Israel’s posture is stretched across multiple fronts with little give — as a tense pause gives way to imminent confrontation. Gaza’s ceasefire is fraying under Hamas’s refusal to disarm, the northern front is heating up by Israeli design, and high-stakes U.S.–Iran diplomacy teeters between deal and war. Israeli leadership is navigating this tactical pause as exactly that: a short breather before the next storm, not a path to resolution. The coming weeks will likely force decisions that determine whether Israel breaks its enemies’ remaining strength — or faces a multi-front conflagration on adversaries’ terms.
Jerusalem has preemptively resumed strikes in Lebanon to curtail Hezbollah’s rearmament, even as it prepares to finish off Hamas in Gaza if the group balks (it will) at the disarmament demanded by President Trump’s peace deal. Washington is in sync with Trump’s team quietly coordinating “quick, decisive” strike options on Iran that avoid a long war.
Meanwhile, hostile narratives and lawfare from the UN, NGOs and adversary states are crescendoing—and are seen in Israel as just another front to be managed. Domestically, the wartime unity has given way to political fissures—chiefly the Haredi draft crisis and judicial overreach—which risk government stability if mishandled.
War, Security & Force Posture
Gaza: Ceasefire on Borrowed Time
Phase 1 of the Gaza war, the rescue of hostages and destruction of Hamas’ military infrastructure, effectively concluded with the recovery of the last Israeli hostage’s remains. Every hostage, living and fallen, is now accounted for, removing the chief rationale for restraint. President Trump hailed this as a “great moment” and immediately insisted Hamas must now follow through on its promise to disarm. In theory, an International Stabilization Force (ISF) under Trump’s new Board of Peace is waiting in the wings to assume governance of Gaza once Hamas lays down arms.
In reality, Hamas shows no sign of voluntary disarmament. Israeli skepticism about Hamas’ intentions has been fully validated. The group’s intransigence about giving up its arsenal or power is blatant. Indeed, Israeli intelligence and regional analysts widely doubt that “Hamas will peacefully disarm,” correctly expecting the group to obstruct and stall. Over the past month Hamas has been rebuilding defensive positions and command tunnels under the cover of the ceasefire, preparing for a fight to hold onto its weapons. Israeli officials have made clear that Gaza’s long-term stabilization, will simply not proceed unless Hamas is neutralized and fully disarmed.
Israel is treating the current truce as purely tactical. The IDF continues limited operations “east of the Yellow Line” inside Gaza, hunting remaining Hamas tunnels and arms depots. Just last night, a ceasefire breach underscored the fragility of the calm. Gazan gunmen opened fire on Israeli forces along the perimeter, seriously wounding an IDF reserve officer. Israel’s response was swift and pointed — tank and air units struck targets in northern Gaza, killing at least 9 militants in involved in the blatant violation by Hamas. The IDF stands ready to resume large-scale operations in Gaza at a moment’s notice, should Hamas’s violations escalate.
Strategically, Israel is already shaping Gaza’s future on its terms. Bibi has flatly ruled out any Turkish or Qatari forces in Gaza (an idea floated as part of an international force) and refuses to countenance a Palestinian Authority takeover there. He stated unequivocally that no sovereign Palestinian state will be established in Gaza, and that Israel will maintain security control “from the Jordan River to the sea,” including Gaza. In other words, Israel intends to retain the ultimate security grip on Gaza even if a new governance mechanism (like the ISF and technocratic administration) is introduced. This stance has caused friction with the international committee managing Gaza’s transition. The PM’s Office protested when a proposed Gaza management body (NCAG) appeared with a Palestinian Authority emblem, calling it a bait-and-switch and vowing “the Palestinian Authority will not be a partner in the management of Gaza.” Israel will accept outside help in administering Gaza, but on the condition that it does not empower its adversaries or dilute Israel’s security supremacy.
The current ceasefire is highly conditional and likely short-lived. Israeli officials privately assess that Hamas is simply buying time and regrouping, not earnestly transitioning to a post-conflict posture. We judge that absent a miraculous capitulation by Hamas, the IDF will re-engage in Gaza in the near term — perhaps with a limited objective of crippling any resurgent militant capabilities, or even a comprehensive “Phase B” operation to forcibly disarm Hamas. The trigger could be another serious ceasefire violation or the first sign that Hamas is reneging on the disarmament deal (which appears certain). Israel has already drawn “red lines” inside Gaza. It reopened the Rafah crossing in a limited way as a goodwill step, but is poised to push its security perimeter forward again if needed. Diplomatically, the U.S. is trying to entice Hamas into compliance (with talk of amnesty and Gulf reconstruction funds), yet all players know Hamas’s Islamist ideology makes voluntary disarmament a non starter. The likely scenario is a collapse of the demilitarization talks and a unilateral Israeli enforcement of Gaza’s demilitarization with establishment of no-go security zones, frequent raids on suspected arms caches, and a delay of Gaza’s rebuilding indefinitely. Israeli leaders are fully prepared to weather the outcry that will ensue. A Gaza “peace” that leaves Hamas armed is no peace at all.
The Northern Front: Preempting Hezbollah
About a year ago, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire halted major fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon on the condition that Hezbollah withdraw to the north of the Litani River and disarm its southern units by end of 2025. Those conditions have not been met. Israeli intelligence observed Hezbollah fighters sneaking back south almost immediately, rebuilding rocket launch sites under the nose (and often with the complicity) of the Lebanese Army. Arms depots that should have been dismantled have instead been enlarged, shifted, and concealed. In short, Hezbollah has been trying to wait out Israeli and international attention. Jerusalem’s response has been to signal, in word and deed, that it will not tolerate a Hezbollah re-armament cycle. As our previous assessment warned, Israel’s posture up north is now decisively one of preemption.
