Minister Katz declared air superiority achieved and ordered continuous strikes. The IDF dropped 1,200+ munitions in the first 24 hours. The CSIS assessed this operation differs drastically from June 2025’s limited nuclear strikes — the US-Israel coalition has moved beyond proliferation targets and is seeking to destroy the Iranian government entirely. Trump’s four stated objectives: eliminate nuclear capability, destroy missile arsenal, degrade proxy networks, annihilate the Iranian navy. The fifth — regime change — was stated politically but omitted from Waltz’s formal UNSC enumeration.

Iran’s retaliation. The IRGC launched ballistic missiles and drones against Israel, US installations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and Jordan, and Gulf Arab civilian infrastructure. One woman killed in Tel Aviv — siren system failed to provide standard warning before impact. Eight killed in Beit Shemesh Sunday, including a 10-year-old critically wounded. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar struck. US Fifth Fleet service center in Bahrain hit. Dubai International Airport — the world’s busiest international hub — sustained concourse damage, operations suspended. Debris from interceptions damaged the Burj Al Arab facade and ignited fires at Jebel Ali Port and Palm Jumeirah. UAE intercepted 132 missiles and 195 drones. Jordan downed two ballistic missiles. Over 1,400 regional flights cancelled. CENTCOM stated it suffered no casualties.

Iran is firing in sustained drips, not concentrated volleys. Approximately 2,500 ballistic missiles remain, with production facilities now under bombardment. The Alma Center had assessed pre-strike inventory at 1,000–1,200 with roughly 100 serviceable launchers — the IDF’s higher estimate of 2,500 may reflect newer production that escaped June 2025’s campaign. The attrition strategy is coherent: exhaust Israeli and US interceptor stocks, generate civilian casualties to force a ceasefire, buy time for the succession crisis to produce a functioning command structure. The strategy’s constraint is also its obituary: the leadership that would have coordinated a sophisticated multi-front offensive no longer exists.

The Minab school strike will dominate the international narrative. Iranian state media reported 108–148 deaths at a girls’ elementary school in Hormozgan province. The Washington Post noted no independent confirmation of casualty figures. Iran’s regime has a documented history of using civilian sites as military infrastructure and inflating casualty counts — and also a documented history of locating military assets near civilian populations. Neither the US nor Israel has explained the specific targeting. The information war is now fully engaged: Araghchi called it a war crime. The regime that built a nuclear program to annihilate Israel is now citing dead children. Expect this to dominate UNGA debate and European ministerial statements within days.

Succession. A Provisional Leadership Council has formed per Article 111 of the constitution: Ayatollah Alireza Arafi (Guardian Council member), President Pezeshkian (“reformist” which means hardliner-light-ish in Persian politics), and Chief Justice Ejei (hardliner). Security chief Larijani has posted publicly and appears to have survived — his warning against “secessionist groups” exploiting the crisis, and the UAE’s shift to remote schooling, suggest regional assumption that the next 72 hours remain acute. The IRGC is pushing to name a successor outside constitutional procedures, within hours, arguing it is not feasible to convene the 88-member Assembly of Experts under bombardment. Deputy IRGC chief Ahmad Vahidi is cited as a likely candidate. Mojtaba Khamenei — the late leader’s son — has IRGC backing but lacks clerical credentials and formal office.

The determining variable: whether the IRGC fractures or consolidates. A cohesive IRGC produces a harder, more security-dominated system draped in clerical legitimacy. A fractured IRGC — under bombardment, with its command decapitated, and a population that cheered in Tehran streets when state media confirmed Khamenei’s death — creates the opening Netanyahu and Trump are betting on. The FDD assessed before the strike that the regime was at its weakest point since 1979. Jacob Nagel wrote that total dismantlement was the only option. The strike delivered more than Nagel’s scenario contemplated. Whether it delivered enough depends on what Iranian security personnel decide in the next hours — defend the regime, defect, or wait.

Three scenario paths from here. First: the IRGC consolidates under a hardline successor, Iran’s attrition missile campaign continues for 5–7 days, and the operation produces a degraded but surviving regime that retains some capacity and unlimited grievance — a North Korea outcome. Probability: 35–40%. Second: the IRGC fragments under sustained bombardment and popular pressure, the protest movement (which produced the largest demonstrations since 1979 in January) reignites, and the regime enters terminal collapse within 30–60 days. Probability: 25–30%. Third: a negotiated cessation facilitated by the interim council, with the regime accepting severe constraints in exchange for survival — the least likely outcome but the one every European capital and the UN will pursue. Probability: 15–20%.

Gaza / Hamas

February confirmed Hamas will not disarm. March adds a different complication: the world’s attention has been violently redirected to Tehran.

The 60-day disarmament ultimatum framework remains the declared Israeli timeline. Smotrich’s indication that the formal ultimatum would arrive “in coming days” has been overtaken by events. The IDF is simultaneously executing the largest operation in its history against Iran and maintaining security operations in Gaza. Yahalom engineering units demolished five kilometers of tunnel routes in the Beit Hanoun area. IDF forces struck terrorists approaching Israeli personnel east of the Yellow Line. The physical dismantlement continues.

Hamas’s shadow government problem is now the live governance battle. Egypt’s intelligence chief, Hamas negotiator al-Hayya, and Board of Peace coordinator Mladenov met to review Israel’s Day After demands: full disarmament, tunnel maps covering 350 km, exclusion of Hamas from police authority, integration of anti-Hamas militia into Gaza police. Hamas has “agreed” to “hand over governance” while simultaneously moving its commanders into the governance structure. Qatar and Turkey are the enforcement mechanism. Neither has any incentive to enforce.

The operational window to contest Hamas’s structural embedding is closing while every senior decision-maker is focused on Iran. This is a strategic risk — simultaneous activation of both fronts — playing out in a form where the second front advances through bureaucratic infiltration rather than kinetic action.

The International Stabilization Force remains unserious. Indonesia’s 8,000 troops pledged with 1,000 by April. Countries that refused: Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE. The NCAG’s 5,000 Palestinian police — without explicit Hamas exclusion criteria — are one of the vehicles for Hamas’s reentry. Our judgment that Phase 2 was “faltering” was right but now we’d say generous. Phase 2 is on hold.

Northern Front / Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s restraint is the operation’s most important side-bet — and the one with the shortest clock.

Hezbollah condemned the strikes and called on the region to “confront this aggressive plan.” It, however, did not pledge to retaliate. This matches June 2025’s 12-Day War, when Qassem declined multiple Iranian requests to join. The CFR assessed that assumptions about Hezbollah activation no longer hold — the group is at its weakest point, Israel has continued degrading its infrastructure, and the Lebanese government sees the moment as an opportunity to reassert sovereignty. US Ambassador Issa told President Aoun that Israel will not escalate against Lebanon if it refrains from hostile actions.

The IDF struck Radwan Force compounds in the Bekaa Valley — eight strikes this past Thursday alone — and more than 10 strikes on launch positions and subterranean shafts in al-Qatrani and Wadi Barghuz just yesterday. These strikes targeted infrastructure Hezbollah rebuilt in direct violation of the ceasefire. The message: if you are thinking about joining, this is what we will hit first.

February’s assessment described IRGC officers in Lebanon personally managing strategic war plans and rebuilding missile capabilities. With Khamenei dead and the IRGC command chain severed, those officers face a principal-agent problem: the principal who authorized and funded their mission is dead. The interim council that replaces him may want to avoid further catastrophe. An IRGC that consolidates power and demands Hezbollah activation is a different variable than a Leadership Council focused on regime survival. Hezbollah is watching the succession crisis before deciding.

Hezbollah had told AFP before the strikes that an attack on Khamenei constituted a “red line.” Khamenei is dead. Hezbollah’s red line was crossed. Its response was a press statement, not missiles. The gap between declared red lines and actual behavior is the most reliable indicator of organizational weakness.

Judea & Samaria

The 2025 annual report from Rescuers Without Borders documented 5,051 attacks: 3,299 rock-throwing incidents, 458 Molotov cocktails, 655 laser blinding attempts, 286 explosive charges, 19 shootings. Twenty-four Israelis murdered, over 400 wounded.

PIJ is expanding with $60–70 million annually from Iran (ongoing funding is now in question, however) and has established cooperative networks with armed groups including Brigade 313 in Jenin. The thwarted Karmiel cell — four Israeli Arab citizens planning to shoot IDF soldiers, coordinating via a WhatsApp group with one minor supporting ISIS — illustrates the internal front risk.

Iran’s funding pipeline to PIJ and Judea & Samaria cells now faces a question: does the pipeline survive without the regime that built it? IRGC financial architecture is distributed and resilient. Funds already in motion do not stop when the sender dies. But the next tranche — the next $60–70 million — depends on whether the successor regime can execute international financial transfers under maximal sanctions pressure with its banking infrastructure degraded. The short-term risk increases: cells may accelerate operations fearing their funding window is closing. The medium-term trajectory depends on the succession outcome.

Israel’s Supreme Planning Council approved 1,338 housing units in Kedumim — doubling the community’s size — as part of a 3,000-home plan. Building continues. The international community’s capacity to object is temporarily consumed by Tehran.

Red Sea / Maritime

The Strait of Hormuz is now an active chokepoint crisis. Hapag-Lloyd — the world’s fifth-largest container carrier — suspended all Hormuz transit indefinitely. The oil tanker Sky Light was attacked by Iranian forces near the strait. If the suspension spreads to other carriers, roughly 20–21% of global seaborne oil trade faces disruption. This is the pressure mechanism that matters most to Washington’s economic calculus and to the Gulf states hosting US forces. Oil prices will be the first constraint on the operation’s duration that no amount of military superiority can override.

Global Proxies

A suicide drone struck the US consulate in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan — the Iran-aligned militia network executing pre-delegated authorization. An Israeli missile struck Kataib Hezbollah headquarters in Jurf al-Sakhr south of Baghdad, killing at least two. The Erbil hit is proof-of-concept for how the next 72 hours of proxy activity looks when IRGC central command cannot coordinate: regional nodes executing standing orders without leadership guidance.

The June 2025 sequencing — strikes on nuclear/military targets first, then repressive apparatus — got the order right but faltered on execution. The January 2026 protests proved that clear leadership and direct calls to the street work — millions answered Pahlavi’s call in January. Netanyahu calling on “Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Ahwazis, and Baloch” to take to the streets, is the test of whether operational conditions now support what January demonstrated politically. Pahlavi has urged Iranians to prepare for regime collapse and called on security forces to defect. The NCRI has announced a Provisional Government. The diaspora is celebrating globally. Whether the IRGC’s remaining ground forces — still deployed, still armed, still dangerous — decide to shoot or defect is the variable that determines everything.

International Arena

United States

The US has now fought alongside Israel in three distinct operations against Iran in nine months: Operation Midnight Hammer (June 2025, B-2 strikes on nuclear facilities), the broader June 2025 campaign, and now Operation Epic Fury. Trump’s eight-minute video declaration — released TruthSocial, not in a congressional address or media briefing — stated four military objectives and one political objective. The military: eliminate nuclear capability, destroy missile arsenal, degrade proxies, annihilate the navy. The political: “The hour of your freedom is at hand.”

F-22s from Ovda Airbase provided air superiority. Dual-carrier posture — Ford and Lincoln — provided Tomahawk volleys. Arab partners — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE — had suggested they would restrict US military use of their territory, forcing the F-22 deployment to Israel and requiring KC-46/KC-135 tanker convergence on Ben Gurion. Those same Arab partners are now absorbing Iranian missile strikes on their territory. The political posturing that complicated pre-strike planning has been overtaken by Iranian missiles hitting Dubai International Airport. Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE — Major Non-NATO Allies — may find that Iranian retaliation clarifies their positioning faster than any diplomatic note.

The US Embassy’s pop-up consular services at Efrat — the first in Judea and Samaria — proceeded as planned February 27. US-Israel alignment is now not merely at peak elevation. It is operationally fused in real-time combat.

Europe & Institutions

The UK blocked RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia for Iran strikes — citing international law liability. It then watched as Iranian missiles hit Dubai. Norway’s Foreign Minister said the strikes breach international law standards. Belgium urged that Iranians “must not pay the price for their government’s choices.” Ireland urged “restraint.” Canada affirmed Israel’s right to self-defense and US action to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons.

The European response divides into three categories. First: countries that will defend the operation legally and politically (very few — Czech Republic stands out, calling Iran’s program a danger to Europe). Second: countries that will oppose the operation but do nothing material (most of Western Europe). Third: countries that will use the operation to advance institutional constraints on Israel — lawfare escalation, arms suspension discussions, humanitarian crisis narratives. The Minab school strike will be the fulcrum for category three. Expect it in every ministerial statement, UNGA emergency session, and NGO press release in the coming days.

The UK Green Party’s March conference debates Motion A105 — “Zionism is Racism” — with leader Polanski indicating support. Four seats. Minimal direct impact. The normalization of eliminationist language in a mainstream Western party during a week when Israel eliminated the regime that promised Jewish annihilation is the damage.

Arab States

Saudi Arabia’s dual-track operation is now exposed. The Washington Post reported MBS privately pressed Trump to launch the attack, dispatched KBS to Washington in January, and personally assured Pezeshkian that Saudi soil and airspace would not be used. Riyadh called an emergency GCC meeting. Saudi Arabia condemned Iranian strikes on Gulf states as “brutal Iranian aggression.” The calculation — that a degraded Iran is safer than an intact one — is now being tested by missiles flying over Gulf neighbors.

The UAE shifted to remote schooling. Dubai’s airport is closed. Jebel Ali Port had fires. Abu Dhabi reported one fatality (then deleted the post). Iran’s retaliation has hit every Gulf state that hosts US forces. The IRGC’s pre-delegated authorization structure means these attacks may continue regardless of what the interim council decides. For the Gulf states, the abstract question of whether to facilitate US strikes has become the concrete experience of absorbing Iranian retaliation for doing so.

UN & Lawfare

Ambassador Danon and US Ambassador Waltz defended the strikes at the emergency UNSC session as lawful preemptive action. Guterres declared both the strikes and Iran’s retaliation violations of the UN Charter — the institutional reflex that treats aggression and self-defense as symmetrical infractions. Russia requested a special IAEA Board of Governors session. Iran’s ambassador called it war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The UNSC will produce no resolution. What it produces is record. The legal arguments are on tape. The Minab school narrative will be weaponized. The IAEA Board meeting — scheduled for March 2, which February’s assessment identified as a potential referral trigger — now faces a different question: does the board assess the remnants of Iran’s nuclear program after a decapitation strike, or does it become a venue for condemning the strikes themselves? Russia will push the latter. The US will block both.