In late January, Israel initiated a new campaign of “calibrated” strikes in Lebanon to blunt Hezbollah’s renewal of its missile threat. A few days ago, as ceasefire violations by Hezbollah mounted, the IDF launched widescale airstrikes on Hezbollah infrastructure across southern Lebanon. Notably, the Israeli Air Force employed bunker-buster munitions in these strikes — a clear message that no target, not even buried command bunkers, is safe. In one pinpoint strike, the IDF eliminated Muhammad al-Husseini, Hezbollah’s chief artillery commander in the Tyre sector, who had been instrumental in rocket attacks during the war and was now orchestrating rearmament efforts.
Hezbollah’s response so far has been measured but hostile. The group has fired sporadic anti-tank missiles and rockets into northern Israel over the past month (the “repeated violations” that sparked Israel’s strikes ), but notably has avoided its full barrage capability. Hezbollah issued defiant rhetoric, warning that if Iran is attacked by the U.S., “Hezbollah will not stay out of the confrontation.” They frame the current standoff as “defending our land and existence” against Western designs for “Greater Israel.” This narrative — casting Hezbollah as a resistance defending Lebanon from aggression — is typical propaganda as pressure. Jerusalem is no longer cowed by Hezbollah’s threats, as evidenced by the IDF striking Hezbollah operatives at will.
Interestingly, elements of the Lebanese state are voicing unprecedented dissent against Hezbollah’s adventurism. There is genuine alarm in Beirut at the prospect of another devastating conflict with Israel. However, it is doubtful that Lebanese leaders can actually restrain Hezbollah when Tehran gives it orders. Their statements are better read as positioning: if war comes, Beirut wants to say “we warned against it” and perhaps seek to avoid full Israeli punishment by distancing the official state from Hezbollah’s actions. Israel, for its part, has signaled through U.S. intermediaries that it holds the Lebanese state responsible for Hezbollah’s disarmament — effectively putting the onus on Beirut to avert war, or else face Israel’s response.
All signals still point to a likely escalation in the relatively near future. Israel’s “short fuse” with Hezbollah is practically burned down to the end. Our January assessment noted a “limited war in Lebanon” aimed at decisively stripping Hezbollah’s rocket threat was imminent. We are now seeing the opening phase of that with an aerial campaign to thin out Hezbollah’s arsenal and command structure. The big question is whether it stops there or expands into a full offensive. The IDF has alerted units and even reportedly rehearsed a push to the Litani River (enforcing that buffer zone by physically clearing it). If Hezbollah retaliates in any significant way — say a mass volley of missiles — Israel will almost certainly launch a broad incursion into south Lebanon. The IDF Northern Command is already clearing vegetation and obstacles on the border fence (using herbicides and engineering units) to remove cover that could be used by Hezbollah infiltrators. In plain terms, the IDF is preparing the battlefield.
One wildcard is the Iran factor: Israel is coordinating closely with Washington on the possibility of confronting Iran directly (more on that below), and there is a scenario where an Israeli strike on Hezbollah could be synchronized with a U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. If that occurs, it is possible Israel might aim not just to push Hezbollah north, but to decisively eliminate Hezbollah as a fighting force while Iran is on its back foot. The next month constitutes the prime window for such action, before Hezbollah can further entrench or Iran finds ways around U.S. pressure. Outsiders who assumed Israel was “too tied up in Gaza” to tackle Hezbollah are already proven wrong. Barring an unlikely capitulation by Hezbollah (suddenly pulling back north of the Litani and dismantling arsenals, which would cut against its very identity), the northern front is poised to ignite into active conflict.
Iran and its Proxies: Edge of a Precipice
The Iran-Israel-U.S. triangle is at perhaps its most delicate point in years. On one hand, President Trump’s team is giving diplomacy a final go: a high-level meeting with Iran’s negotiators is scheduled for this Friday, involving U.S. envoys (Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner). The aim is to assemble a package that “prevents war,” likely trading limited Iranian nuclear concessions for sanctions relief and a freeze on hostilities. Tehran, under immense pressure, is at least pretending to play along with negotiations. But the signals beneath the surface are far less optimistic. U.S. officials admit they are preparing for failure.
Trump is weighing a short, sharp attack on Iran if diplomacy stalls. He has “not ruled out military strikes against Iran” even as talks proceed. The U.S. has massively boosted its regional posture: the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its strike group have entered the Middle East theater, missile defense batteries (Patriot, THAAD) have been deployed across the Gulf, and allied bases are being fortified or partially evacuated of non-essential personnel. Notably, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states — initially very opposed to a U.S. strike for fear of Iranian retaliation — have shifted their tone in recent days. Riyadh privately warned Iran that it “would not stay silent if U.S. bases on its territory are attacked” in retaliation, even as it publicly urges diplomacy. This suggests the Gulf states now believe Trump may be intent on striking, and they don’t want to be seen siding with Iran when the die is cast.
From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s “axis of resistance” is under strain but still dangerous. The two-year campaign of Israeli and U.S. operations has inflicted serious blows on Iran’s capabilities — from strikes on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure to direct clashes with its proxies in Syria, Iraq, and at sea. Iran tried unprecedented direct attacks, and paid a steep price in retaliation. Israeli intelligence reports Iran’s leadership is shaken: anti-regime protests have erupted across Iran (spanning over 30 provinces in January), with thousands of protesters killed in clashes with security forces. Khamenei’s inner circle fears that a U.S. military blow could threaten the regime’s survival. Iran is cornered between trying to avoid giving the U.S. a pretext to strike while also not wanting to appear weak.
Thus far, Tehran’s play has been to use proxies and deniable escalation to raise the costs for Israel and the U.S. without crossing a clear red line. For instance, Yemen’s Houthis (an Iranian proxy) have repeatedly threatened new attacks in the Red Sea, especially as U.S. naval power crowds Iran’s environs. The Houthis are relocating missile and drone stockpiles and holding intensive military meetings — essentially preparing for the possibility of war with Israel or the U.S. In Iraq and Syria, Iranian-backed militias have made bellicose statements, but have so far held back from attacking Israel directly.
Tehran has signaled that if Trump hits Iran, it will activate Hezbollah to strike Israel on Iran’s behalf — effectively opening a second front to divert and deter Israel and the U.S. Israeli military intelligence fully anticipates this.
President Trump has reportedly given Iran only a short window to show concrete willingness to halt its nuclear advances and regional aggression. If Iran does not bend, the probability of U.S. military action will spike. Our assessment is that Trump is loath to enter a long war as midterm elections loom, but he also will not tolerate an Iran on the verge of nuclear weapons. Thus, a one-off or short campaign of strikes (“shock and awe” style) is on the table. Israel, for its part, is quietly urging a firm line. If Washington hesitates, Israel might even act unilaterally in some form, though the preference is a joint effort. Multiple Iranian proxies stand ready to erupt in concert if the order comes. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, perhaps even militias in Syria, will unleash attacks if Iran is hit. Israel will then face multi-front fire again — but it has prepared for exactly that scenario with nationwide air defense drills, reserve call-ups, and pre-positioning of forces. A recent Home Front Command drill simulated massive Iranian missile salvos on Israeli cities (a mass-casualty rescue exercise at Zikim base). Israel knows what might be coming and is bracing itself. There is also a chance — though not a large one — that Iran will hunker down and play for time, making just enough concessions or delaying moves to avoid giving the U.S. justification to attack. In that case, we might see a tense stand-off without a strike through the spring, with Iran refraining from major proxy attacks and the U.S./Israel refraining from bombing, all while diplomatic talks drag on. But given all actors’ current postures, the scales are tipping toward confrontation. Iran’s supreme leader will not capitulate fully. Trump is currently unlikely to accept a half-measure deal—though could probably be persuaded if the optics are right. For Israel, every week that passes with Iran’s nuclear program inching forward is simply borrowing time.
Judea & Samaria: Low-Intensity Flashpoints
While the world’s attention fixes on Gaza and the northern border, a dangerous security vacuum is widening in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian Authority’s grip on the territory has become extraordinarily weak. Over the last month, Israeli forces have had to intensify raids in Nablus, Jenin, Jericho and other hotbeds to suppress growing militant activity, as the PA’s security presence withers. Militias and terror cells, many inspired or directed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, operate with increasing impunity in northern Samaria. Even PA officials privately admit that whatever legitimacy the PA had has slipped. This raises the risk of chaos — essentially, areas of Judea and Samaria descending into Gaza-like insurgency — if Israel doesn’t prop the PA up or directly fill the void. So far, Israel has chosen the latter course: IDF raids occur almost nightly, capturing weapons, breaking up terror plots, and trying to prevent a new intifada from igniting.
Israel’s policy in Judea & Samaria right now is essentially one of containment and crisis management. There is a recognition in the security echelon that a total PA collapse would be a nightmare — Israel would be forced into administration of Palestinian enclaves at a time when its military bandwidth is already stretched. Thus, quietly, Israel is trying to bolster the PA where it can (e.g. transferring tax revenues, allowing foreign aid to reach PA security forces) even as it bypasses the PA to eliminate imminent threats. It’s a delicate balancing act: too much Israeli heavy-handedness further undermines the PA, too little and the terrorists gain freer rein. The IDF’s presence in Judea and Samaria is at its highest in years, with some units on permanent reinforcement since the Gaza war began.
Without significant change, Judea and Samaria will continue simmering at a low boil, with periodic spikes of violence. A major trigger could be a Hamas call to arms in the Judea and Samaria if Gaza reignites. Israeli intelligence is keenly focused on Hamas operatives in the West Bank who might orchestrate mass casualty attacks or coordinate uprisings in tandem with Gaza fighting. So far, Israeli preventive raids (and the barrier) have kept a lid on organized terror emanating from the region, but lone-wolf attacks remain a serious concern. We assess that Israel will continue essentially governing security in the PA areas for the foreseeable future, treating the PA as a hollow framework. Overall, this front is a pressure cooker: not boiling over yet, but under pressure and largely overshadowed by bigger wars — until it isn’t. It is a precarious status quo, predicated on Israel’s ability to be everywhere at once – Gaza, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria.
Red Sea Arena & Other Proxies
Beyond Israel’s immediate borders, the ripple effects of the conflict reach into the Red Sea and even further afield. The Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen have become a de facto front line. In January, as noted, the Houthis explicitly threatened to launch a new attack in the Red Sea — timed conspicuously as the U.S. moved an aircraft carrier into the region. This threat is not idle: the Houthis possess advanced anti-ship missiles and long-range drones (supplied by Iran) that can reach Eilat or target shipping lanes. The U.S. Navy and Israeli Navy have both increased patrols and readiness in the Red Sea corridor. In mid-January, a U.S. missile destroyer, the USS Delbert D. Black, docked in Eilat for joint drills, underscoring U.S.-Israel naval cooperation in this arena. Shortly after, that destroyer and Israeli vessels conducted live-fire exercises in the Red Sea, signaling to the Houthis (and Iran) that this route is under close watch .
Intelligence indicates the Houthis are actively preparing for the contingency of a regional war: they have relocated missile and drone stockpiles into hardened sites and held high-level meetings on war plans. Israeli officials have privately warned the Houthis (through backchannels, likely Oman or Saudi mediators) that any attack on Israel or its shipping will result in Israeli retaliation on Yemeni soil. The Houthis, for their part, likely calculate that if the U.S. strikes Iran, all bets are off and they would gain prestige by attacking Israel. It’s a powder keg awaiting a spark from the Persian Gulf side.