Israel’s High Court issued a temporary injunction Friday blocking the March 1 NGO shutdown deadline — the 37 organizations including MSF and Oxfam that refused staff disclosure requirements. The government’s position — that organizations whose employees participated in October 7 should not hold operational licenses — is factually grounded. The court will decide how long it wants to take to say so. The injunction buys time. It does not resolve the underlying question.

Inside Israel

Coalition: United for the Duration

Israel’s political spectrum closed ranks within hours. Lapid — who had boycotted Netanyahu’s Knesset session for the Modi address — declared “we are all united on the operation.” Bennett posted “full support for the IDF, the Israeli government and the prime minister.” Gantz aligned. Golan gave “full backing” with one substantive caveat: the operation “must culminate in the removal of the Iranian threat in a manner that bolsters Israel’s security over the long term” through “precise, coherent and actionable war goals.” That caveat is the only thing worth listening to in the first 24 hours of political reaction.

Knesset Speaker Ohana suspended parliamentary activities. The FADC convenes Monday for a classified briefing and vote declaring a “special situation” on the home front. Hadash-Ta’al condemned the strikes as participation in “global American imperialism.” MK Cassif called it “a war of choice” with “no connection to the interests or security of any people.” Liberman demanded a treason charge. The argument that a Knesset member who actively opposes his country’s war against the regime that ordered October 7 has crossed from dissent to something else is not without legal content. The practical outcome will be noise.

The Haredi protest at Modiin Illit deserves specific attention. Activists erected a display labeled “Hostages Square” — empty yeshiva study stands in a traffic roundabout with black and yellow ribbons, equating draft evaders in military custody with Israeli hostages held in Gaza. The installation mirrors Hostages Square iconography in Tel Aviv. On the day the IDF executed the largest military operation in its history — with pilots who did not attend yeshiva — the statement embedded in that roundabout reads plainly: our draft exemption matters more than your security. The Haredi political leadership has either endorsed this framing or failed to repudiate it. Both are choices.

The draft implosion continues underneath the operational unity. Declared evaders: 16,880 as of February 15, up from 2,257 in July 2025. AG Baharav-Miara told the High Court the government has “not formulated a plan” for revoking economic benefits despite a court order. The IDF needs 12,000 recruits. The state is producing paper while 70,000 reservists are called up for Iran operations.

The budget passed first reading 62–55. The VAT revolt — eight Likud MKs joining the opposition, Smotrich signing a new order within hours defying the Knesset — is now suspended under wartime unity. These fissures do not disappear. They wait.

Home front failures are now lethal. The siren failure in Tel Aviv left residents less time than required to reach shelters. Eight dead in Beit Shemesh. Ra’am MK Alhawashla’s warning that 150,000 Bedouin citizens lack access to protected spaces has moved from political complaint to active liability. Home Front Command instructions to shelter are operationally meaningless for a population with no shelters to reach. The State Comptroller’s February finding of “total disorder” in evacuation planning — decade-old guidelines, Kiryat Shmona excluded from plans — is now not a retrospective criticism. It is a description of conditions under fire.

India Alignment

Modi’s Knesset address on February 25 — calling Israel “a protective wall against barbarism,” condemning October 7, and declaring “either the jihadist axis of evil will break us, or we will break it” — was the highest-profile public alignment by a non-Western democracy. India: 1.4 billion people, $20.5 billion in Israeli arms purchases over five years, $3.9 billion bilateral trade. India formally formalizing relations with Somaliland — with Israel accrediting Somaliland’s ambassador and a presidential visit to Jerusalem in late March — adds Horn of Africa strategic depth. Every European foreign minister citing Israeli isolation works with a map missing 1.4 billion people.

What to Watch Next Month

• Iran succession resolution (next 72 hours–30 days).
  Whether the IRGC accepts the interim council or imposes its own candidate — and whether the Assembly of Experts can convene under bombardment — determines regime trajectory. Watch IRGC-linked Telegram channels and Mojtaba Khamenei’s movements.

• Iranian protest reignition.
  January’s demonstrations were the largest since 1979. The IRGC is deploying to prevent a repeat. If security forces fracture or defect, the regime enters terminal crisis. Watch Kerman, Mashhad, Isfahan — cities with January protest history.

• Hezbollah activation decision (48–72 hours).
  Current IDF assessment: staying out. The red line (Khamenei’s death) was crossed. Hezbollah’s response was a press release. The question is whether IRGC reconstitution produces a demand to activate.

• Hormuz chokepoint escalation.
  If carrier suspensions spread beyond Hapag-Lloyd, oil markets will force the operation’s timeline. Watch Brent crude and Gulf shipping insurance rates.

• Hamas disarmament timeline under wartime diversion.
  The 60-day framework is on hold operationally. Hamas’s bureaucratic infiltration of NCAG continues while attention focuses on Tehran.

• Coalition durability through the operation and into Ramadan overlap.
  Flag rallies last days. When casualties mount and the operation extends, Golan’s caveat — defined, actionable war goals — becomes the opposition’s lever.

Diaspora Front

The Yale Youth Poll data from December quantified the structural threat: 18% of Americans aged 18–22 say Jews negatively impact the US. 15% under 30 say Israel should not exist. These numbers do not change because the supreme leader is dead. They will intensify as the Minab narrative reaches campus.

New polls in Maine and Florida show Gen Z voters gravitating toward candidates with alarming records on Jew-hate across party lines — a 73-point margin for Graham Platner among Maine Democrats under 35, a 23-point lead for Israel-bashing James Fishback among Florida Republicans 18–34. Consistency across parties rules out ideology as the explanatory variable. Algorithmic radicalization is the more durable answer.

The DOJ’s UCLA lawsuit — 81 pages, $584 million in suspended research funds — remains the sharpest federal enforcement against institutional Jew-hate. The Trump administration’s willingness to use financial leverage produces compliance faster than any campus protest. At a Skirball forum, five California gubernatorial candidates competed to present Jewish safety credentials — in the same week three antisemitism lawsuits were filed against California educational institutions. California has 1.2 million Jews and the governing coalition is legally exposed.

Washington DSC’s Metro DSA chapter issued a candidate questionnaire demanding applicants pledge to boycott Israel, refuse to meet with Zionists, and support “Palestinian liberation.” Ward 4 Councilmember Janeese Lewis George signed it and pledged to divest public funds from Israel. The NCRI’s Ron Halber called it “a revolting anti-Jewish loyalty oath.” This is not fringe. It is a party chapter in the nation’s capital producing ideological purity tests that exclude Jews.

Illinois state Sen. Robert Peters — running for Congress on an anti-AIPAC platform — was found to have privately filed a pro-Israel policy paper with AIPAC after meeting with its Midwest director. Publicly: AIPAC supporters commit “unspeakable horrors.” Privately: Israel is “a vital partner.” The hypocrisy is useful ammunition.

Two actionable items for communities:

1. The Minab narrative is coming to your campus, your newsroom, and your city council within 48 hours
   Iranian state media casualty figures — 108–148 dead at a girls’ school — are unverified and come from a regime that embeds military assets in civilian infrastructure. Demand independent verification before accepting regime-sourced numbers. The same government claiming civilian casualties built a nuclear program to annihilate Israel and massacred its own protesters in January. Context, not credulity.

2. Document and report DSA-style loyalty oaths, BDS questionnaires, and institutional purity tests that exclude Jews from public participation.
   The DC questionnaire is a template that will spread. Report to DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, local law enforcement, and anti-discrimination bodies. Do not engage these as legitimate political discourse. They are identity-targeted exclusion dressed in progressive language.

Trigger Scenarios

IRGC consolidation produces a hardline successor and sustained attrition campaign
If the IRGC’s remaining command structure coalesces around a security-first successor — Vahidi, Mojtaba Khamenei, or a consensus hardliner — within 72 hours, the regime survives in degraded form. The attrition missile campaign continues for 5–10 days, exhausting interceptor stocks and generating civilian casualties in Israel and the Gulf. The Hormuz chokepoint becomes the regime’s primary leverage tool. International pressure for a ceasefire builds from every capital whose airline traffic through Dubai is grounded. Israel and the US face the choice of extending operations against a surviving regime or accepting a degraded Iran that retains institutional capacity and unlimited motivation for revenge. Probability: 35–40% within 14 days.

Iranian protest movement reignites under operational cover
January’s demonstrations — the largest since 1979, with millions answering Pahlavi’s January 8–9 call — occurred before the IRGC’s senior leadership was decapitated. If the population in Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Kerman sees security forces hesitate or fragment, the street calculus changes. Trump’s call for Iranians to “take over their governance” and Netanyahu’s call for ethnic minorities to rise up provide external backing. When security personnel see their own lives in jeopardy, they are more likely to defect than suppress. That condition now exists. Probability of sustained protest activity within 14 days: 40–50%. Probability of protest producing regime collapse within 60 days: 20–25%.

Hezbollah activation under IRGC pressure
Hezbollah declared Khamenei’s death a red line. It responded with a press release. If a hardline IRGC successor demands activation — and IRGC officers embedded in Hezbollah attempt to execute the order — the northern front ignites. Israel has already struck Radwan Force compounds, missile arrays, and tunnel infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The IDF’s warning to Beirut — strikes on civilian infrastructure including the airport — is calibrated to deter. Hezbollah’s unrecovered losses from 2024–2025 and its organizational awareness that its patron is in terminal crisis argue against activation. IRGC command direction argues for it. Probability in current phase: 20–30%. Probability if IRGC consolidates: 45–55%.

Hormuz closure triggers oil market crisis and operational ceiling
If Hapag-Lloyd’s suspension spreads to Maersk, MSC, and CMA-CGM, the 20–21% of global seaborne oil flowing through Hormuz faces disruption. Brent crude spikes. Gulf state tolerance for hosting US operations — already strained by Iranian missile strikes on Dubai, Doha, and Manama — erodes. Washington faces a choice between operational tempo and economic consequences. The IRGC understands this: the Strait is their strongest remaining leverage. Probability of sustained Hormuz disruption exceeding 14 days: 30–40%.

Hamas exploits operational diversion to embed in Day After governance
While Israel’s senior leadership manages the Iran campaign, Hamas’s bureaucratic infiltration of NCAG ministries, police recruitment, and institutional architecture continues. Al-Qassam commanders in civilian roles, district governors with military links, copies of all government files secured before handover. The 60-day disarmament ultimatum clock is running against an organization that is embedding faster than the governance alternative can exclude it. Probability Hamas achieves irreversible institutional presence in NCAG within 60 days: 50–60%.

Coalition fracture after operational phase concludes
When the operation concludes — whether in one week or three — the underlying coalition fractures resume: Haredi draft implosion (16,880 evaders, no enforcement plan, High Court challenge pending), VAT revolt, Kotel bill, budget conditionality. Golan’s caveat — defined war goals — becomes the opposition’s platform. If the operation produces ambiguous results (degraded but surviving regime), Netanyahu faces both criticism for insufficient outcome and resumption of internal crises simultaneously. Probability of elections within 120 days post-operation: 20–25%.

What Hardened

• Israeli-American operational fusion.
  F-22s from Israeli tarmac. Tomahawks from US carriers. HIMARS in first combat deployment. Unconfirmed, as yet, reports of B-2s. Joint intelligence that tracked three simultaneous leadership meetings and adjusted the strike window when the schedule changed. This is integration.

• Iran’s existential threat to Israel is degraded to a degree without precedent.
  Khamenei dead. IRGC command decapitated. Nuclear infrastructure — already damaged in June 2025 — now faces a succession crisis layered on degraded capacity. Missile production under active bombardment. The nearly half-a-century long project to annihilate Israel has lost its architect and its institutional command.

• Hezbollah’s demonstrated unwillingness to fight for its patron.
  For the second time in nine months, Hezbollah declined to join an Iran conflict. The red line of Khamenei’s death was crossed. The response was a statement. Hezbollah is an organization that knows it is not ready and acts accordingly.

• Saudi strategic commitment.
  MBS privately pressed Trump to attack. His brother delivered the message to Washington in January. Riyadh calculated that a degraded Iran is safer than an intact one.

• India’s civilizational alignment with Israel.
  Modi in the Knesset, $20.5 billion in arms purchases. The largest democracy on earth standing publicly with Israel during the week Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader. Structural, procurement-embedded, and engineered to survive elections.

What Slipped

• Israeli home front protection.
  Siren failure in Tel Aviv. Eight dead in Beit Shemesh. 150,000 Bedouin without shelters. The Comptroller’s “total disorder” finding in February is now a description of active conditions, rather than merely a historical critique.

• Hamas governance infiltration window.
  While every senior Israeli decision-maker focuses on Iran, Hamas is embedding al-Qassam commanders in the NCAG governance structure. The 60-day ultimatum is on hold operationally. The bureaucratic infiltration is not.

• International legitimacy of the operation — compressed by civilian casualty narratives.
  The Minab school claim — 108–148 dead, unverified, from a regime that embeds military assets near civilians — will dominate the information war. The regime that built a nuclear program to annihilate Israel is now martyring its own dead children for diplomatic leverage. Expect this at UNGA, in European capitals, and on campus.

• Ceasefire framework in Lebanon — now irrelevant.
  The IDF is striking Hezbollah positions daily. Hezbollah rebuilds daily. The ceasefire is a name for the interval between strikes. UNIFIL and the LAF are bystanders.

• Democratic Party trajectory on Israel.
  The DNC autopsy — Israel policy was a “net-negative” for Harris — combined with the Yale data and the Ceasefire Compliance Act’s 25 co-sponsors creates structural incentive to distance from Israel. A war with Iran accelerates the dynamic, not the other way around.

What’s Next

• Iran succession outcome (72 hours–30 days).
  The IRGC pushes for an extralegal appointment. The interim council projects constitutional legitimacy. Whether the Assembly of Experts can convene under bombardment, and whether the result is a hardliner, a pragmatist, or institutional fragmentation, is the most consequential political question in the region.

• Iranian street response.
  January’s protests proved the population can mobilize. The IRGC’s remaining ground forces are the constraint on the redux. If they hesitate, the regime dies from within. If they hold, the regime survives in some form. Watch for defection reports from provincial IRGC and Basij units.