Elsewhere, Syria’s evolving situation bears mention. The regime change in Damascus opened a question of whether Syria might distance from Iran. So far, the signals are mixed. The new Syrian leadership has engaged in talks with the U.S. and even Israel via intermediaries, suggesting interest in stabilizing and possibly reclaiming the south free of Iranian proxies. President Trump praised Syria’s “hard work” towards a constructive relationship and even eased some sanctions as a carrot. However, Israel remains deeply wary — Netanyahu demanded a demilitarized buffer zone in Syria stretching from Damascus to the Golan, free of Iranian militias and heavy weapons. He delivered an ultimatum to Damascus to that effect, despite U.S. caution to go slow. Israeli strikes in Syria have actually continued at a low tempo, hitting suspected IRGC arms convoys and militia bases (though receiving less media attention lately). A complicating factor is Turkey’s presence: Turkey has deployed a new radar system at Damascus International Airport (as part of its growing influence in Syria) which can potentially limit Israeli Air Force operations by tracking Israeli jets at long range. This is part of Turkey’s broader maneuvering — Ankara is both cozying up to Iran’s narrative (publicly criticizing Israel) and trying to insert itself as a regional powerbroker (like floating a defense pact with Pakistan and Saudi, though Riyadh appears cool on that). Israel responded by banning entry to several Turkish officials (including President Erdogan’s son) over anti-Israel activities. The Turkey-Israel rift, while not an active military front, is a diplomatic front to watch. Turkey could, for instance, threaten to close the Bosphorus to U.S./NATO warships in event of a war or increase support to Hamas. So far, it’s mostly posturing and nuisance (like the radar deployment).
Overall, Israel’s force posture is stretched region-wide. It has reinforced the Red Sea naval presence, kept air assets on alert for Syria and Iraq contingencies, and maintained high readiness at home. The IDF calls this “a period of improving readiness for war” across multiple arenas. Notably, Israel’s maritime defenses have hardened significantly — there have been no successful hits on Israeli naval or commercial assets despite Iran’s attempts. But Israel remains vigilant against asymmetric blows, like mines or explosive boats that could still target ships. In sum, the periphery fronts (Yemen, Syria, Iraq) are subordinate theaters that will ignite only if the core Iran conflict does. Israel’s working assumption is that any big war will not stay limited — proxies everywhere will activate. Thus it is postured to engage from the Red Sea to the Golan to the Gulf, if required.
International Arena
United States: Lockstep with Israel, Eyes on Iran
The U.S.–Israel strategic alignment is stronger than it has been in decades. Despite occasional tactical disagreements, the Trump administration has essentially embraced Israel’s assessment of the threat landscape. Washington continues to provide robust diplomatic cover and military aid — U.S. flights delivering precision munitions and air defense interceptors arrive almost weekly, keeping Israel well-stocked for any new flare-up. The White House has vetoed hostile UN Security Council resolutions targeting Israel’s Gaza operation and has bluntly backed Israel’s right to eliminate Hamas and defend itself on the northern front. Of course, President Trump’s calculus is not purely altruistic. With the 2026 midterm elections on the horizon, Trump wants to project strength and results. He sees supporting Israel’s tough stance as politically advantageous, so long as it succeeds quickly. There is an undercurrent in Washington that if by spring Hamas is still armed in Gaza or Hezbollah is firing rockets again, even this friendly White House will grow frustrated. But for now, U.S. patience is holding. Trump has even tied the success of Gaza stabilization to the broader anti-Iran effort, telling Netanyahu that showing “every hostage returned” and Hamas disarmed helps keep American public support high for confronting Iran. In short, the U.S. is all-in on Israel’s core objectives: neutralize Hamas, deter or defeat Hezbollah, and stop Iran from getting the bomb.
On Iran, as discussed, the U.S. is playing both good cop (negotiations) and bad cop (military buildup). Israeli officials are fully looped in. Netanyahu met this week in Jerusalem with U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff for three hours to hash out the Iran approach. Israel presented a firm list for any deal: removal of all enriched uranium from Iran, a halt to enrichment, tight limits on ballistic missiles, and an end to Iran’s proxy support. These are demands that Iran will not accept in full, which suggests Israel would quietly prefer no deal over a weak deal. There is little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem right now — if anything, Israel’s stance is stiffening U.S. resolve. As a senior U.S. official noted, the planned summit Friday is about preventing war, but “the Trump administration hopes Iran will come ready to make needed compromises” — implying that if not, the military option is ready. Trump has asked for a plan that “would not risk a long-term war,” and sources indicate this could mean overwhelming air and cyber strikes over 48-72 hours to cripple Iran’s nuclear sites and command structure.
Politically, Trump is wary of getting embroiled in a new Middle East quagmire, but he also prides himself on being a dealmaker — if he strikes Iran, he’ll want to call it a “one-and-done” action that made the world safer. Israeli influence on these deliberations is significant. IDF Chief Zamir’s temporarily secret Washington trip was likely to provide the latest intel on Iran’s thresholds and perhaps to coordinate rules of engagement. There have even been reports (unconfirmed) that Israeli fighter jets might participate in a U.S.-led strike or handle certain proxy targets while U.S. forces hit Iran proper.
Europe: From Sympathy to Scrutiny
In EU capitals and the U.K., the predominant narrative is one of Palestinian suffering and Israeli “war crimes.” As noted in January’s assessment, Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in those arenas. European media is still saturated with images of Gazan devastation. This has translated into political pressure: the EU Parliament passed a (non-binding) resolution condemning Israel’s “disproportionate force,” several European governments have paused arms exports to Israel, and calls are growing for international sanctions if Israel resumes large-scale military action in Gaza without a political solution. France and Germany, traditionally somewhat understanding of Israel’s security needs, are openly split. France’s President has suggested an international trusteeship for Gaza (implicitly questioning Israel’s judgment), while Germany’s Chancellor voices support for Israel but faces a restless coalition with dissenting voices.
At the United Nations, European states have mostly aligned with the humanitarian push. The UN General Assembly in late December approved a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to urgently weigh in on whether Israel’s actions in Gaza constitute genocide. The UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on the 2025 Gaza War released a damning report accusing Israel of war crimes and “genocidal intent” — language that rightly infuriated Israel. That COI report explicitly recommended the ICC issue arrest warrants for top Israeli officials. Sure enough, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has pursued charges. ICC judges recently affirmed the court’s jurisdiction to investigate alleged crimes in the Palestinian territories, and notably the ICC has issued arrest warrants for PM Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant on suspicion of war crimes in Gaza. (These warrants were initially under seal but became public after Israel tried to challenge them in court and lost.) Israel, of course, rejects the ICC’s authority (Israel is not an ICC member) and has no intention of handing over officials. In much of the world, Israel’s leaders are painted as wanted war criminals. This is lawfare at its peak — the Palestinians and their NGO allies leveraging international bodies to criminalize Israel’s self-defense.
European NGOs and activist groups are also in high gear. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and a coterie of local NGOs have filed briefs to the ICC, compiled dossiers on Israeli strikes, and lobbied European governments to punish Israel. These groups are blatantly biased—indeed, Jerusalem has long accused some of them of being fronts for pro-Palestinian activism. The assessment here is that NGO narratives are being used as pressure tools. Israeli officials privately admit lawfare is an impediment — it forces them to devote effort to defending against probes and can chill some operational decisions — but they also are determined not to let “preaching from Geneva or New York” override security imperatives.
A few European countries are quietly sympathetic to Israel’s broader fight against Iran. For instance, reports suggest the U.K. and France have provided intelligence support regarding Hezbollah and have beefed up naval forces in the Med to deter any Iranian moves there. But their publics are unsupportive of Israel’s Gaza actions, so politically they keep distance. Also, Eastern European states (Poland, Hungary, etc.) remain pro-Israel in EU forums, partly out of alignment with Trump and partly due to their own security outlooks. This has prevented a unified EU sanctions move. Instead, the pressure is coming via the UN and ICC, where individual European states can support inquiries without having to act unilaterally.
Internationally, Israel feels isolated in the court of public opinion but not in the corridors of power. The Global South and Muslim countries are uniformly blasting Israel—many have called Gaza a genocide, and some (like South Africa and Malaysia) cut diplomatic ties. Israel calculates that strategic relationships (U.S., certain Arab partners, India, etc.) matter more. As long as those hold, UN votes and NGO reports, while troublesome, are “noise” to be managed. The Israeli strategy here is twofold: diplomatically engage behind the scenes to temper the language of resolutions (e.g. getting Europe to focus on humanitarian issues rather than explicit war crimes accusations), and win on the ground so convincingly that the facts become moot.
A UN Security Council session is scheduled in mid-February where members will push for a resolution demanding Israel refrain from a Lebanon escalation and calling for protection of Lebanese civilians — likely vetoed by the U.S. Additionally, there is talk of a special UN tribunal to investigate Hamas’s Oct 7 crimes and Israel’s response in tandem (championed by some Europeans)—Israel opposes this as equating terrorists with a sovereign state. Bottom line: Israel is navigating an increasingly hostile international arena where its narrative has largely been lost. It will rely on the U.S. (and a few allies) to block concrete penalties, and it will portray the UN and ICC as politicized.
Arab States: Quiet Partners, Public Critics
The Arab state landscape is a study in doublespeak. In public forums (UN, Arab League), virtually all Arab and Muslim-majority states rail against Israel’s actions. Gulf states, which were courting Israel not long ago, have taken a few steps back: the Saudi-Israel normalization talks that were so prominent in 2024 are effectively on ice until the Gaza situation resolves. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) must balance his tacit alignment with the U.S./Israel against public opinion, which is extremely pro-Palestinian. Thus, Saudi Arabia officially condemns Israeli “excesses” in Gaza, yet behind closed doors it is coordinating with the U.S. and even sharing messages with Israel.
Other Gulf states are similar: the UAE has been outspoken in aid to Gaza and criticism of Israeli bombing, but it hasn’t cut ties or canceled its defense cooperation with Israel (rumor is some Israeli defense tech personnel are quietly still active in the UAE). Qatar remains the odd player — funding and hosting Hamas leaders (who are now under even greater scrutiny) and trying to position itself as a mediator. Israel, however, is rightly distrustful of Qatari involvement (seeing Qatar as too aligned with Hamas—given that they are one of their largest patrons). Still, pragmatic contacts continue; Mossad officials reportedly communicate via Qatari intermediaries to Hamas even now regarding the disarmament talks. We expect Qatar to continue straddling the fence: ensuring it’s part of any deal to keep relevance (and its Al Jazeera narrative machine running), but not alienating the U.S. by obstructing outright.
Egypt is a critical piece: Cairo facilitated much of the humanitarian corridors and has worked with Israel and the U.S. on the idea of an international force for Gaza. President Sisi privately prefers that Gaza not be dumped back on Egypt (he doesn’t want to govern it) but also doesn’t want Hamas strong. Egypt has beefed up security in Sinai to prevent jihadist spillover. Tellingly, Egypt and Israel remain tightly coordinated on security; Egypt even let Israeli drones overfly parts of Sinai recently to monitor for ISIS or Hamas movements. Publicly, Sisi criticizes Israel to placate the street, but behind the scenes he’s urging Hamas to play ball with Trump’s deal to avoid the Strip becoming an ISIS-like zone.
Jordan is extremely nervous. The king fears a new intifada or that Gaza chaos could destabilize Judea and Samaria and spill into Jordan. Jordan’s rhetoric towards Israel has been harsh (Amman temporarily recalled its ambassador in protest during the height of the Gaza bombing), but security ties quietly persist. The Israel-Jordan-U.S. coordination to keep Judea and Samaria calm and ensure the Temple Mount status quo remains intact is ongoing. Israel recently thanked Jordan (quietly) for helping pass messages to the PA to discourage violence. The concern is if the PA falls apart, Jordan might face an influx of refugees or militants — a nightmare for the Hashemites. So Jordan supports any effort to bolster the PA and is wary of Israel’s moves in Judea and Samaria.
In the broader Arab/Muslim world: Iran’s allies Syria (the new regime) and Iraq have to walk carefully. Iraq’s government officially condemned Israel loudly, but also does not want to be a battleground again; it’s trying to rein in Shi’ite militias, with mixed success. Syria’s new leadership, as mentioned, is exploring distancing from Iran enough to get sanctions relief and reconstruction money — which implicitly means not supporting Hezbollah offensively. How far that goes is unclear, but Turkey and Russia are guarantors of the new setup, and they have their own reasons to avoid an Israel-Hezbollah war (Russia doesn’t want Israel striking Syria extensively; Turkey doesn’t want millions more refugees).