• Operation duration and defined end state.
  Cabinet was briefed: approximately one week. Trump suggested regime change. Netanyahu said if Iranians rise up, the timeline shortens. The gap between a one-week air campaign and regime change from within is the strategic incoherence the opposition will eventually exploit.

• Gulf economic consequences.
  Dubai airport closed. Hormuz transits suspended. 1,400+ regional flights cancelled. Oil market response will be the first constraint on operational duration that military planners cannot control.

• Minab narrative cycle.
  The school strike — verified or not — will dominate international discourse. Iran’s information war apparatus, despite 4% internet connectivity domestically, has functional international media operations. Expect UNGA emergency session, European ministerial condemnations, and campus mobilization pegged to this single event.

• Hamas disarmament timeline — operational or abandoned.
  The 60-day framework cannot proceed during an active Iran campaign. Either it resumes post-operation or it quietly dies. If it dies, reconquest planning reactivates. The question is when, not whether.

• Prediction markets as intelligence vulnerability.
  An Israeli reservist and civilian indicted for using classified advance knowledge of June 2025 strikes to bet on Polymarket, collecting $150K+. Anonymous traders turned $34K into $400K+ betting on Maduro’s removal hours before the US raid. Prediction markets now telegraph classified operational timing to adversaries. This vulnerability becomes more acute with each operation.

• Pakistan-Afghanistan escalation.
  Pakistan’s air strikes on Kabul and Kandahar, 274 claimed Taliban killed — occurred during the same week as Roaring Lion. The world’s attention is on Tehran. South Asia’s nuclear-armed states are moving toward open war.

The supreme leader who promised Israel’s destruction by 2040 ran out of time on Saturday morning. Israeli intelligence tracked three leadership meetings in Tehran, adjusted the strike window, and sent 200 jets to deliver the answer. The regime is headless. The missiles are still flying. The IRGC still has guns and the organizational memory of decades of “revolutionary” infrastructure. Whether this operation produces the regime’s collapse, its consolidation, or a prolonged attrition conflict across a half dozen countries depends on decisions being made in the next 72 hours. The only certainty is that the man who ordered “Death to Israel” is dead.

— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief

Tip? Share it securely via Signal (@Uri.30) or ProtonMail (Uri.Zehavi@Proton.me).

Israel’s posture is stretched across multiple fronts with little give — as a tense pause gives way to imminent confrontation. Gaza’s ceasefire is fraying under Hamas’s refusal to disarm, the northern front is heating up by Israeli design, and high-stakes U.S.–Iran diplomacy teeters between deal and war. Israeli leadership is navigating this tactical pause as exactly that: a short breather before the next storm, not a path to resolution. The coming weeks will likely force decisions that determine whether Israel breaks its enemies’ remaining strength — or faces a multi-front conflagration on adversaries’ terms.

Jerusalem has preemptively resumed strikes in Lebanon to curtail Hezbollah’s rearmament, even as it prepares to finish off Hamas in Gaza if the group balks (it will) at the disarmament demanded by President Trump’s peace deal. Washington is in sync with Trump’s team quietly coordinating “quick, decisive” strike options on Iran that avoid a long war.

Meanwhile, hostile narratives and lawfare from the UN, NGOs and adversary states are crescendoing—and are seen in Israel as just another front to be managed. Domestically, the wartime unity has given way to political fissures—chiefly the Haredi draft crisis and judicial overreach—which risk government stability if mishandled.

War, Security & Force Posture

Gaza: Ceasefire on Borrowed Time

Phase 1 of the Gaza war, the rescue of hostages and destruction of Hamas’ military infrastructure, effectively concluded with the recovery of the last Israeli hostage’s remains. Every hostage, living and fallen, is now accounted for, removing the chief rationale for restraint. President Trump hailed this as a “great moment” and immediately insisted Hamas must now follow through on its promise to disarm. In theory, an International Stabilization Force (ISF) under Trump’s new Board of Peace is waiting in the wings to assume governance of Gaza once Hamas lays down arms.

In reality, Hamas shows no sign of voluntary disarmament. Israeli skepticism about Hamas’ intentions has been fully validated. The group’s intransigence about giving up its arsenal or power is blatant. Indeed, Israeli intelligence and regional analysts widely doubt that “Hamas will peacefully disarm,” correctly expecting the group to obstruct and stall. Over the past month Hamas has been rebuilding defensive positions and command tunnels under the cover of the ceasefire, preparing for a fight to hold onto its weapons. Israeli officials have made clear that Gaza’s long-term stabilization, will simply not proceed unless Hamas is neutralized and fully disarmed.

Israel is treating the current truce as purely tactical. The IDF continues limited operations “east of the Yellow Line” inside Gaza, hunting remaining Hamas tunnels and arms depots. Just last night, a ceasefire breach underscored the fragility of the calm. Gazan gunmen opened fire on Israeli forces along the perimeter, seriously wounding an IDF reserve officer. Israel’s response was swift and pointed — tank and air units struck targets in northern Gaza, killing at least 9 militants in involved in the blatant violation by Hamas. The IDF stands ready to resume large-scale operations in Gaza at a moment’s notice, should Hamas’s violations escalate.

Strategically, Israel is already shaping Gaza’s future on its terms. Bibi has flatly ruled out any Turkish or Qatari forces in Gaza (an idea floated as part of an international force) and refuses to countenance a Palestinian Authority takeover there. He stated unequivocally that no sovereign Palestinian state will be established in Gaza, and that Israel will maintain security control “from the Jordan River to the sea,” including Gaza. In other words, Israel intends to retain the ultimate security grip on Gaza even if a new governance mechanism (like the ISF and technocratic administration) is introduced. This stance has caused friction with the international committee managing Gaza’s transition. The PM’s Office protested when a proposed Gaza management body (NCAG) appeared with a Palestinian Authority emblem, calling it a bait-and-switch and vowing “the Palestinian Authority will not be a partner in the management of Gaza.” Israel will accept outside help in administering Gaza, but on the condition that it does not empower its adversaries or dilute Israel’s security supremacy.

The current ceasefire is highly conditional and likely short-lived. Israeli officials privately assess that Hamas is simply buying time and regrouping, not earnestly transitioning to a post-conflict posture. We judge that absent a miraculous capitulation by Hamas, the IDF will re-engage in Gaza in the near term — perhaps with a limited objective of crippling any resurgent militant capabilities, or even a comprehensive “Phase B” operation to forcibly disarm Hamas. The trigger could be another serious ceasefire violation or the first sign that Hamas is reneging on the disarmament deal (which appears certain). Israel has already drawn “red lines” inside Gaza. It reopened the Rafah crossing in a limited way as a goodwill step, but is poised to push its security perimeter forward again if needed. Diplomatically, the U.S. is trying to entice Hamas into compliance (with talk of amnesty and Gulf reconstruction funds), yet all players know Hamas’s Islamist ideology makes voluntary disarmament a non starter. The likely scenario is a collapse of the demilitarization talks and a unilateral Israeli enforcement of Gaza’s demilitarization with establishment of no-go security zones, frequent raids on suspected arms caches, and a delay of Gaza’s rebuilding indefinitely. Israeli leaders are fully prepared to weather the outcry that will ensue. A Gaza “peace” that leaves Hamas armed is no peace at all.

The Northern Front: Preempting Hezbollah

About a year ago, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire halted major fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon on the condition that Hezbollah withdraw to the north of the Litani River and disarm its southern units by end of 2025. Those conditions have not been met. Israeli intelligence observed Hezbollah fighters sneaking back south almost immediately, rebuilding rocket launch sites under the nose (and often with the complicity) of the Lebanese Army. Arms depots that should have been dismantled have instead been enlarged, shifted, and concealed. In short, Hezbollah has been trying to wait out Israeli and international attention. Jerusalem’s response has been to signal, in word and deed, that it will not tolerate a Hezbollah re-armament cycle. As our previous assessment warned, Israel’s posture up north is now decisively one of preemption.

In late January, Israel initiated a new campaign of “calibrated” strikes in Lebanon to blunt Hezbollah’s renewal of its missile threat. A few days ago, as ceasefire violations by Hezbollah mounted, the IDF launched widescale airstrikes on Hezbollah infrastructure across southern Lebanon. Notably, the Israeli Air Force employed bunker-buster munitions in these strikes — a clear message that no target, not even buried command bunkers, is safe. In one pinpoint strike, the IDF eliminated Muhammad al-Husseini, Hezbollah’s chief artillery commander in the Tyre sector, who had been instrumental in rocket attacks during the war and was now orchestrating rearmament efforts.

Hezbollah’s response so far has been measured but hostile. The group has fired sporadic anti-tank missiles and rockets into northern Israel over the past month (the “repeated violations” that sparked Israel’s strikes ), but notably has avoided its full barrage capability. Hezbollah issued defiant rhetoric, warning that if Iran is attacked by the U.S., “Hezbollah will not stay out of the confrontation.” They frame the current standoff as “defending our land and existence” against Western designs for “Greater Israel.” This narrative — casting Hezbollah as a resistance defending Lebanon from aggression — is typical propaganda as pressure. Jerusalem is no longer cowed by Hezbollah’s threats, as evidenced by the IDF striking Hezbollah operatives at will.

Interestingly, elements of the Lebanese state are voicing unprecedented dissent against Hezbollah’s adventurism. There is genuine alarm in Beirut at the prospect of another devastating conflict with Israel. However, it is doubtful that Lebanese leaders can actually restrain Hezbollah when Tehran gives it orders. Their statements are better read as positioning: if war comes, Beirut wants to say “we warned against it” and perhaps seek to avoid full Israeli punishment by distancing the official state from Hezbollah’s actions. Israel, for its part, has signaled through U.S. intermediaries that it holds the Lebanese state responsible for Hezbollah’s disarmament — effectively putting the onus on Beirut to avert war, or else face Israel’s response.

All signals still point to a likely escalation in the relatively near future. Israel’s “short fuse” with Hezbollah is practically burned down to the end. Our January assessment noted a “limited war in Lebanon” aimed at decisively stripping Hezbollah’s rocket threat was imminent. We are now seeing the opening phase of that with an aerial campaign to thin out Hezbollah’s arsenal and command structure. The big question is whether it stops there or expands into a full offensive. The IDF has alerted units and even reportedly rehearsed a push to the Litani River (enforcing that buffer zone by physically clearing it). If Hezbollah retaliates in any significant way — say a mass volley of missiles — Israel will almost certainly launch a broad incursion into south Lebanon. The IDF Northern Command is already clearing vegetation and obstacles on the border fence (using herbicides and engineering units) to remove cover that could be used by Hezbollah infiltrators. In plain terms, the IDF is preparing the battlefield.

One wildcard is the Iran factor: Israel is coordinating closely with Washington on the possibility of confronting Iran directly (more on that below), and there is a scenario where an Israeli strike on Hezbollah could be synchronized with a U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. If that occurs, it is possible Israel might aim not just to push Hezbollah north, but to decisively eliminate Hezbollah as a fighting force while Iran is on its back foot. The next month constitutes the prime window for such action, before Hezbollah can further entrench or Iran finds ways around U.S. pressure. Outsiders who assumed Israel was “too tied up in Gaza” to tackle Hezbollah are already proven wrong. Barring an unlikely capitulation by Hezbollah (suddenly pulling back north of the Litani and dismantling arsenals, which would cut against its very identity), the northern front is poised to ignite into active conflict.

Iran and its Proxies: Edge of a Precipice

The Iran-Israel-U.S. triangle is at perhaps its most delicate point in years. On one hand, President Trump’s team is giving diplomacy a final go: a high-level meeting with Iran’s negotiators is scheduled for this Friday, involving U.S. envoys (Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner). The aim is to assemble a package that “prevents war,” likely trading limited Iranian nuclear concessions for sanctions relief and a freeze on hostilities. Tehran, under immense pressure, is at least pretending to play along with negotiations. But the signals beneath the surface are far less optimistic. U.S. officials admit they are preparing for failure.

Trump is weighing a short, sharp attack on Iran if diplomacy stalls. He has “not ruled out military strikes against Iran” even as talks proceed. The U.S. has massively boosted its regional posture: the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its strike group have entered the Middle East theater, missile defense batteries (Patriot, THAAD) have been deployed across the Gulf, and allied bases are being fortified or partially evacuated of non-essential personnel. Notably, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states — initially very opposed to a U.S. strike for fear of Iranian retaliation — have shifted their tone in recent days. Riyadh privately warned Iran that it “would not stay silent if U.S. bases on its territory are attacked” in retaliation, even as it publicly urges diplomacy. This suggests the Gulf states now believe Trump may be intent on striking, and they don’t want to be seen siding with Iran when the die is cast.

From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s “axis of resistance” is under strain but still dangerous. The two-year campaign of Israeli and U.S. operations has inflicted serious blows on Iran’s capabilities — from strikes on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure to direct clashes with its proxies in Syria, Iraq, and at sea. Iran tried unprecedented direct attacks, and paid a steep price in retaliation. Israeli intelligence reports Iran’s leadership is shaken: anti-regime protests have erupted across Iran (spanning over 30 provinces in January), with thousands of protesters killed in clashes with security forces. Khamenei’s inner circle fears that a U.S. military blow could threaten the regime’s survival. Iran is cornered between trying to avoid giving the U.S. a pretext to strike while also not wanting to appear weak.

Thus far, Tehran’s play has been to use proxies and deniable escalation to raise the costs for Israel and the U.S. without crossing a clear red line. For instance, Yemen’s Houthis (an Iranian proxy) have repeatedly threatened new attacks in the Red Sea, especially as U.S. naval power crowds Iran’s environs. The Houthis are relocating missile and drone stockpiles and holding intensive military meetings — essentially preparing for the possibility of war with Israel or the U.S. In Iraq and Syria, Iranian-backed militias have made bellicose statements, but have so far held back from attacking Israel directly.

Tehran has signaled that if Trump hits Iran, it will activate Hezbollah to strike Israel on Iran’s behalf — effectively opening a second front to divert and deter Israel and the U.S. Israeli military intelligence fully anticipates this.

President Trump has reportedly given Iran only a short window to show concrete willingness to halt its nuclear advances and regional aggression. If Iran does not bend, the probability of U.S. military action will spike. Our assessment is that Trump is loath to enter a long war as midterm elections loom, but he also will not tolerate an Iran on the verge of nuclear weapons. Thus, a one-off or short campaign of strikes (“shock and awe” style) is on the table. Israel, for its part, is quietly urging a firm line. If Washington hesitates, Israel might even act unilaterally in some form, though the preference is a joint effort. Multiple Iranian proxies stand ready to erupt in concert if the order comes. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, perhaps even militias in Syria, will unleash attacks if Iran is hit. Israel will then face multi-front fire again — but it has prepared for exactly that scenario with nationwide air defense drills, reserve call-ups, and pre-positioning of forces. A recent Home Front Command drill simulated massive Iranian missile salvos on Israeli cities (a mass-casualty rescue exercise at Zikim base). Israel knows what might be coming and is bracing itself. There is also a chance — though not a large one — that Iran will hunker down and play for time, making just enough concessions or delaying moves to avoid giving the U.S. justification to attack. In that case, we might see a tense stand-off without a strike through the spring, with Iran refraining from major proxy attacks and the U.S./Israel refraining from bombing, all while diplomatic talks drag on. But given all actors’ current postures, the scales are tipping toward confrontation. Iran’s supreme leader will not capitulate fully. Trump is currently unlikely to accept a half-measure deal—though could probably be persuaded if the optics are right. For Israel, every week that passes with Iran’s nuclear program inching forward is simply borrowing time.

Judea & Samaria: Low-Intensity Flashpoints

While the world’s attention fixes on Gaza and the northern border, a dangerous security vacuum is widening in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian Authority’s grip on the territory has become extraordinarily weak. Over the last month, Israeli forces have had to intensify raids in Nablus, Jenin, Jericho and other hotbeds to suppress growing militant activity, as the PA’s security presence withers. Militias and terror cells, many inspired or directed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, operate with increasing impunity in northern Samaria. Even PA officials privately admit that whatever legitimacy the PA had has slipped. This raises the risk of chaos — essentially, areas of Judea and Samaria descending into Gaza-like insurgency — if Israel doesn’t prop the PA up or directly fill the void. So far, Israel has chosen the latter course: IDF raids occur almost nightly, capturing weapons, breaking up terror plots, and trying to prevent a new intifada from igniting.

Israel’s policy in Judea & Samaria right now is essentially one of containment and crisis management. There is a recognition in the security echelon that a total PA collapse would be a nightmare — Israel would be forced into administration of Palestinian enclaves at a time when its military bandwidth is already stretched. Thus, quietly, Israel is trying to bolster the PA where it can (e.g. transferring tax revenues, allowing foreign aid to reach PA security forces) even as it bypasses the PA to eliminate imminent threats. It’s a delicate balancing act: too much Israeli heavy-handedness further undermines the PA, too little and the terrorists gain freer rein. The IDF’s presence in Judea and Samaria is at its highest in years, with some units on permanent reinforcement since the Gaza war began.

Without significant change, Judea and Samaria will continue simmering at a low boil, with periodic spikes of violence. A major trigger could be a Hamas call to arms in the Judea and Samaria if Gaza reignites. Israeli intelligence is keenly focused on Hamas operatives in the West Bank who might orchestrate mass casualty attacks or coordinate uprisings in tandem with Gaza fighting. So far, Israeli preventive raids (and the barrier) have kept a lid on organized terror emanating from the region, but lone-wolf attacks remain a serious concern. We assess that Israel will continue essentially governing security in the PA areas for the foreseeable future, treating the PA as a hollow framework. Overall, this front is a pressure cooker: not boiling over yet, but under pressure and largely overshadowed by bigger wars — until it isn’t. It is a precarious status quo, predicated on Israel’s ability to be everywhere at once – Gaza, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria.

Red Sea Arena & Other Proxies

Beyond Israel’s immediate borders, the ripple effects of the conflict reach into the Red Sea and even further afield. The Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen have become a de facto front line. In January, as noted, the Houthis explicitly threatened to launch a new attack in the Red Sea — timed conspicuously as the U.S. moved an aircraft carrier into the region. This threat is not idle: the Houthis possess advanced anti-ship missiles and long-range drones (supplied by Iran) that can reach Eilat or target shipping lanes. The U.S. Navy and Israeli Navy have both increased patrols and readiness in the Red Sea corridor. In mid-January, a U.S. missile destroyer, the USS Delbert D. Black, docked in Eilat for joint drills, underscoring U.S.-Israel naval cooperation in this arena. Shortly after, that destroyer and Israeli vessels conducted live-fire exercises in the Red Sea, signaling to the Houthis (and Iran) that this route is under close watch .

Intelligence indicates the Houthis are actively preparing for the contingency of a regional war: they have relocated missile and drone stockpiles into hardened sites and held high-level meetings on war plans. Israeli officials have privately warned the Houthis (through backchannels, likely Oman or Saudi mediators) that any attack on Israel or its shipping will result in Israeli retaliation on Yemeni soil. The Houthis, for their part, likely calculate that if the U.S. strikes Iran, all bets are off and they would gain prestige by attacking Israel. It’s a powder keg awaiting a spark from the Persian Gulf side.

Elsewhere, Syria’s evolving situation bears mention. The regime change in Damascus opened a question of whether Syria might distance from Iran. So far, the signals are mixed. The new Syrian leadership has engaged in talks with the U.S. and even Israel via intermediaries, suggesting interest in stabilizing and possibly reclaiming the south free of Iranian proxies. President Trump praised Syria’s “hard work” towards a constructive relationship and even eased some sanctions as a carrot. However, Israel remains deeply wary — Netanyahu demanded a demilitarized buffer zone in Syria stretching from Damascus to the Golan, free of Iranian militias and heavy weapons. He delivered an ultimatum to Damascus to that effect, despite U.S. caution to go slow. Israeli strikes in Syria have actually continued at a low tempo, hitting suspected IRGC arms convoys and militia bases (though receiving less media attention lately). A complicating factor is Turkey’s presence: Turkey has deployed a new radar system at Damascus International Airport (as part of its growing influence in Syria) which can potentially limit Israeli Air Force operations by tracking Israeli jets at long range. This is part of Turkey’s broader maneuvering — Ankara is both cozying up to Iran’s narrative (publicly criticizing Israel) and trying to insert itself as a regional powerbroker (like floating a defense pact with Pakistan and Saudi, though Riyadh appears cool on that). Israel responded by banning entry to several Turkish officials (including President Erdogan’s son) over anti-Israel activities. The Turkey-Israel rift, while not an active military front, is a diplomatic front to watch. Turkey could, for instance, threaten to close the Bosphorus to U.S./NATO warships in event of a war or increase support to Hamas. So far, it’s mostly posturing and nuisance (like the radar deployment).

Overall, Israel’s force posture is stretched region-wide. It has reinforced the Red Sea naval presence, kept air assets on alert for Syria and Iraq contingencies, and maintained high readiness at home. The IDF calls this “a period of improving readiness for war” across multiple arenas. Notably, Israel’s maritime defenses have hardened significantly — there have been no successful hits on Israeli naval or commercial assets despite Iran’s attempts. But Israel remains vigilant against asymmetric blows, like mines or explosive boats that could still target ships. In sum, the periphery fronts (Yemen, Syria, Iraq) are subordinate theaters that will ignite only if the core Iran conflict does. Israel’s working assumption is that any big war will not stay limited — proxies everywhere will activate. Thus it is postured to engage from the Red Sea to the Golan to the Gulf, if required.

International Arena

United States: Lockstep with Israel, Eyes on Iran

The U.S.–Israel strategic alignment is stronger than it has been in decades. Despite occasional tactical disagreements, the Trump administration has essentially embraced Israel’s assessment of the threat landscape. Washington continues to provide robust diplomatic cover and military aid — U.S. flights delivering precision munitions and air defense interceptors arrive almost weekly, keeping Israel well-stocked for any new flare-up. The White House has vetoed hostile UN Security Council resolutions targeting Israel’s Gaza operation and has bluntly backed Israel’s right to eliminate Hamas and defend itself on the northern front. Of course, President Trump’s calculus is not purely altruistic. With the 2026 midterm elections on the horizon, Trump wants to project strength and results. He sees supporting Israel’s tough stance as politically advantageous, so long as it succeeds quickly. There is an undercurrent in Washington that if by spring Hamas is still armed in Gaza or Hezbollah is firing rockets again, even this friendly White House will grow frustrated. But for now, U.S. patience is holding. Trump has even tied the success of Gaza stabilization to the broader anti-Iran effort, telling Netanyahu that showing “every hostage returned” and Hamas disarmed helps keep American public support high for confronting Iran. In short, the U.S. is all-in on Israel’s core objectives: neutralize Hamas, deter or defeat Hezbollah, and stop Iran from getting the bomb.

On Iran, as discussed, the U.S. is playing both good cop (negotiations) and bad cop (military buildup). Israeli officials are fully looped in. Netanyahu met this week in Jerusalem with U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff for three hours to hash out the Iran approach. Israel presented a firm list for any deal: removal of all enriched uranium from Iran, a halt to enrichment, tight limits on ballistic missiles, and an end to Iran’s proxy support. These are demands that Iran will not accept in full, which suggests Israel would quietly prefer no deal over a weak deal. There is little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem right now — if anything, Israel’s stance is stiffening U.S. resolve. As a senior U.S. official noted, the planned summit Friday is about preventing war, but “the Trump administration hopes Iran will come ready to make needed compromises” — implying that if not, the military option is ready. Trump has asked for a plan that “would not risk a long-term war,” and sources indicate this could mean overwhelming air and cyber strikes over 48-72 hours to cripple Iran’s nuclear sites and command structure.

Politically, Trump is wary of getting embroiled in a new Middle East quagmire, but he also prides himself on being a dealmaker — if he strikes Iran, he’ll want to call it a “one-and-done” action that made the world safer. Israeli influence on these deliberations is significant. IDF Chief Zamir’s temporarily secret Washington trip was likely to provide the latest intel on Iran’s thresholds and perhaps to coordinate rules of engagement. There have even been reports (unconfirmed) that Israeli fighter jets might participate in a U.S.-led strike or handle certain proxy targets while U.S. forces hit Iran proper.

Europe: From Sympathy to Scrutiny

In EU capitals and the U.K., the predominant narrative is one of Palestinian suffering and Israeli “war crimes.” As noted in January’s assessment, Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in those arenas. European media is still saturated with images of Gazan devastation. This has translated into political pressure: the EU Parliament passed a (non-binding) resolution condemning Israel’s “disproportionate force,” several European governments have paused arms exports to Israel, and calls are growing for international sanctions if Israel resumes large-scale military action in Gaza without a political solution. France and Germany, traditionally somewhat understanding of Israel’s security needs, are openly split. France’s President has suggested an international trusteeship for Gaza (implicitly questioning Israel’s judgment), while Germany’s Chancellor voices support for Israel but faces a restless coalition with dissenting voices.

At the United Nations, European states have mostly aligned with the humanitarian push. The UN General Assembly in late December approved a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to urgently weigh in on whether Israel’s actions in Gaza constitute genocide. The UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on the 2025 Gaza War released a damning report accusing Israel of war crimes and “genocidal intent” — language that rightly infuriated Israel. That COI report explicitly recommended the ICC issue arrest warrants for top Israeli officials. Sure enough, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has pursued charges. ICC judges recently affirmed the court’s jurisdiction to investigate alleged crimes in the Palestinian territories, and notably the ICC has issued arrest warrants for PM Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant on suspicion of war crimes in Gaza. (These warrants were initially under seal but became public after Israel tried to challenge them in court and lost.) Israel, of course, rejects the ICC’s authority (Israel is not an ICC member) and has no intention of handing over officials. In much of the world, Israel’s leaders are painted as wanted war criminals. This is lawfare at its peak — the Palestinians and their NGO allies leveraging international bodies to criminalize Israel’s self-defense.

European NGOs and activist groups are also in high gear. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and a coterie of local NGOs have filed briefs to the ICC, compiled dossiers on Israeli strikes, and lobbied European governments to punish Israel. These groups are blatantly biased—indeed, Jerusalem has long accused some of them of being fronts for pro-Palestinian activism. The assessment here is that NGO narratives are being used as pressure tools. Israeli officials privately admit lawfare is an impediment — it forces them to devote effort to defending against probes and can chill some operational decisions — but they also are determined not to let “preaching from Geneva or New York” override security imperatives.

A few European countries are quietly sympathetic to Israel’s broader fight against Iran. For instance, reports suggest the U.K. and France have provided intelligence support regarding Hezbollah and have beefed up naval forces in the Med to deter any Iranian moves there. But their publics are unsupportive of Israel’s Gaza actions, so politically they keep distance. Also, Eastern European states (Poland, Hungary, etc.) remain pro-Israel in EU forums, partly out of alignment with Trump and partly due to their own security outlooks. This has prevented a unified EU sanctions move. Instead, the pressure is coming via the UN and ICC, where individual European states can support inquiries without having to act unilaterally.

Internationally, Israel feels isolated in the court of public opinion but not in the corridors of power. The Global South and Muslim countries are uniformly blasting Israel—many have called Gaza a genocide, and some (like South Africa and Malaysia) cut diplomatic ties. Israel calculates that strategic relationships (U.S., certain Arab partners, India, etc.) matter more. As long as those hold, UN votes and NGO reports, while troublesome, are “noise” to be managed. The Israeli strategy here is twofold: diplomatically engage behind the scenes to temper the language of resolutions (e.g. getting Europe to focus on humanitarian issues rather than explicit war crimes accusations), and win on the ground so convincingly that the facts become moot.

A UN Security Council session is scheduled in mid-February where members will push for a resolution demanding Israel refrain from a Lebanon escalation and calling for protection of Lebanese civilians — likely vetoed by the U.S. Additionally, there is talk of a special UN tribunal to investigate Hamas’s Oct 7 crimes and Israel’s response in tandem (championed by some Europeans)—Israel opposes this as equating terrorists with a sovereign state. Bottom line: Israel is navigating an increasingly hostile international arena where its narrative has largely been lost. It will rely on the U.S. (and a few allies) to block concrete penalties, and it will portray the UN and ICC as politicized.

Arab States: Quiet Partners, Public Critics

The Arab state landscape is a study in doublespeak. In public forums (UN, Arab League), virtually all Arab and Muslim-majority states rail against Israel’s actions. Gulf states, which were courting Israel not long ago, have taken a few steps back: the Saudi-Israel normalization talks that were so prominent in 2024 are effectively on ice until the Gaza situation resolves. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) must balance his tacit alignment with the U.S./Israel against public opinion, which is extremely pro-Palestinian. Thus, Saudi Arabia officially condemns Israeli “excesses” in Gaza, yet behind closed doors it is coordinating with the U.S. and even sharing messages with Israel.

Other Gulf states are similar: the UAE has been outspoken in aid to Gaza and criticism of Israeli bombing, but it hasn’t cut ties or canceled its defense cooperation with Israel (rumor is some Israeli defense tech personnel are quietly still active in the UAE). Qatar remains the odd player — funding and hosting Hamas leaders (who are now under even greater scrutiny) and trying to position itself as a mediator. Israel, however, is rightly distrustful of Qatari involvement (seeing Qatar as too aligned with Hamas—given that they are one of their largest patrons). Still, pragmatic contacts continue; Mossad officials reportedly communicate via Qatari intermediaries to Hamas even now regarding the disarmament talks. We expect Qatar to continue straddling the fence: ensuring it’s part of any deal to keep relevance (and its Al Jazeera narrative machine running), but not alienating the U.S. by obstructing outright.

Egypt is a critical piece: Cairo facilitated much of the humanitarian corridors and has worked with Israel and the U.S. on the idea of an international force for Gaza. President Sisi privately prefers that Gaza not be dumped back on Egypt (he doesn’t want to govern it) but also doesn’t want Hamas strong. Egypt has beefed up security in Sinai to prevent jihadist spillover. Tellingly, Egypt and Israel remain tightly coordinated on security; Egypt even let Israeli drones overfly parts of Sinai recently to monitor for ISIS or Hamas movements. Publicly, Sisi criticizes Israel to placate the street, but behind the scenes he’s urging Hamas to play ball with Trump’s deal to avoid the Strip becoming an ISIS-like zone.

Jordan is extremely nervous. The king fears a new intifada or that Gaza chaos could destabilize Judea and Samaria and spill into Jordan. Jordan’s rhetoric towards Israel has been harsh (Amman temporarily recalled its ambassador in protest during the height of the Gaza bombing), but security ties quietly persist. The Israel-Jordan-U.S. coordination to keep Judea and Samaria calm and ensure the Temple Mount status quo remains intact is ongoing. Israel recently thanked Jordan (quietly) for helping pass messages to the PA to discourage violence. The concern is if the PA falls apart, Jordan might face an influx of refugees or militants — a nightmare for the Hashemites. So Jordan supports any effort to bolster the PA and is wary of Israel’s moves in Judea and Samaria.

In the broader Arab/Muslim world: Iran’s allies Syria (the new regime) and Iraq have to walk carefully. Iraq’s government officially condemned Israel loudly, but also does not want to be a battleground again; it’s trying to rein in Shi’ite militias, with mixed success. Syria’s new leadership, as mentioned, is exploring distancing from Iran enough to get sanctions relief and reconstruction money — which implicitly means not supporting Hezbollah offensively. How far that goes is unclear, but Turkey and Russia are guarantors of the new setup, and they have their own reasons to avoid an Israel-Hezbollah war (Russia doesn’t want Israel striking Syria extensively; Turkey doesn’t want millions more refugees).

Notably, some Arab countries have engaged with Trump’s “Board of Peace.” Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan and even Indonesia announced they are joining what Trump calls a “Peace Council” to support Gaza’s rebuilding and regional stability. This was a diplomatic win for Trump — it shows broad Muslim participation, at least nominally. But these countries joined primarily to restrain Trump and Israel. Indeed, leaks suggest Saudi, Turkey, and Qatar banded together to urge Trump to hold off on striking Iran, fearing a regional inferno. They briefly succeeded in late January when a rumored U.S. strike was postponed after Gulf pressure. Who knew a jet could be such a powerful investment? However, as Iran dragged its feet, that united front frayed. More recently, Saudi’s defense minister privately told U.S. counterparts that if Trump doesn’t follow through on his threats, it would embolden Iran — a stark change. Riyadh now bets that a short war might actually remove the Iranian sword dangling over the region. It’s a remarkable turn: the same Saudi that warned against a strike now may be implicitly greenlighting one, or at least preparing to ride out the consequences.

Inside Israel: Coalition Strains and Home Front Resilience

Political Cohesion vs. “Haredi Draft” Crisis

Inside Israel, the once all-consuming external threat is beginning to share the stage with resurging internal divisions. During the height of the war emergency, Israel’s famously fractious politics were relatively muted — a unity mindset prevailed as the country mobilized. But as the immediate crisis ebbed, fault lines within the governing coalition have re-emerged. The most acute dispute is the “Haredi draft crisis.” Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties, which are key members of the coalition, are insisting on legislating a renewed exemption for their community from military service. This has been a long-simmering issue: Israel’s Supreme Court struck down the previous blanket exemption law. The Haredi parties want a law enshrining continuing mass exemptions (effectively formalizing that Haredim can avoid the draft), whereas much of the Israeli public (to say nothing of the IDF leadership) demand greater Haredi participation in sharing the national burden.

As the war pressure lifted slightly, the coalition’s unity “slipped” on this issue. Tensions came to a head recently when the Knesset’s legal adviser warned that if the state budget isn’t passed by March (the deadline) due to infighting, the government will automatically collapse and new elections will be called. This essentially tied the budget vote to resolving the draft law dispute. Netanyahu has been scrambling to keep his coalition together: he implored allies that “the last thing Israel needs in the current situation is elections.” Behind closed doors he has been mediating between the two ultra-Orthodox factions (Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael, which together form the United Torah Judaism party) and his secular nationalist partners. One Haredi faction threatened that if the draft law isn’t lenient enough, they would break off and run separately — a move that would weaken the coalition’s stability. Netanyahu managed to get the state budget’s first reading passed 62–55 in the Knesset, with Haredi party support, by promising them progress on the draft law. The budget is a massive ₪660 billion ($180B) package reflecting wartime expenditures and reconstruction needs. It modestly increases welfare subsidies (some aimed at Haredi communities) and defense spending remains high, though Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich touted that they are starting to rein it in.

Crucially, alongside the budget, Netanyahu’s team is advancing a Conscription Arrangements Law to address the Haredi draft. The reported plan is to lower the draft age for Haredim (so older students can get exemptions more easily), set very low annual quotas for ultra-Orthodox enlistment, and essentially codify a broad exemption while encouraging voluntary service. Even within the coalition, some military-minded members are uneasy, as it could hurt IDF manpower long-term. The IDF itself, particularly the Chief of Staff Zamir, has been vocal that expanding Haredi enlistment is an “operational necessity” for the future of the military. In a speech to Haredi soldiers at Nevatim Airbase, Zamir praised those who serve and said integrating more ultra-Orthodox while respecting their lifestyle is critical to ensure readiness for future challenges. The IDF just this week took a historic step by issuing a new order formalizing special service tracks for Haredim — dubbed “Magen” (Shield) and others — that allow gender-segregated units, religious accommodations, etc., to make enlistment more palatable. They even appointed a special advisor on Haredi affairs to the Chief of Staff to oversee these programs. In essence, the military is preparing to absorb more ultra-Orthodox if the law eventually forces it, or even if it doesn’t (to attract volunteers).

The Haredi draft issue has already led to unrest. Extremist ultra-Orthodox rioters in Jerusalem and elsewhere have blocked roads and clashed with police, demanding full exemption. In one incident, a protester was accidentally run over by a car trying to get through a Haredi roadblock, seriously injuring him. This incident nearly spiraled — hundreds of Haredim gathered, and there were fears of wider violence.

Netanyahu’s challenge is to avoid a coalition breakup while also avoiding a rupture with the broader public (who might protest en masse if a too-sweeping exemption law passes). He likely will push through a compromise law in the coming weeks — one that in practice defers most Haredi service for years (by raising exemption age, etc.) — and hope the outrage can be managed until security allows more focus on it. The opposition is already signaling that once the external threat subsides, they will mobilize the public against what they term a “draft-dodging deal.” Expect large protests in Tel Aviv and elsewhere over the draft law.

Trigger Table: Key Scenarios

Israel faces a range of potential trigger events in the coming weeks. Below is a “trigger table” outlining plausible scenarios, their triggers, and likely responses – along with an assessment of probability and approximate time window:

• Hamas Reneges & Gaza Escalation (Likely in next 1–4 weeks)
  If Hamas continues to resist all disarmament efforts or commits a major ceasefire breach (e.g. a deadly attack on IDF troops or renewed rocket fire on Israeli cities), Israel will resume full-scale military operations in Gaza. This would include heavy airstrikes on remaining Hamas strongholds and possibly a ground operation into Gaza City/Khan Younis to forcibly strip Hamas of weaponry.
  
  Probability: High. Hamas’ behavior so far suggests non-compliance, and small clashes are already occurring.

• Northern War Expands (Moderate-High in next 2–6 weeks)
  Triggered either by a major Hezbollah provocation (e.g. a large rocket barrage causing Israeli civilian deaths, or a successful anti-tank ambush on IDF forces) or by Israel’s own schedule of preemption reaching a crescendo. In either case, Israel would launch a broad offensive in Lebanon. Expect massive airstrikes across southern Lebanon (and possibly Beirut Dahiya if high-level targets) and a ground invasion up to the Litani River to clear Hezbollah positions.
  
  Probability: Moderate-High. The current path of events points this way, if Hezbollah retaliates for ongoing strikes. Israel is already striking Hezbollah targets; a misstep or intentional escalation by Hezbollah could remove any remaining restraints. Israel is clearly inclined to “finish the job” sooner rather than later.

• Iran Direct Strike or U.S. Strike on Iran (Moderate in 4–8 weeks)
  Scenario 1: Iran, feeling cornered, attempts a preemptive strike on Israel or U.S. assets — perhaps a volley of ballistic missiles at Israeli cities or U.S. bases (via proxies or directly). This would trigger immediate retaliation: Israel (and likely the U.S.) would unleash force against Iran’s nuclear and military facilities.
  
  Scenario 2: Diplomatic talks collapse and President Trump orders a “quick, decisive” strike on Iran preemptively.
  
  In either scenario, expect multi-front proxy attacks in response — Hezbollah raining rockets, Iraqi militias firing at U.S. bases, Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping. Israel would go into full emergency mode, executing war plans for a two-front (north and Iran) conflict. It might include Israel striking Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets in Syria/Iraq to stem the tide.
  
  Probability: Moderate. U.S.-Iran negotiations are at a knife’s edge; we give maybe a 50% chance of a U.S. strike order by late Feb if Iran doesn’t budge. Iran launching first is a lower probability (they usually avoid being seen as the aggressor against U.S./Israel directly), but not impossible if they think war is inevitable.

• Judea & Samaria Meltdown (Moderate-low in next 8–12 weeks)
  If the PA loses all its remaining grip (President Abbas is weak and rumors of his health failing swirl), militant factions could launch a coordinated uprising. Also, Hamas might try to ignite Judea and Samaria if Gaza is under full assault, calling for mass attacks.
  Probability: Moderate to low. The PA’s erosion is real, but Israel is mitigating day by day. This is more a creeping crisis than a sudden trigger, unless an extraordinary spark occurs.

• Coalition Breakdown & Early Elections (Low-Moderate, by late March)
  If the budget and conscription lawaren’t passed by the end of March, Knesset dissolves automatically. Trigger would be hardline Haredi parties refusing to budge or a key partner bolting.
  
  Probability: Currently low. Most in the coalition know elections now would be very unpopular. However, if security stabilizes by March, some might risk it to avoid conceding on draft law. We think Netanyahu will find a compromise to avoid this scenario.

• Major Diaspora Terror Attack (Moderate-High, ongoing window)
  We must note this non-Israel trigger: A mass-casualty antisemitic terror attack abroad (like the Sydney massacre) could influence Israel’s strategy. For example, if Hezbollah or Iran’s agents perpetrated a deadly attack on an Israeli embassy or a Jewish center in the United States or Europe, Israel might retaliate directly against Iranian interests even absent a direct conflict trigger. Or, conversely, such an event could strengthen international resolve against Iran/Hezbollah. Probability: Moderate. The threat is high as per intel, though security is also high. We’re in a window of elevated risk globally.

Israeli decision-makers are actively gaming these scenarios. The period from now through late March is the critical window in which either conflicts will escalate and possibly climax — or, if by April things are still in stalemate, international pressure and internal fatigue will mount to force some freeze. Israel is thus operating with a sense of “now or never” to resolve the Gaza and Hezbollah threats.

What’s Next?

What Hardened (Solidified Trends and Resolve):

• Jerusalem’s Resolve to Finish Off Hamas & Hezbollah – Hardened: Far from war-weariness softening Israel’s stance, the determination to neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah once and for all has only hardened. The gruesome experiences of the past two years — October 7, the rocket barrages, the hostage crisis — have steeled Israeli society and leadership to accept no half-measures. Neither international hand-wringing nor two-year fatigue has altered the conviction that security is achieved only by decisive force. Outsiders expecting Israeli restraint will be proven wrong; Israel is prepared to act unilaterally and boldly to remove existential threats.

• U.S.–Israel Strategic Sync – Hardened: The strategic alignment between Washington and Jerusalem is at a peak. The Trump administration’s backing of Israel is unequivocal and actively operational — from diplomatic cover to expedited weapons deliveries and joint contingency planning. U.S. warnings to Iran’s proxies on Israel’s behalf, shared intelligence, and close coordination on Iran illustrate this unprecedented sync. In effect, the U.S. and Israel are moving as one phalanx against Tehran’s axis. This unity has encouraged Israel to press forward (knowing the U.S. “has its back”) and also stiffened America’s resolve (U.S. officials openly echo Israel’s red-lines now).

• Diaspora Jewish Vigilance – Hardened: The shock of global antisemitic attacks has awakened Jewish communities worldwide into a state of heightened vigilance and solidarity. What was once complacency in relatively “safe” diaspora havens has hardened into alert vigilance. After incidents like the Sydney massacre, Jewish communities are more mobilized, security-conscious, and outspoken than ever. Volunteer security patrols, inter-denominational cooperation, and assertive advocacy have replaced prior quiet.

• Global Jihadist Zeal Against Israel/Jews – Hardened: On the flip side, the commitment of Islamist extremists to target Israel and Jews has also solidified. Hezbollah’s ideology and Iran’s resolve to confront Israel have not been cowed by Israeli strikes. If anything, they are doubling down on rhetoric of “resistance” being existential. Likewise, Hamas’s refusal to entertain any political diminishment or true ceasefire has become ever more obvious — their ideology of jihad against Israel remains intact despite military blows. This hardened hatred means Israel cannot bank on deterrence alone. These actors won’t voluntarily quit, reinforcing Israel’s view that they must be decisively neutralized.