Notably, some Arab countries have engaged with Trump’s “Board of Peace.” Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan and even Indonesia announced they are joining what Trump calls a “Peace Council” to support Gaza’s rebuilding and regional stability. This was a diplomatic win for Trump — it shows broad Muslim participation, at least nominally. But these countries joined primarily to restrain Trump and Israel. Indeed, leaks suggest Saudi, Turkey, and Qatar banded together to urge Trump to hold off on striking Iran, fearing a regional inferno. They briefly succeeded in late January when a rumored U.S. strike was postponed after Gulf pressure. Who knew a jet could be such a powerful investment? However, as Iran dragged its feet, that united front frayed. More recently, Saudi’s defense minister privately told U.S. counterparts that if Trump doesn’t follow through on his threats, it would embolden Iran — a stark change. Riyadh now bets that a short war might actually remove the Iranian sword dangling over the region. It’s a remarkable turn: the same Saudi that warned against a strike now may be implicitly greenlighting one, or at least preparing to ride out the consequences.
Inside Israel: Coalition Strains and Home Front Resilience
Political Cohesion vs. “Haredi Draft” Crisis
Inside Israel, the once all-consuming external threat is beginning to share the stage with resurging internal divisions. During the height of the war emergency, Israel’s famously fractious politics were relatively muted — a unity mindset prevailed as the country mobilized. But as the immediate crisis ebbed, fault lines within the governing coalition have re-emerged. The most acute dispute is the “Haredi draft crisis.” Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties, which are key members of the coalition, are insisting on legislating a renewed exemption for their community from military service. This has been a long-simmering issue: Israel’s Supreme Court struck down the previous blanket exemption law. The Haredi parties want a law enshrining continuing mass exemptions (effectively formalizing that Haredim can avoid the draft), whereas much of the Israeli public (to say nothing of the IDF leadership) demand greater Haredi participation in sharing the national burden.
As the war pressure lifted slightly, the coalition’s unity “slipped” on this issue. Tensions came to a head recently when the Knesset’s legal adviser warned that if the state budget isn’t passed by March (the deadline) due to infighting, the government will automatically collapse and new elections will be called. This essentially tied the budget vote to resolving the draft law dispute. Netanyahu has been scrambling to keep his coalition together: he implored allies that “the last thing Israel needs in the current situation is elections.” Behind closed doors he has been mediating between the two ultra-Orthodox factions (Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael, which together form the United Torah Judaism party) and his secular nationalist partners. One Haredi faction threatened that if the draft law isn’t lenient enough, they would break off and run separately — a move that would weaken the coalition’s stability. Netanyahu managed to get the state budget’s first reading passed 62–55 in the Knesset, with Haredi party support, by promising them progress on the draft law. The budget is a massive ₪660 billion ($180B) package reflecting wartime expenditures and reconstruction needs. It modestly increases welfare subsidies (some aimed at Haredi communities) and defense spending remains high, though Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich touted that they are starting to rein it in.
Crucially, alongside the budget, Netanyahu’s team is advancing a Conscription Arrangements Law to address the Haredi draft. The reported plan is to lower the draft age for Haredim (so older students can get exemptions more easily), set very low annual quotas for ultra-Orthodox enlistment, and essentially codify a broad exemption while encouraging voluntary service. Even within the coalition, some military-minded members are uneasy, as it could hurt IDF manpower long-term. The IDF itself, particularly the Chief of Staff Zamir, has been vocal that expanding Haredi enlistment is an “operational necessity” for the future of the military. In a speech to Haredi soldiers at Nevatim Airbase, Zamir praised those who serve and said integrating more ultra-Orthodox while respecting their lifestyle is critical to ensure readiness for future challenges. The IDF just this week took a historic step by issuing a new order formalizing special service tracks for Haredim — dubbed “Magen” (Shield) and others — that allow gender-segregated units, religious accommodations, etc., to make enlistment more palatable. They even appointed a special advisor on Haredi affairs to the Chief of Staff to oversee these programs. In essence, the military is preparing to absorb more ultra-Orthodox if the law eventually forces it, or even if it doesn’t (to attract volunteers).
The Haredi draft issue has already led to unrest. Extremist ultra-Orthodox rioters in Jerusalem and elsewhere have blocked roads and clashed with police, demanding full exemption. In one incident, a protester was accidentally run over by a car trying to get through a Haredi roadblock, seriously injuring him. This incident nearly spiraled — hundreds of Haredim gathered, and there were fears of wider violence.
Netanyahu’s challenge is to avoid a coalition breakup while also avoiding a rupture with the broader public (who might protest en masse if a too-sweeping exemption law passes). He likely will push through a compromise law in the coming weeks — one that in practice defers most Haredi service for years (by raising exemption age, etc.) — and hope the outrage can be managed until security allows more focus on it. The opposition is already signaling that once the external threat subsides, they will mobilize the public against what they term a “draft-dodging deal.” Expect large protests in Tel Aviv and elsewhere over the draft law.
Trigger Table: Key Scenarios
Israel faces a range of potential trigger events in the coming weeks. Below is a “trigger table” outlining plausible scenarios, their triggers, and likely responses – along with an assessment of probability and approximate time window:
Hamas Reneges & Gaza Escalation (Likely in next 1–4 weeks)
If Hamas continues to resist all disarmament efforts or commits a major ceasefire breach (e.g. a deadly attack on IDF troops or renewed rocket fire on Israeli cities), Israel will resume full-scale military operations in Gaza. This would include heavy airstrikes on remaining Hamas strongholds and possibly a ground operation into Gaza City/Khan Younis to forcibly strip Hamas of weaponry.
Probability: High. Hamas’ behavior so far suggests non-compliance, and small clashes are already occurring.Northern War Expands (Moderate-High in next 2–6 weeks)
Triggered either by a major Hezbollah provocation (e.g. a large rocket barrage causing Israeli civilian deaths, or a successful anti-tank ambush on IDF forces) or by Israel’s own schedule of preemption reaching a crescendo. In either case, Israel would launch a broad offensive in Lebanon. Expect massive airstrikes across southern Lebanon (and possibly Beirut Dahiya if high-level targets) and a ground invasion up to the Litani River to clear Hezbollah positions.
Probability: Moderate-High. The current path of events points this way, if Hezbollah retaliates for ongoing strikes. Israel is already striking Hezbollah targets; a misstep or intentional escalation by Hezbollah could remove any remaining restraints. Israel is clearly inclined to “finish the job” sooner rather than later.Iran Direct Strike or U.S. Strike on Iran (Moderate in 4–8 weeks)
Scenario 1: Iran, feeling cornered, attempts a preemptive strike on Israel or U.S. assets — perhaps a volley of ballistic missiles at Israeli cities or U.S. bases (via proxies or directly). This would trigger immediate retaliation: Israel (and likely the U.S.) would unleash force against Iran’s nuclear and military facilities.
Scenario 2: Diplomatic talks collapse and President Trump orders a “quick, decisive” strike on Iran preemptively.
In either scenario, expect multi-front proxy attacks in response — Hezbollah raining rockets, Iraqi militias firing at U.S. bases, Houthis targeting Red Sea shipping. Israel would go into full emergency mode, executing war plans for a two-front (north and Iran) conflict. It might include Israel striking Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets in Syria/Iraq to stem the tide.
Probability: Moderate. U.S.-Iran negotiations are at a knife’s edge; we give maybe a 50% chance of a U.S. strike order by late Feb if Iran doesn’t budge. Iran launching first is a lower probability (they usually avoid being seen as the aggressor against U.S./Israel directly), but not impossible if they think war is inevitable.Judea & Samaria Meltdown (Moderate-low in next 8–12 weeks)
If the PA loses all its remaining grip (President Abbas is weak and rumors of his health failing swirl), militant factions could launch a coordinated uprising. Also, Hamas might try to ignite Judea and Samaria if Gaza is under full assault, calling for mass attacks.
Probability: Moderate to low. The PA’s erosion is real, but Israel is mitigating day by day. This is more a creeping crisis than a sudden trigger, unless an extraordinary spark occurs.Coalition Breakdown & Early Elections (Low-Moderate, by late March)
If the budget and conscription lawaren’t passed by the end of March, Knesset dissolves automatically. Trigger would be hardline Haredi parties refusing to budge or a key partner bolting.
Probability: Currently low. Most in the coalition know elections now would be very unpopular. However, if security stabilizes by March, some might risk it to avoid conceding on draft law. We think Netanyahu will find a compromise to avoid this scenario.Major Diaspora Terror Attack (Moderate-High, ongoing window)
We must note this non-Israel trigger: A mass-casualty antisemitic terror attack abroad (like the Sydney massacre) could influence Israel’s strategy. For example, if Hezbollah or Iran’s agents perpetrated a deadly attack on an Israeli embassy or a Jewish center in the United States or Europe, Israel might retaliate directly against Iranian interests even absent a direct conflict trigger. Or, conversely, such an event could strengthen international resolve against Iran/Hezbollah. Probability: Moderate. The threat is high as per intel, though security is also high. We’re in a window of elevated risk globally.
Israeli decision-makers are actively gaming these scenarios. The period from now through late March is the critical window in which either conflicts will escalate and possibly climax — or, if by April things are still in stalemate, international pressure and internal fatigue will mount to force some freeze. Israel is thus operating with a sense of “now or never” to resolve the Gaza and Hezbollah threats.
What’s Next?
What Hardened (Solidified Trends and Resolve):
Jerusalem’s Resolve to Finish Off Hamas & Hezbollah – Hardened: Far from war-weariness softening Israel’s stance, the determination to neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah once and for all has only hardened. The gruesome experiences of the past two years — October 7, the rocket barrages, the hostage crisis — have steeled Israeli society and leadership to accept no half-measures. Neither international hand-wringing nor two-year fatigue has altered the conviction that security is achieved only by decisive force. Outsiders expecting Israeli restraint will be proven wrong; Israel is prepared to act unilaterally and boldly to remove existential threats.
U.S.–Israel Strategic Sync – Hardened: The strategic alignment between Washington and Jerusalem is at a peak. The Trump administration’s backing of Israel is unequivocal and actively operational — from diplomatic cover to expedited weapons deliveries and joint contingency planning. U.S. warnings to Iran’s proxies on Israel’s behalf, shared intelligence, and close coordination on Iran illustrate this unprecedented sync. In effect, the U.S. and Israel are moving as one phalanx against Tehran’s axis. This unity has encouraged Israel to press forward (knowing the U.S. “has its back”) and also stiffened America’s resolve (U.S. officials openly echo Israel’s red-lines now).
Diaspora Jewish Vigilance – Hardened: The shock of global antisemitic attacks has awakened Jewish communities worldwide into a state of heightened vigilance and solidarity. What was once complacency in relatively “safe” diaspora havens has hardened into alert vigilance. After incidents like the Sydney massacre, Jewish communities are more mobilized, security-conscious, and outspoken than ever. Volunteer security patrols, inter-denominational cooperation, and assertive advocacy have replaced prior quiet.
Global Jihadist Zeal Against Israel/Jews – Hardened: On the flip side, the commitment of Islamist extremists to target Israel and Jews has also solidified. Hezbollah’s ideology and Iran’s resolve to confront Israel have not been cowed by Israeli strikes. If anything, they are doubling down on rhetoric of “resistance” being existential. Likewise, Hamas’s refusal to entertain any political diminishment or true ceasefire has become ever more obvious — their ideology of jihad against Israel remains intact despite military blows. This hardened hatred means Israel cannot bank on deterrence alone. These actors won’t voluntarily quit, reinforcing Israel’s view that they must be decisively neutralized.