What Slipped (Deteriorated or Lost Ground):

• International Sympathy for Israel – Slipped Away: Any meagre reservoir of goodwill and sympathy Israel briefly enjoyed has all but evaporated in Europe and the UN. Focus globally has shifted almost entirely to Palestinian suffering and legal accusations against Israel. Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in many forums; its diplomatic maneuvering room has narrowed. European publics and media are largely hostile or at least unsympathetic, complicating Israeli diplomacy and PR. Israel will proceed anyway, but the lack of sympathetic voices could translate into challenges down the road (like slower weapons resupply from some European suppliers, or increased legal harassment).

• Palestinian Authority Control & Relevance – Slipped Further: The Palestinian Authority’s already tenuous control in parts of Judea and Samaria has further eroded to near-irrelevance. Militants in northern Samaria openly defy the PA, and Israel has had to fill the security vacuum directly . Whatever shreds of legitimacy the PA had among Palestinians have largely slipped away — most Palestinians view it as impotent or colluding with Israel. This raises the risk that when Abbas exits the scene (he’s in his late 80s and in failing health), chaos and/or a Hamas foothold will ensue. Israel in effect is propping the PA up to avoid total anarchy, but this is an unsustainable long-term strategy.

What’s Next (Emerging Pressures & Scenarios):

• Controlled Israeli Offensive in Lebanon – Imminent: All indicators point to Israel executing a major offensive against Hezbollah in the very near term. Already airstrikes have expanded, and evacuation orders in south Lebanon have begun as precursors. We assess that Israel will escalate to broad air and ground operations unless by some miracle Hezbollah blinks first (highly unlikely). The timing is likely sooner rather than later — Israel prefers to strike before Hezbollah can further rearm or an Iran deal alters the equation. Expect the Litani Line to be enforced. Israel may issue an ultimatum for civilians to leave certain zones, then hit Hezbollah’s infrastructure hard, possibly followed by limited incursions to push fighters north of Litani.

• Phase 2 Gaza Gambit – Faltering and Unilateral Plan B: The much-touted transition to Phase 2 in Gaza (international force deployment, technocratic governance) is on the verge of collapsing. Israel is prepared for that outcome: expect Israel to unilaterally enforce security in Gaza — establishing no-go buffer zones, conducting targeted raids at will, controlling borders — and delay Gaza’s reconstruction indefinitely until its terms (Hamas disarmed) are met. In effect, Israel’s message to the world: “No disarmament, no rebuilding.” That scenario seems likely as Hamas is digging in. So what’s next is likely a long-term Israeli security presence around and even inside Gaza and a prolonged standoff where Gazans receive humanitarian aid but no full rehabilitation. This is not the outcome diplomats hoped for, but it’s where things are heading given Hamas’s stance.

• Iran’s Dilemma Point – Decision in Coming Weeks: Iran faces a fateful choice: whether to actively “open its front” against Israel/US or lie low. Indicators to watch: any resumption of proxy attacks on U.S. bases or Israeli territory (e.g. militia rocket attacks, Houthi strikes), or provocative nuclear steps (like enrichment jumps). If Iran tests Israel’s red lines (e.g. approaching weapons-grade uranium or orchestrating a mass proxy assault), the next move could be Israeli (or joint U.S.-Israeli) strikes on Iranian soil. Conversely, Iran might decide now is the time to hunker down — to absorb the blows to Hezbollah and not retaliate, effectively saving its powder for later. A quiet period from Tehran (no major proxy flare-ups) likely means Iran is trying to ride out Trump’s term or waiting for a better strategic moment. We anticipate clarity on this by mid-March: either Iran engages (directly or via proxies) — triggering open conflict — or it takes a tactical backseat while cursing loudly. This is a key “what’s next” that will determine if the region explodes into a wider war or steps back from the brink.

Israel’s immediate next moves are geared toward regaining strategic initiative on its terms — hitting Hezbollah preemptively, holding Gaza at gunpoint until conditions are met, and coordinating with the U.S. to corner Iran. Decision-makers should watch the above triggers and indicators closely. The timeline to either solidify Israeli gains or slide into wider war is very tight.

Strategic Forecast and Verdict

Israel stands at a strategic inflection point as February 2026 unfolds. After two years of continuous conflict and upheaval, the nation’s overall posture is compressed but unbroken. Our assessment is that Israel is poised to aggressively shape the outcome in its favor, leveraging its current advantages in resolve, U.S. backing, and military readiness.

In practical terms, expect Israel’s strategy to deliver a “compressed finish.” Swiftly wrap up the unfinished business in Lebanon by incapacitating Hezbollah’s rocket threat. Holding Gaza in a vice until Hamas either capitulates or is removed. The timing is driven by a recognition that windows close — Trump’s political timeline, global patience, and Israel’s own public unity all have expiry dates. Therefore, Israel will likely act “sooner rather than later” on its northern front and press the Iran issue to a head, rather than allow protracted limbo. By early spring, we foresee either a significantly changed landscape — Hamas effectively disarmed or marginalized, Hezbollah knocked back for a generation, Iran deterred by force or deal — or, failing that, a multi-front war burning itself out by force of Israeli arms.

On the domestic front, the Haredi draft crisis in particular will be a crucible for the Netanyahu government. A compromise will be cobbled together to avert immediate government collapse, but it will leave lingering resentments and likely fuel large protests. A national healing and reckoning process looms on the horizon—Israelis will demand accountability for the early failures (Oct 7) and debate the country’s direction after the guns fall silent.

Israel is entering the final act of this multi-front conflict cycle. The posture is brittle only in the sense that it’s under strain, but it’s far from breaking. Indeed it is on the offensive psychologically. The coming 30–90 days will likely bring resolution to several open fronts. Outsiders should brace for bold moves from Jerusalem that may appear “shocking” but in reality have been telegraphed for months.

For decision-makers and serious observers, they must be ready to recalibrate views. By April, the “facts on the ground” could be markedly different (e.g., a demilitarized Gaza overseen by an interim international board, a southern Lebanon cleared of rockets). Strategic surprises are likely only to those not heeding Israel’s clear signals. Barring unforeseen cataclysms, Israel will likely emerge from this crucible having profoundly altered the region’s terror landscape in its favor.

— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief

Tip? Share it securely via Signal (@Uri.30) or ProtonMail (Uri.Zehavi@Proton.me).

Shalom, my friend.

Israel enters 2026 in a tense holding pattern across multiple fronts.

A U.S.-brokered Gaza ceasefire has halted full-scale combat, but Hamas is dragging its feet on disarmament and demobilization. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s partial pullback has not translated into true disarmament, prompting Israel to initiate calibrated strikes and preparations for a wider campaign. Iran’s regional influence operations remain active but under heavy pressure, as Israeli and U.S. actions have blunted Tehran’s proxies from Gaza to the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, Judea and Samaria simmer with intermittent violence under a complicit Palestinian Authority.

Internationally, Washington’s alignment with Jerusalem is solidifying, even as European support drifts amid human-rights scrutiny.

Domestically, Israel’s wartime unity is giving way to familiar political fissures over conscription and judicial matters.

The strategic direction for the coming weeks is clear: Israel is poised to press its advantages and not allow time to work in its enemies’ favor. Outsiders expecting Israel to relent under pressure are misreading reality. Jerusalem is soberly resolute—securing its nation by decisively neutralizing threats, while managing the economic and societal strains of protracted conflict.

Trigger Watch

Expect flash developments if any of the following occur:

• Hezbollah Breaks [Accepted] Ceasefire Limits: e.g. major rocket barrage or anti-tank strike causing high Israeli casualties.

• Northern War Expands: IDF launches full-scale air and ground offensive in Lebanon to decisively degrade Hezbollah. U.S. backs Israel while warning others (Syria, Iran’s militias) to stay out.

• Hamas Reneges on Demilitarization: Continues to refuse to disarm and commits new terror attack during ceasefire.

• Gaza Campaign Resumes: Israel freezes reconstruction and retains a military presence in Gaza “yellow line” zones. Targeted operations eliminate holdout militants and tunnels, potentially re-escalating to prevent Hamas resurgence.

• Iranian Escalation or Nuclear Progress: Iran or proxy directly strikes Israel (missile attack) or Tehran is caught enriching uranium.

• Direct Confrontation: Israel (with U.S. nod) strikes Iranian assets — from nuclear sites to IRGC bases. Gulf allies quietly support action. Expect region-wide alerts for proxy retaliation (Iraq, Syria, Yemen).

• Palestinian Authority Collapse: PA ceases security coordination or widespread uprisings occur.

• Unilateral Security Control: Israel moves to contain chaos, re-entering flashpoints like Jenin and Nablus in force. Emergency measures to prevent terror havens, while hardliners push for accelerated sovereignty claims in Judea & Samaria.

The Gazan Front

Israel’s Gaza strategy has shifted from all-out military pressure to a fraught diplomatic holding pattern. Under Phase 1 of the U.S.-led peace framework, Hamas released all living Israeli hostages and ostensibly ceded governing authority in Gaza to a technocratic committee. In return, Israel pulled back most ground forces to designated “yellow line” zones inside Gaza and agreed to a ceasefire, enabling a surge of humanitarian aid.

However, Hamas is clearly gaming the interim. The terror group refuses to actually disarm — proposing to freeze or hide weapons rather than surrender them — and retains active fighters. Israeli patrols still face lethal ambushes from Hamas terrorists. For example, a few weeks ago, Hamas militants emerged from a Rafah tunnel and wounded five IDF soldiers with an RPG. Such incidents underscore Hamas’s bad faith. Even as its political leaders talk about moving on to the next phase, armed cadres continue “post-ceasefire” resistance.

Israel is treating the current calm as tactical and conditional. The government has made clear that Phase 2 — the long-term stabilization of Gaza — will not proceed unless Hamas is fully neutralized and they have returned the remains of the last hostage. President Trump signaled the same, warning that Hamas must disarm for the peace deal to advance.

Diplomats may be busy assembling the international “Board of Peace” and Stabilization Force to take over Gaza’s governance, but on the ground Israel is not loosening its grip. Engineering units are demolishing remaining Hamas tunnel networks and arms caches across Gaza, with explosions echoing daily. Israeli troops continue to hold a strategic belt inside Gaza — the yellow line — effectively bisecting the strip. This posture ensures that half of Gaza remains under IDF overwatch, preventing Hamas from moving freely closer to the Israeli population.

Reconstruction of Gaza is on hold. Debris removal in Rafah and other devastated zones has barely begun, hampered by both security concerns and political objections over funding. Israel’s finance minister flatly refused to have Israeli taxpayers bankroll Gaza’s rebuilding, and no major Gulf aid will materialize as long as Hamas retains any arsenal.

This impasse has a strategic upside for Jerusalem. It denies Hamas the ability to claim any recovery as a win, while putting pressure on Gaza’s population (and the international community) to force Hamas’s hand. Hamas, true to form, is spinning the lack of reconstruction as an Israeli failure to uphold the truce — a convenient, if patently incorrect, excuse to delay its own demobilization. But that narrative is wearing thin. Global donors and Arab states are aligning with the logic that Gaza can’t be rebuilt until the gunmen are gone. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have signaled they won’t invest in Gaza’s future on Hamas’s terms, a stance that bolsters Israel’s position.

The newly “formed” International Stabilization Force (ISF) fails to actually materialize and it won’t be able to robustly enforce disarmament, so Israel will simply do it unilaterally — maintaining freedom of action to strike any rearmament efforts and prolonging its military presence as needed. Hamas is not going anywhere unless compelled to do so by force. Any outside optimism that Hamas can be gently coaxed into laying down arms is misplaced. Gaza will remain a powder keg under watch, rather than a reconstruction project, until Israel is convinced that Hamas’s war-making ability is definitively eliminated.

Northern Front

The northern front is tilting toward a renewed confrontation as Israel loses patience with Hezbollah’s noncompliance with agreements.

A year ago, intense conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon forced a U.S.-brokered ceasefire that required Hezbollah to pull its forces north of the Litani River and dismantle its militarized zone along Israel’s border. For a time, that truce held. Israeli residents evacuated during the 2023 fighting were able to return home under a cautious calm. But Hezbollah has not disarmed south of the Litani. Arms depots and rocket infrastructure were supposed to be removed by the end of 2025, yet Israeli intelligence observes that Hezbollah’s operatives are rebuilding networks under the nose of the (and in some cases, overtly complicit) Lebanese Army. Hezbollah’s strategy is transparent: buy time, feign cooperation, rearm in the shadows. Jerusalem has rightly determined that this charade has run its course.

Israel has began shifting from deterrence to active prevention up north. The IDF has launched a series of pinpoint airstrikes in southern and eastern Lebanon, hitting Hezbollah arms storehouses and Hamas units that Iran transplanted into Lebanon. Jerusalem is effectively telling Beirut and the UN: We see what Hezbollah is doing, and we will not sit idle.

The diplomatic facade in Lebanon is also crumbling in the face of reality. Lebanon’s government — now led by Western-leaning figures (President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam) — publicly acknowledges that Hezbollah’s weapons are a problem. Salam has bluntly said “Hezbollah’s weapons did not protect Lebanon” and demanded the group hand over its arsenal to the state. He even invited U.S. and French forces to help inspect and clear out remaining Hezbollah arms depots in the south. This is unprecedented rhetoric from Lebanese leaders, likely driven by fear that Israel will otherwise do the job by force. Indeed, Israel has conveyed stark warnings through U.S. intermediaries: if Hezbollah is not actually disarmed, Israel will escalate on its own terms.

Complicating the northern picture is Syria’s evolving role. Syria, traditionally Hezbollah’s logistics rear and Iran’s ally, has seen upheaval. President Bashar al-Assad was ousted some months ago, replaced by (the terrorist) Ahmed al-Sharaa (now wearing a suit) in a Russia-Turkey brokered transition. The new Syrian leadership has shown openness to dialogue with Israel — a remarkable shift praised by Washington — but one wonders how (not at all) trustworthy they are as a potential peace partner.

President Trump lauded Syria’s “hard work” toward a constructive relationship and even eased sanctions as a reward. Yet Israel remains deeply wary.

Netanyahu demanded Syria agree to a demilitarized buffer zone stretching from Damascus to the Golan, essentially insisting that Iranian militias and heavy weapons stay far from Israeli territory. He delivered an ultimatum to that effect, overriding U.S. counsel to “take it easy” in Syria. Israel will not allow Iran or its proxies to regroup in Syria even if Assad’s departure offers a diplomatic opening. Additionally, there are no shortage of jihadist groups (including ISIS remnants) which might exploit any Syrian power vacuum.

Israel’s posture on the northern front is now decisively one of pre-emption. We assess that unless Hezbollah immediately yields on disarmament south of the Litani — an unlikely deescalation — Israel will intensify its campaign into a broader operation.

The IDF’s recent evacuation warnings in Lebanon hint at tactics used in Gaza: reduce civilian risk, then hit targets with overwhelming force. A full ground incursion into Lebanon is on the table if that’s what it takes to push Hezbollah beyond rocket range. Notably, U.S. support for Israel here is firm. Washington has publicly and privately warned Iran’s Iraqi Shi’ite militias not to intervene, under threat of Israeli strikes in Iraq and elsewhere.

Outsiders who assume Israel is “too tied up in Gaza” to tackle Hezbollah will be proven wrong. Jerusalem is determined to finish the job that was only half-done in 2024. The coming weeks will see a final diplomatic flurry, but Israel’s fuse is short.

Expect a limited war in Lebanon aimed at once and for all stripping Hezbollah of its strategic rocket threat. The northern front will thus shift from uneasy truce back to active conflict, unless by some miracle Hezbollah blinks first — an outcome contrary to its very identity.

Iran and Regional Proxies

Iran enters 2026 having absorbed significant blows to its prestige and assets, yet it remains a central orchestrator of threats to Israel. Over the past two years, Iran directly confronted Israel in unprecedented ways and paid a steep price.

Israeli strikes (often with U.S. assistance or cover) hit deep into Iran’s military infrastructure, including its nuclear program and ballistic missile sites.

Tehran’s attempts at retaliation, such as a brazen drone strike on a U.S. base in Qatar and attacks on Gulf shipping, invited punishing responses that severely degraded Iran’s forward capabilities.

Israeli intelligence suggests Iran is already rebuilding its missile program at a quick pace. Notably, Iran recently moved air defense batteries to its northwest, near Azerbaijan, hinting at fears of an Israeli approach from that direction. The implication is clear. Iran suspects Israel might strike again, possibly from Azeri soil or airspace (and that suspicion is likely correct).

In the proxy arena, Iran’s “axis of resistance” is under strain. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran’s crown jewel proxy, is being squeezed as detailed above. Hamas in Gaza has been knocked off, more or less, of its governing perch and is at the mercy of ceasefire monitors —an outcome Iran surely detests, given the IRGC helped arm and train Hamas for years. Iran tried to exploit the hostage diplomacy during the Gaza ceasefire. Tehran conditioned its help freeing Thai hostages on Thailand pulling its migrant workers from Israel (a bid to hurt Israel’s economy). This gambit only underscored Iran’s opportunism and its willingness to use others’ citizens as pawns. Meanwhile in Iraq and Syria, Iran’s militia allies have faced repeated Israeli and American strikes whenever they mobilized to threaten Israel. The U.S. message to Baghdad was unequivocal: keep Iran-backed militias out of the Israel-Hezbollah fight, or Israel will hit them on Iraqi soil. So far, this deterrent has held. Iraqi Shi’ite militias have blustered but not opened a serious western front.

Yet Iran is far from yielding. Iranian officials likely believe that U.S. political focus will shift (with thanks in no small part to their cyber operations and chaos-sowing elsewhere) and Israeli stamina will wane, giving Iran an opening to regain lost ground later.

Israeli and Western security services are on high alert for IRGC Quds Force plots targeting Israeli diplomats, soft targets abroad, or Jewish diaspora sites. Some of the recent uptick in global antisemitic violence can be traced to Iran’s propaganda and funding networks fueling jihadist actors. Iran’s hand was suspected in a foiled plot against the UAE Israeli embassy last month, and in cyber attacks on Israeli infrastructure as recently as a few days ago. While these did not make major headlines, they illustrate Iran’s pattern: probe for weak spots, retaliate unconventionally.

On the nuclear front, Israel’s red line is fast approaching. Enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran are reportedly close to weapons-grade in sufficient quantity for multiple devices (if weaponized). Mossad and the IDF are undoubtedly dusting off contingency plans.

The coming period could see a dramatic Israeli move against Iranian nuclear targets if diplomacy doesn’t yield an immediate rollback. Given the Trump administration’s confrontational stance on Iran, there is less U.S. restraint on Israel now than under previous U.S. governments. Indeed, Israeli defense officials assess a renewed strike on Iran’s missile or nuclear facilities is “imminent” unless Iran freezes its programs. The Iranian regime’s air defense drills and redeployments indicate Iran is bracing for such an event. The pressure is on Iran: either de-escalate its proxy wars and nuclear ambitions or face direct conflict with an emboldened Israel (backed by an equally out-of-patience Washington).

Judea & Samaria

This theatre remains volatile, a tinderbox of low-intensity conflict that could yet ignite into a major uprising if mishandled. Over the last month or so, Israeli forces have been running nightly counterterror raids across Judea and Samaria to preempt any spread of the war. These operations are extensive: the IDF concluded a two-month campaign in the Etzion sector (south of Jerusalem) in early December, netting scores of terror suspects and weapons caches. In the north of this region, the military has not hesitated to use heavy measures in terror hubs like Nur al-Shams and Jenin — demolishing militant safe houses and arresting cells before they can organize attacks.

These efforts have largely succeeded in thwarting major terror plots. Several would-be bombings and shootings were intercepted, including the daytime arrest of a suspect in Nablus’s busy market and the takedown of a car-ramming attempt near Hebron.

Despite these tactical successes, underlying tensions are worsening. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is increasingly discredited and weak. President Mahmoud Abbas’s regime did nothing of note during the Gaza war except issue angry speeches. It has lost what little grip it had on the hearts and minds of Palestinians—and indeed is picking up the slack by emulating some of Hamas’s tactics against its own populace. In many northern towns (Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus), local armed groups — mostly aligned with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad — hold more sway than PA security forces.

Israeli intelligence recently uncovered a new terror infrastructure in Tulkarm linked to multiple attacks, highlighting that militant recruitment continues despite the PA’s nominal presence. Israel is essentially operating alone to keep a lid on violence here. Coordination with PA security exists but is minimal and fraught with mistrust—the PA is a terrorist organization, albeit a sometimes pragmatic one.

A disturbing trend is the uptick in Israeli extremist vigilantism in parts of Judea and Samaria. A fringe group, the “Hilltop Youth” falsely considered part of the “settler community” (they’re by and large comprised of disaffected youths from places like Haifa—in essence a youth gang), has been emboldened by a sense of impunity and ongoing Palestinian terror attacks have perpetrated revenge assaults on Palestinian civilians. It is important to note that while this is concerning, it’s some few dozen actors in response to literally thousands of Palestinians attacking Jews—something they commit at a rate some twenty times more frequently than their gang activity. Fortunately, Israeli security forces are cracking down on them and have started to use electronic monitoring more effectively to clamp down on it. Such violence is a double-edged strategic liability: it diverts Israeli forces and undermines Israel on the world stage.

Looking ahead, the Palestinian areas of Judea and Samaria face a crisis of governance. The PA is effectively a bystander, and whispers of its collapse or Abbas’s departure are growing. Israel is war-gaming scenarios of the PA’s sudden failure.

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has authorized contingency plans for a “Day After Abbas” — which could involve Israel moving forces into key areas to prevent Hamas from filling any vacuum. Meanwhile, major swathes of the public are calling for a more permanent Israeli presence.

Outsiders often misread the area’s quiet as stability. In truth, it’s a tense quiet enforced by Israeli vigilance. The absence of mass uprisings in support of Gaza was a relief, but it took extraordinary measures — including deploying additional brigades to calm flashpoints and carrot-and-stick management of the PA. With Gaza’s war seemingly paused, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria are growing more restless, not less.

Israel’s best play is to keep a firm security grip while quietly reinforcing administration. Judea and Samaria could explode with little warning if we see a full or partial PA collapse along with opportunistic incitement by Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel must continue proactive counterterrorism and disciplined policing to navigate this minefield.

Red Sea and Maritime Arena

Israel’s adversaries have repeatedly tried to expand the conflict to the Red Sea and broader maritime domain, with mixed success. The Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s southern proxy, engaged in several high-profile attacks on shipping recently, aiming to disrupt global (and, of course, Israel’s) trade lanes and U.S. naval movements. However, a combination of American military pressure and Israeli long-range strikes has tempered the Houthi threat. The U.S. Navy’s Task Force 59, bolstered by European allies, began “Operation Prosperity Guardian” a few months ago in a concerted effort to escort vessels and neutralize Yemeni missile launchers. Israeli airstrikes, some covert, hit Houthi drone workshops and arms convoys. For now, an uneasy U.S.-Houthi ceasefire has reduced the frequency of missile attacks in the Red Sea corridor.

Still, the threat has not vanished. Intelligence indicated the Houthis even considered a ground operation — a wild card notion of sending fighters towards Israel’s southern border, perhaps via a smuggling route or by infiltrating Jordan from Saudi Arabia. While that sounds far-fetched, it is illustrative of their overall posture. More concretely, the Houthis (and Iran’s naval units) maintain the ability to launch one-off surprise attacks: say, a drone swarm at Eilat port or mining a busy Red Sea strait. Israel’s Navy and Air Force remain on high alert around the Bab al-Mandab choke point. In one incident last month, unidentified drones approached an Israeli cargo ship off Eritrea’s coast — they were shot down by a U.S. destroyer escorting the convoy, illustrating close U.S.-Israel coordination at sea. Maritime security around Israel has effectively become a joint mission with Western allies, as global commerce demands these sea lanes stay open.

Beyond Yemen, Israel is watching the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.

In the Mediterranean, Turkey’s erratic stance and the presence of Hamas operatives in Lebanon and Syria pose risks to Israeli maritime targets (whether cargo or cruise ships or gas rigs). So far there have been no successful attacks in those areas, but some cargo ships bound for Israel were harassed (one Greek vessel reported warning shots off Lebanon’s coast just a few weeks ago). Israel has quietly armed its gas rigs and even civilian vessels with counter-drone and CIWS systems.

In the Persian Gulf, Israel doesn’t have an open presence, but it benefits from the Abraham Accords navies (Bahrain, UAE) which monitor Iranian naval movements closely. A notable development is the redeployment of an Israeli-owned but foreign-flagged fleet of tankers that now route via the Cape of Good Hope, avoiding Suez and Red Sea chokepoints altogether — a costly but telling adjustment to the threat.

Strategically, Israel has hardened its maritime defenses, and its adversaries have been unable to score a significant hit on Israeli assets at sea. However, the maritime domain remains a space where Iran and its proxies will look for asymmetric opportunities. The IDF has issued public warnings to shipping about potential mines or explosives-laden boats, trying to deny the enemy any easy targets. France and the UK have naval elements in the Red Sea, and even traditionally neutral states have condemned Houthi attacks on civilian shipping as piracy. This broad support gives Israel diplomatic cover to act robustly against maritime threats.

Global Jihadist & Diaspora Threat Network

Jewish communities abroad are facing a security reality not seen in decades, effectively normalizing a constant threat level.

The most gruesome example came just weeks ago in Australia. A mass-casualty terrorist attack at a Hanukkah celebration at Sydney beach. Two attackers, motivated by online jihadist propaganda, killed 15 people and wounded some 40 others. They had improvised explosive devices, but were neutralized before they could be detonated. Australian authorities admitted that years of escalating anti-Israel agitation — replete with chants of incitement — preceded this attack. In other words, the warning signs were there, but were insufficiently acted upon. Jewish institutions worldwide are ramping up their guards, drills, and vigilance.

Similar, if less deadly, incidents have proliferated: A synagogue bombing plot was foiled in France. An attempted shooting at a Jewish school in Florida was averted by an armed guard. Pro-Hamas rallies in European cities have turned violent, requiring police to rescue threatened Jewish motorists or homeowners. Israel’s security services are quietly aiding many countries with threat intelligence to preempt attacks. The “diaspora front” has thus become an extension of Israel’s — though it is one Israel must wage delicately, respecting sovereign governments even as it protects its people abroad. Notably, the Mossad and Shin Bet have reportedly dispatched liaisons to Europe and North America to assist local law enforcement in monitoring extremist cells.

Far from cowed, Jewish communities are organizing self-defense training, enhancing community alert systems, and publicly voicing support for Israel’s right to self-defense. The outpouring of diaspora volunteers — whether in IDF reserve service, emergency fundraising, or political advocacy — has been immense. Thousands of dual citizens flew to Israel to serve when the war began. This has not gone unnoticed by jihadist propagandists, who paint Jewish civilians abroad as “legitimate targets” due to their connection to Israel. This vile narrative echoes the darkest chapters of history, and yet it has gained alarming traction online. The normalization of antisemitic rhetoric (sometimes disguised, thinly, as “anti-Zionism”) in Western discourse over the past two years has created cover for violent actors to justify their deeds.

Israel is warning its partners that the terror threat to Jews abroad is a harbinger of broader security erosion. Today it’s synagogues and Jewish events. Tomorrow it will be Western interests at large. Radical Islamist networks often test their tactics on Israeli/Jewish targets first, then expand the target list. The wave of violence has pushed some allied governments to get off the fence. European governments are also (belatedly) increasing surveillance on returnees from Syria and on Iran-backed cultural centers that were previously tolerated. Israel would like to see a more concerted international crackdown on the sources of incitement — namely, certain Hamas-affiliated charities and Iranian propaganda outlets that operate freely in the West. There are signs of progress, but, currently, it seems to be more for optics than for effect.

United States Posture

The United States under the Trump administration is delivering a masterclass in alignment with Israel — albeit with occasional tempering advice (read: demands) behind closed doors (generally). Over the past month, Washington’s support for Israel’s security objectives has been full-throated. President Donald Trump frames the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and peace plan as a signature achievement, and he is deeply invested in seeing it succeed (or at least not publicly fail). Notably, the U.S. steered a UN Security Council resolution in November endorsing the Gaza peace framework, giving international legal weight to Israel’s demands for Hamas demilitarization and an international force in Gaza.

On the military front, U.S. posture is one of forward-leaning deterrence to guard against escalation. American fighter jets are still patrolling over Syria and Iraq, ostensibly targeting ISIS but implicitly warning Iran and its proxies. After the October 2023 Hamas onslaught, the U.S. surged naval assets (two carrier strike groups) to the Eastern Med and the Gulf. Those deployments have since drawn down slightly, but a robust presence remains. U.S. Central Command is closely coordinating with the IDF — whether it’s intelligence sharing on Hezbollah’s movements or expediting delivery of critical munitions. Indeed, American military resupply to Israel has been impressive.

However, U.S. support is not unconditional. President Trump — while sympathetic to Israeli aims — is highly attuned to American public optics and the need to avoid quagmires. The White House has privately urged Israel to calibrate its Syria approach. Trump told Netanyahu to “take it easy” in Syria and not provoke the new government there. The U.S. has invested in Syria’s post-Assad transition and does not want Israel stirring that pot too much. In response, Netanyahu essentially thumbed his nose by declaring a new ultimatum to Damascus about buffer zones. This indicates a minor rift — Israel pursuing maximal security demands, and the U.S. counseling a bit of restraint where its own diplomatic efforts are at play — not a breakdown in relations. At the macro level, Washington and Jerusalem are in lockstep that Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah must emerge from this period decisively weakened.

Domestic U.S. politics also factor in. Trump is undoubtedly eyeing the 2026 midterms. If images of renewed urban warfare in Gaza or a “humanitarian catastrophe” reappear, it will sour segments of U.S. public opinion. The administration is thus simultaneously boosting Israel and managing Israel.

In terms of U.S. alignment vs pressure, right now alignment dominates. The only notable pressures from the U.S. side are cautionary: don’t embarrass us by overreach. For example, if Israel were to strike Iran openly, the U.S. would prefer it be framed as last resort and ideally after consultation (even if just a heads-up). Likewise on Palestinian issues. Washington still wants to see the PA empowered eventually in Gaza, and frowns on any Israeli moves that look like they’re taking over. But these differences are mostly managed behind closed doors.

One must note, though: American strategic patience is not infinite. Trump and his hawkish advisors revel in Israel’s tough approach, but they also need results. If by the Spring Hamas is still armed in Gaza or Hezbollah is lobbing rockets again, even this White House will get frustrated. Moreover, as the U.S. gears up for confrontation with China, there’s an undercurrent in the Pentagon worried about overfixation on Mideast theaters. So Israel should seize this moment of maximal U.S. support to achieve irreversible gains.

Europe and International Institutions

While the U.S. tightens its embrace of Israel, much of Europe and the international institutional milieu is drifting into a more adversarial stance toward Jerusalem’s wartime conduct. European leaders continue to profess Israel’s right to self-defense, but their tone on Gaza has grown increasingly critical with each passing month of conflict.

So far, the EU as a body has stopped short of sanctions or suspension of agreements. Divisions among member states (with Germany, Hungary, others blocking extreme steps) mean that Europe’s response remains more rhetoric than substance. However, the diplomatic temperature is unmistakably cooler. At the UN Human Rights Council and in the General Assembly, European countries have increasingly abstained or even voted for resolutions censuring Israel’s military tactics. The term “disproportionate” is back in European statements, and at the extreme, officials from Ireland, Spain, and Belgium have alleged Israel has committed war crimes — regardless of lack of merit to these claims — in reference to Gaza. Israel doesn’t enjoy (if it ever has) the benefit of the doubt in many international fora.

The UN’s commission of inquiry on the Gaza conflict is collecting evidence and will likely produce a scathing report in 2026, potentially accusing Israel of grave breaches. The ICC (International Criminal Court) has also signaled renewed interest in targeting Israel’s legitimacy on the world stage.

Thus, Israel is bracing for another wave of lawfare. Dozens of NGOs, some with EU funding, are preparing lawsuits in various jurisdictions against Israeli officials and military officers for alleged war crimes. The Israeli government’s stance is rightfully defiant. It refuses any cooperation with the UN inquiry or the ICC on these matters, calling them biased. Israel’s allies are working to block or delay such efforts — for instance, the U.S. quietly lobbied key ICC member states to oppose any fast-tracking of a Gaza case. Nonetheless, the legal and PR battle will intensify.

European public opinion, influenced by relentless media focus on Palestinian civilian suffering, has shifted significantly. The public has become embolden by the “anti-Zionism” fig leaf to embrace full-on Jew-hate. Large protests in London, Paris, and Berlin have put pressure on European governments to distance themselves from Israel’s campaign. We see tangible effects: the UK and France paused some arms exports to Israel pending “reviews” (a symbolic gesture, as most big-ticket deliveries had already been made). The EU is leveraging aid promises for Gaza as a way to gain political say, occasionally irking Israel by insisting on frameworks that involve the PA or UN oversight.

At the same time, not all international trends are against Israel. In an interesting twist, several countries in the Global South (e.g. India, Brazil) have kept strong ties with Israel throughout, eyeing its counter-terror experience and defense tech. And a new phenomenon: some Muslim-majority nations quietly appreciate Israel’s stance against Iran. The Abraham Accords countries (UAE, Bahrain, etc.) haven’t publicly cheered Israel on, but behind closed doors they understand Israel’s objectives align with their interest in a weakened Hamas (which they correctly see as Iranian/Turkish/Qatari-backed Islamists).

That said, Europe’s drift is more problematic because of Europe’s influence in international bodies. Israel’s strategists are concerned about a long-term erosion of legitimacy on the European front — today it might be hostile rhetoric, tomorrow? Well, there are lots of things on that table.

As for the United Nations and other institutions: the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon stands as a bystander while Israel and Hezbollah shadow-box. When/if war resumes, expect UN peacekeepers to evacuate rather than impede the IDF. The UNRWA (UN agency in Gaza) is desperately trying to remain relevant in relief distribution, but Israel has sidelined it in favor of direct aid via the UN Security Council mechanism. The World Bank and IMF are readying Gaza reconstruction fund plans, but those are frozen until security parameters are met. Israel’s diplomacy in these corridors is focused on one goal — delay and dilute any hostile action until the conflict’s outcome is irreversible. So far, that strategy is working. Talk is cheap, and Israel can weather verbal storms.

Domestic: Coalition Politics, Conscription, and Judicial Overhang

On the home front, Israel’s wartime unity gave way to familiar schisms and political jockeying, even as the external war smolders on. In the initial phase of the conflict, a broad sense of national unity and purpose muted internal disputes — opposition protests paused, and a national emergency government was formed. However, that was short lived and signs of domestic fractures are evident—no x-ray needed. The unity government arrangement unraveled as opposition figures peeled away over disagreements on the Gaza ceasefire terms and the handling of hostages. Prime Minister Netanyahu is once again helming a narrow coalition, and its inherent contradictions are on full display.

One critical flashpoint is the conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi). This long-simmering issue has reemerged with a vengeance. During the war, while hundreds of thousands of both secular and religious reservists have been serving continuously, the vast majority of Haredi men remained exempt from military service — a fact not lost on the public. Netanyahu’s coalition promised the Haredi parties a new law cementing their exemptions, but doing so in the current climate is like pouring fuel on a fire.

In early December, Netanyahu planned to announce his conscription bill; instead he abruptly canceled the address due to security developments in Lebanon — a convenient way to dodge the issue for the moment. Behind closed doors, his partners are haggling. Neither Likud nor the opposition will accept a blanket exemption enshrined in law. Any compromise granting Haredim more leniency infuriates secular Israelis, while any tougher stance risks the coalition’s collapse. We are seeing mass protests flaring up again, this time with reservists and their families leading the charge, demanding equality in sacrifice.

Another domestic pressure point, quieter but structurally unresolved, is the judicial reform confrontation that the war merely paused. Netanyahu’s pre-October 7 push to recalibrate the balance between the elected branches and the High Court was frozen under emergency conditions, not abandoned. Elements of that struggle are now resurfacing indirectly and awkwardly.

The High Court is again positioning itself to rule on the legality of wartime emergency measures. That posture reinforces the core grievance of reform advocates: a Court that has claimed authority to review not only ordinary legislation, but even amendments to Basic Laws, in a system that never defined such power through a completed constitutional framework. What supporters call “guardrails,” critics increasingly see as judicial self-expansion into political terrain that was never formally delegated.

At the same time, Netanyahu’s corruption trial (dragging on for over five years now) continues in fragmented fashion, adding a personal layer to an already distorted institutional fight. The Prime Minister’s request to postpone testimony on security grounds sparked predictable outrage, but it also underscored an unresolved tension: a legal system that insists on treating an incumbent wartime prime minister as an ordinary defendant, while simultaneously demanding deference to its own authority in reviewing government action during war. The spectacle of judges being asked—explicitly—to weigh national security considerations against procedural rigidity only deepens public skepticism about whether Israel’s current legal order is fit for purpose.

President Isaac Herzog is considering a discreet escape hatch: a pardon arrangement that would end the trial. Reports suggest Herzog is exploring a narrowly tailored “yes, but” framework, aimed less at personal absolution than at defusing a trial that many Israelis—rightly or wrongly—now view as emblematic of a broader system that overreached.

The backlash from governance NGOs has been fierce, with accusations of “backroom deals” and institutional corruption. Yet that reaction itself reveals the depth of the crisis: a legal and political ecosystem so brittle that even discussing constitutional safety valves is treated as illegitimate. Beneath the noise, the issue is not Netanyahu’s fate alone, but a growing sense that Israel is still operating without agreed rules for how courts, executives, and emergencies coexist.

This drama is unfolding largely beneath the war headlines, but it feeds a wider perception problem. Not that Israel’s leadership is merely distracted by survival—but that the state is still paying the price for an unfinished constitutional order, in which judicial power expanded by precedent rather than consent, and reform arrived clumsily, under the shadow of personal litigation and national trauma. Until that structure is clarified, neither trials nor reforms will command full legitimacy, and every crisis will reopen the same fault lines.

Social cohesion in Israel is strained but more or less holding. The public’s tolerance for wartime footing remains remarkably strong. Protests against the war are minimal outside of fringe far-left-wing circles. However, the unity that prevailed right after the October 2023 horror has inevitably frayed at the edges. Military families are exhausted and some are vocal — not against the war aims, but against perceived government incompetence or lack of transparency. The economy’s squeeze (cost of living, reserve duty keeping people from jobs) is starting to bite even middle-income communities, which could translate to domestic unrest if not addressed. Yet, Israelis by and large understand that as long as the external threat remains, internal squabbles must not break the nation’s resolve. There is talk that after the northern front is concluded, Gantz might push for a renewed unity government to guide the post-war phase, possibly easing Netanyahu out in the process. Such talk is speculative but significant.

Civilian institutions have functioned throughout the war (the Knesset passed budgets and war powers; the courts continued operating). The IDF remains a highly respected common denominator — one of the few institutions still broadly trusted across society. But the specter of the judicial overhaul and deep ideological divides (secular vs religious, hawks vs pragmatists) looms large. When the guns go relatively quiet, those issues will roar back. Israel must be careful that victory on the battlefield is not undermined by self-inflicted wounds at home. Netanyahu’s political instincts for survival are strong and we can expect him to tread carefully enough to survive until he can claim some form of win.

Strategic Outlook: Key Judgments and Warnings

Recent developments that solidified trends

• Israeli Resolve and Initiative: Israel’s determination to neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah once and for all has only hardened. Neither international hand-wringing nor two-year war fatigue has softened Jerusalem’s stance.

• U.S.-Israel Strategic Sync: The U.S. alignment with Israel is strong, with Washington providing diplomatic cover and military largesse. Trump’s White House and Netanyahu’s government operate in near-lockstep, emboldening Israel to press forward (e.g. U.S. warnings to Iran’s proxies on Israel’s behalf ).

• Hamas Intransigence: Hamas’s refusal to countenance genuine disarmament or political diminishment has become ever more obvious, validating Israel’s skepticism.

• Diaspora Vigilance: The Jewish diaspora’s awakening to a normalized threat environment has hardened community defenses and unity. After incidents like the Sydney attack, Jewish communities worldwide are more mobilized, security-conscious, and outspoken. What was once complacency in safe havens has hardened into alert vigilance.

Areas where control, advantage, or cohesion have deteriorated

• Hezbollah Deterrence (for Hezbollah): Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israeli action has slipped badly. A year of relative quiet didn’t translate to safety. Israel is now striking Lebanese soil at will. The aura of Hezbollah as untouchable or as Lebanon’s protector has evaporated.

• International Sympathy for Israel: In Europe and UN institutions, focus has shifted almost entirely to Palestinian suffering and legal accusations. Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in those arenas, complicating Israeli diplomacy.

• Palestinian Authority: The PA’s already tenuous control in its areas of Judea and Samaria has further eroded. Militants operate with growing impunity in northern Samaria, and Israel is forced to fill the security vacuum. Whatever legitimacy or relevance the PA had has slipped; Palestinians increasingly see it as irrelevant, raising the risk of chaos if Israel doesn’t prop it up.

• Coalition Solidarity: The unity within Israel’s governing coalition has slipped as the immediate war emergency abates. Fissures over issues like Haredi conscription and handling of Gaza funds have resurfaced. While the coalition still agrees on core security policy, its internal consensus on domestic policy is fraying, which will weaken focus and decision-making if not managed.

Emerging pressures and likely next moves to watch

• Northern Escalation Imminent: All signals point to a controlled Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in the very near term. Watch for Israel expanding airstrikes and possibly a ground push to enforce the Litani line (evacuation orders and strikes have already began). The timing will align with Israel’s choosing — likely sooner rather than later, to preempt Hezbollah rearmament. This will be the next major phase of conflict.

• Phase 2 Gaza Gambit: The transition to Phase 2 in Gaza — with an international force deployment and technocratic administration — will collapse in effect if not in branding in the coming weeks. As Hamas inevitably continues to obstruct disarmament, expect Israel to unilaterally enforce security (no-go zones, targeted raids) and delay reconstruction.

• Iranian Dilemma Point: Iran faces a decision on whether to actively open its front with Israel or hunker down. Indicators to watch: any resumption of proxy drone/missile strikes on U.S. or Israeli targets, or provocative nuclear steps. Should Iran test Israel’s red lines, the next move could be further Israeli strikes on Iranian soil. Conversely, Iran might lie low to regroup — a quiet period from Tehran now likely means it’s saving its powder for later.

• Domestic Turning Point: Domestically, as external threats are handled one by one, Israel will reach a turning point where internal issues demand attention. The next few months will see a resurgence of mass protests (over conscription equity or judicial matters) when the security situation is stable enough to allow it.

This month’s picture is clear. Israel is managing strain, but not surrendering initiative. The pause is tactical, not transformative.

— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief

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