What Slipped (Deteriorated or Lost Ground):
International Sympathy for Israel – Slipped Away: Any meagre reservoir of goodwill and sympathy Israel briefly enjoyed has all but evaporated in Europe and the UN. Focus globally has shifted almost entirely to Palestinian suffering and legal accusations against Israel. Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in many forums; its diplomatic maneuvering room has narrowed. European publics and media are largely hostile or at least unsympathetic, complicating Israeli diplomacy and PR. Israel will proceed anyway, but the lack of sympathetic voices could translate into challenges down the road (like slower weapons resupply from some European suppliers, or increased legal harassment).
Palestinian Authority Control & Relevance – Slipped Further: The Palestinian Authority’s already tenuous control in parts of Judea and Samaria has further eroded to near-irrelevance. Militants in northern Samaria openly defy the PA, and Israel has had to fill the security vacuum directly . Whatever shreds of legitimacy the PA had among Palestinians have largely slipped away — most Palestinians view it as impotent or colluding with Israel. This raises the risk that when Abbas exits the scene (he’s in his late 80s and in failing health), chaos and/or a Hamas foothold will ensue. Israel in effect is propping the PA up to avoid total anarchy, but this is an unsustainable long-term strategy.
What’s Next (Emerging Pressures & Scenarios):
Controlled Israeli Offensive in Lebanon – Imminent: All indicators point to Israel executing a major offensive against Hezbollah in the very near term. Already airstrikes have expanded, and evacuation orders in south Lebanon have begun as precursors. We assess that Israel will escalate to broad air and ground operations unless by some miracle Hezbollah blinks first (highly unlikely). The timing is likely sooner rather than later — Israel prefers to strike before Hezbollah can further rearm or an Iran deal alters the equation. Expect the Litani Line to be enforced. Israel may issue an ultimatum for civilians to leave certain zones, then hit Hezbollah’s infrastructure hard, possibly followed by limited incursions to push fighters north of Litani.
Phase 2 Gaza Gambit – Faltering and Unilateral Plan B: The much-touted transition to Phase 2 in Gaza (international force deployment, technocratic governance) is on the verge of collapsing. Israel is prepared for that outcome: expect Israel to unilaterally enforce security in Gaza — establishing no-go buffer zones, conducting targeted raids at will, controlling borders — and delay Gaza’s reconstruction indefinitely until its terms (Hamas disarmed) are met. In effect, Israel’s message to the world: “No disarmament, no rebuilding.” That scenario seems likely as Hamas is digging in. So what’s next is likely a long-term Israeli security presence around and even inside Gaza and a prolonged standoff where Gazans receive humanitarian aid but no full rehabilitation. This is not the outcome diplomats hoped for, but it’s where things are heading given Hamas’s stance.
Iran’s Dilemma Point – Decision in Coming Weeks: Iran faces a fateful choice: whether to actively “open its front” against Israel/US or lie low. Indicators to watch: any resumption of proxy attacks on U.S. bases or Israeli territory (e.g. militia rocket attacks, Houthi strikes), or provocative nuclear steps (like enrichment jumps). If Iran tests Israel’s red lines (e.g. approaching weapons-grade uranium or orchestrating a mass proxy assault), the next move could be Israeli (or joint U.S.-Israeli) strikes on Iranian soil. Conversely, Iran might decide now is the time to hunker down — to absorb the blows to Hezbollah and not retaliate, effectively saving its powder for later. A quiet period from Tehran (no major proxy flare-ups) likely means Iran is trying to ride out Trump’s term or waiting for a better strategic moment. We anticipate clarity on this by mid-March: either Iran engages (directly or via proxies) — triggering open conflict — or it takes a tactical backseat while cursing loudly. This is a key “what’s next” that will determine if the region explodes into a wider war or steps back from the brink.
Israel’s immediate next moves are geared toward regaining strategic initiative on its terms — hitting Hezbollah preemptively, holding Gaza at gunpoint until conditions are met, and coordinating with the U.S. to corner Iran. Decision-makers should watch the above triggers and indicators closely. The timeline to either solidify Israeli gains or slide into wider war is very tight.
Strategic Forecast and Verdict
Israel stands at a strategic inflection point as February 2026 unfolds. After two years of continuous conflict and upheaval, the nation’s overall posture is compressed but unbroken. Our assessment is that Israel is poised to aggressively shape the outcome in its favor, leveraging its current advantages in resolve, U.S. backing, and military readiness.
In practical terms, expect Israel’s strategy to deliver a “compressed finish.” Swiftly wrap up the unfinished business in Lebanon by incapacitating Hezbollah’s rocket threat. Holding Gaza in a vice until Hamas either capitulates or is removed. The timing is driven by a recognition that windows close — Trump’s political timeline, global patience, and Israel’s own public unity all have expiry dates. Therefore, Israel will likely act “sooner rather than later” on its northern front and press the Iran issue to a head, rather than allow protracted limbo. By early spring, we foresee either a significantly changed landscape — Hamas effectively disarmed or marginalized, Hezbollah knocked back for a generation, Iran deterred by force or deal — or, failing that, a multi-front war burning itself out by force of Israeli arms.
On the domestic front, the Haredi draft crisis in particular will be a crucible for the Netanyahu government. A compromise will be cobbled together to avert immediate government collapse, but it will leave lingering resentments and likely fuel large protests. A national healing and reckoning process looms on the horizon—Israelis will demand accountability for the early failures (Oct 7) and debate the country’s direction after the guns fall silent.
Israel is entering the final act of this multi-front conflict cycle. The posture is brittle only in the sense that it’s under strain, but it’s far from breaking. Indeed it is on the offensive psychologically. The coming 30–90 days will likely bring resolution to several open fronts. Outsiders should brace for bold moves from Jerusalem that may appear “shocking” but in reality have been telegraphed for months.
For decision-makers and serious observers, they must be ready to recalibrate views. By April, the “facts on the ground” could be markedly different (e.g., a demilitarized Gaza overseen by an interim international board, a southern Lebanon cleared of rockets). Strategic surprises are likely only to those not heeding Israel’s clear signals. Barring unforeseen cataclysms, Israel will likely emerge from this crucible having profoundly altered the region’s terror landscape in its favor.
— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief