Strategic Assessment: January 2026
A pause without resolution—and a region nearing its next inflection.
This is the first Strategic Assessment from Israel Brief. You can expect one of these on the first Wednesday of the month going forward.
It’s my attempt to pull daily signals up to altitude—to identify where trajectories are hardening, where leverage is shifting, and where time itself has become a weapon.
Shalom, my friend.
Israel enters 2026 in a tense holding pattern across multiple fronts.
A U.S.-brokered Gaza ceasefire has halted full-scale combat, but Hamas is dragging its feet on disarmament and demobilization. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s partial pullback has not translated into true disarmament, prompting Israel to initiate calibrated strikes and preparations for a wider campaign. Iran’s regional influence operations remain active but under heavy pressure, as Israeli and U.S. actions have blunted Tehran’s proxies from Gaza to the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, Judea and Samaria simmer with intermittent violence under a complicit Palestinian Authority.
Internationally, Washington’s alignment with Jerusalem is solidifying, even as European support drifts amid human-rights scrutiny.
Domestically, Israel’s wartime unity is giving way to familiar political fissures over conscription and judicial matters.
The strategic direction for the coming weeks is clear: Israel is poised to press its advantages and not allow time to work in its enemies’ favor. Outsiders expecting Israel to relent under pressure are misreading reality. Jerusalem is soberly resolute—securing its nation by decisively neutralizing threats, while managing the economic and societal strains of protracted conflict.
Trigger Watch
Expect flash developments if any of the following occur:
Hezbollah Breaks [Accepted] Ceasefire Limits: e.g. major rocket barrage or anti-tank strike causing high Israeli casualties.
Northern War Expands: IDF launches full-scale air and ground offensive in Lebanon to decisively degrade Hezbollah. U.S. backs Israel while warning others (Syria, Iran’s militias) to stay out.
Hamas Reneges on Demilitarization: Continues to refuse to disarm and commits new terror attack during ceasefire.
Gaza Campaign Resumes: Israel freezes reconstruction and retains a military presence in Gaza “yellow line” zones. Targeted operations eliminate holdout militants and tunnels, potentially re-escalating to prevent Hamas resurgence.
Iranian Escalation or Nuclear Progress: Iran or proxy directly strikes Israel (missile attack) or Tehran is caught enriching uranium.
Direct Confrontation: Israel (with U.S. nod) strikes Iranian assets — from nuclear sites to IRGC bases. Gulf allies quietly support action. Expect region-wide alerts for proxy retaliation (Iraq, Syria, Yemen).
Palestinian Authority Collapse: PA ceases security coordination or widespread uprisings occur.
Unilateral Security Control: Israel moves to contain chaos, re-entering flashpoints like Jenin and Nablus in force. Emergency measures to prevent terror havens, while hardliners push for accelerated sovereignty claims in Judea & Samaria.
The Gazan Front
Israel’s Gaza strategy has shifted from all-out military pressure to a fraught diplomatic holding pattern. Under Phase 1 of the U.S.-led peace framework, Hamas released all living Israeli hostages and ostensibly ceded governing authority in Gaza to a technocratic committee. In return, Israel pulled back most ground forces to designated “yellow line” zones inside Gaza and agreed to a ceasefire, enabling a surge of humanitarian aid.
However, Hamas is clearly gaming the interim. The terror group refuses to actually disarm — proposing to freeze or hide weapons rather than surrender them — and retains active fighters. Israeli patrols still face lethal ambushes from Hamas terrorists. For example, a few weeks ago, Hamas militants emerged from a Rafah tunnel and wounded five IDF soldiers with an RPG. Such incidents underscore Hamas’s bad faith. Even as its political leaders talk about moving on to the next phase, armed cadres continue “post-ceasefire” resistance.
Israel is treating the current calm as tactical and conditional. The government has made clear that Phase 2 — the long-term stabilization of Gaza — will not proceed unless Hamas is fully neutralized and they have returned the remains of the last hostage. President Trump signaled the same, warning that Hamas must disarm for the peace deal to advance.
Diplomats may be busy assembling the international “Board of Peace” and Stabilization Force to take over Gaza’s governance, but on the ground Israel is not loosening its grip. Engineering units are demolishing remaining Hamas tunnel networks and arms caches across Gaza, with explosions echoing daily. Israeli troops continue to hold a strategic belt inside Gaza — the yellow line — effectively bisecting the strip. This posture ensures that half of Gaza remains under IDF overwatch, preventing Hamas from moving freely closer to the Israeli population.
Reconstruction of Gaza is on hold. Debris removal in Rafah and other devastated zones has barely begun, hampered by both security concerns and political objections over funding. Israel’s finance minister flatly refused to have Israeli taxpayers bankroll Gaza’s rebuilding, and no major Gulf aid will materialize as long as Hamas retains any arsenal.
This impasse has a strategic upside for Jerusalem. It denies Hamas the ability to claim any recovery as a win, while putting pressure on Gaza’s population (and the international community) to force Hamas’s hand. Hamas, true to form, is spinning the lack of reconstruction as an Israeli failure to uphold the truce — a convenient, if patently incorrect, excuse to delay its own demobilization. But that narrative is wearing thin. Global donors and Arab states are aligning with the logic that Gaza can’t be rebuilt until the gunmen are gone. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have signaled they won’t invest in Gaza’s future on Hamas’s terms, a stance that bolsters Israel’s position.
The newly “formed” International Stabilization Force (ISF) fails to actually materialize and it won’t be able to robustly enforce disarmament, so Israel will simply do it unilaterally — maintaining freedom of action to strike any rearmament efforts and prolonging its military presence as needed. Hamas is not going anywhere unless compelled to do so by force. Any outside optimism that Hamas can be gently coaxed into laying down arms is misplaced. Gaza will remain a powder keg under watch, rather than a reconstruction project, until Israel is convinced that Hamas’s war-making ability is definitively eliminated.
Northern Front
The northern front is tilting toward a renewed confrontation as Israel loses patience with Hezbollah’s noncompliance with agreements.
A year ago, intense conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon forced a U.S.-brokered ceasefire that required Hezbollah to pull its forces north of the Litani River and dismantle its militarized zone along Israel’s border. For a time, that truce held. Israeli residents evacuated during the 2023 fighting were able to return home under a cautious calm. But Hezbollah has not disarmed south of the Litani. Arms depots and rocket infrastructure were supposed to be removed by the end of 2025, yet Israeli intelligence observes that Hezbollah’s operatives are rebuilding networks under the nose of the (and in some cases, overtly complicit) Lebanese Army. Hezbollah’s strategy is transparent: buy time, feign cooperation, rearm in the shadows. Jerusalem has rightly determined that this charade has run its course.
Israel has began shifting from deterrence to active prevention up north. The IDF has launched a series of pinpoint airstrikes in southern and eastern Lebanon, hitting Hezbollah arms storehouses and Hamas units that Iran transplanted into Lebanon. Jerusalem is effectively telling Beirut and the UN: We see what Hezbollah is doing, and we will not sit idle.
The diplomatic facade in Lebanon is also crumbling in the face of reality. Lebanon’s government — now led by Western-leaning figures (President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam) — publicly acknowledges that Hezbollah’s weapons are a problem. Salam has bluntly said “Hezbollah’s weapons did not protect Lebanon” and demanded the group hand over its arsenal to the state. He even invited U.S. and French forces to help inspect and clear out remaining Hezbollah arms depots in the south. This is unprecedented rhetoric from Lebanese leaders, likely driven by fear that Israel will otherwise do the job by force. Indeed, Israel has conveyed stark warnings through U.S. intermediaries: if Hezbollah is not actually disarmed, Israel will escalate on its own terms.
Complicating the northern picture is Syria’s evolving role. Syria, traditionally Hezbollah’s logistics rear and Iran’s ally, has seen upheaval. President Bashar al-Assad was ousted some months ago, replaced by (the terrorist) Ahmed al-Sharaa (now wearing a suit) in a Russia-Turkey brokered transition. The new Syrian leadership has shown openness to dialogue with Israel — a remarkable shift praised by Washington — but one wonders how (not at all) trustworthy they are as a potential peace partner.
President Trump lauded Syria’s “hard work” toward a constructive relationship and even eased sanctions as a reward. Yet Israel remains deeply wary.
Netanyahu demanded Syria agree to a demilitarized buffer zone stretching from Damascus to the Golan, essentially insisting that Iranian militias and heavy weapons stay far from Israeli territory. He delivered an ultimatum to that effect, overriding U.S. counsel to “take it easy” in Syria. Israel will not allow Iran or its proxies to regroup in Syria even if Assad’s departure offers a diplomatic opening. Additionally, there are no shortage of jihadist groups (including ISIS remnants) which might exploit any Syrian power vacuum.
Israel’s posture on the northern front is now decisively one of pre-emption. We assess that unless Hezbollah immediately yields on disarmament south of the Litani — an unlikely deescalation — Israel will intensify its campaign into a broader operation.
The IDF’s recent evacuation warnings in Lebanon hint at tactics used in Gaza: reduce civilian risk, then hit targets with overwhelming force. A full ground incursion into Lebanon is on the table if that’s what it takes to push Hezbollah beyond rocket range. Notably, U.S. support for Israel here is firm. Washington has publicly and privately warned Iran’s Iraqi Shi’ite militias not to intervene, under threat of Israeli strikes in Iraq and elsewhere.
Outsiders who assume Israel is “too tied up in Gaza” to tackle Hezbollah will be proven wrong. Jerusalem is determined to finish the job that was only half-done in 2024. The coming weeks will see a final diplomatic flurry, but Israel’s fuse is short.
Expect a limited war in Lebanon aimed at once and for all stripping Hezbollah of its strategic rocket threat. The northern front will thus shift from uneasy truce back to active conflict, unless by some miracle Hezbollah blinks first — an outcome contrary to its very identity.
Iran and Regional Proxies
Iran enters 2026 having absorbed significant blows to its prestige and assets, yet it remains a central orchestrator of threats to Israel. Over the past two years, Iran directly confronted Israel in unprecedented ways and paid a steep price.
Israeli strikes (often with U.S. assistance or cover) hit deep into Iran’s military infrastructure, including its nuclear program and ballistic missile sites.
Tehran’s attempts at retaliation, such as a brazen drone strike on a U.S. base in Qatar and attacks on Gulf shipping, invited punishing responses that severely degraded Iran’s forward capabilities.
Israeli intelligence suggests Iran is already rebuilding its missile program at a quick pace. Notably, Iran recently moved air defense batteries to its northwest, near Azerbaijan, hinting at fears of an Israeli approach from that direction. The implication is clear. Iran suspects Israel might strike again, possibly from Azeri soil or airspace (and that suspicion is likely correct).
In the proxy arena, Iran’s “axis of resistance” is under strain. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran’s crown jewel proxy, is being squeezed as detailed above. Hamas in Gaza has been knocked off, more or less, of its governing perch and is at the mercy of ceasefire monitors —an outcome Iran surely detests, given the IRGC helped arm and train Hamas for years. Iran tried to exploit the hostage diplomacy during the Gaza ceasefire. Tehran conditioned its help freeing Thai hostages on Thailand pulling its migrant workers from Israel (a bid to hurt Israel’s economy). This gambit only underscored Iran’s opportunism and its willingness to use others’ citizens as pawns. Meanwhile in Iraq and Syria, Iran’s militia allies have faced repeated Israeli and American strikes whenever they mobilized to threaten Israel. The U.S. message to Baghdad was unequivocal: keep Iran-backed militias out of the Israel-Hezbollah fight, or Israel will hit them on Iraqi soil. So far, this deterrent has held. Iraqi Shi’ite militias have blustered but not opened a serious western front.
Yet Iran is far from yielding. Iranian officials likely believe that U.S. political focus will shift (with thanks in no small part to their cyber operations and chaos-sowing elsewhere) and Israeli stamina will wane, giving Iran an opening to regain lost ground later.
Israeli and Western security services are on high alert for IRGC Quds Force plots targeting Israeli diplomats, soft targets abroad, or Jewish diaspora sites. Some of the recent uptick in global antisemitic violence can be traced to Iran’s propaganda and funding networks fueling jihadist actors. Iran’s hand was suspected in a foiled plot against the UAE Israeli embassy last month, and in cyber attacks on Israeli infrastructure as recently as a few days ago. While these did not make major headlines, they illustrate Iran’s pattern: probe for weak spots, retaliate unconventionally.
On the nuclear front, Israel’s red line is fast approaching. Enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran are reportedly close to weapons-grade in sufficient quantity for multiple devices (if weaponized). Mossad and the IDF are undoubtedly dusting off contingency plans.
The coming period could see a dramatic Israeli move against Iranian nuclear targets if diplomacy doesn’t yield an immediate rollback. Given the Trump administration’s confrontational stance on Iran, there is less U.S. restraint on Israel now than under previous U.S. governments. Indeed, Israeli defense officials assess a renewed strike on Iran’s missile or nuclear facilities is “imminent” unless Iran freezes its programs. The Iranian regime’s air defense drills and redeployments indicate Iran is bracing for such an event. The pressure is on Iran: either de-escalate its proxy wars and nuclear ambitions or face direct conflict with an emboldened Israel (backed by an equally out-of-patience Washington).
Judea & Samaria
This theatre remains volatile, a tinderbox of low-intensity conflict that could yet ignite into a major uprising if mishandled. Over the last month or so, Israeli forces have been running nightly counterterror raids across Judea and Samaria to preempt any spread of the war. These operations are extensive: the IDF concluded a two-month campaign in the Etzion sector (south of Jerusalem) in early December, netting scores of terror suspects and weapons caches. In the north of this region, the military has not hesitated to use heavy measures in terror hubs like Nur al-Shams and Jenin — demolishing militant safe houses and arresting cells before they can organize attacks.
These efforts have largely succeeded in thwarting major terror plots. Several would-be bombings and shootings were intercepted, including the daytime arrest of a suspect in Nablus’s busy market and the takedown of a car-ramming attempt near Hebron.
Despite these tactical successes, underlying tensions are worsening. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is increasingly discredited and weak. President Mahmoud Abbas’s regime did nothing of note during the Gaza war except issue angry speeches. It has lost what little grip it had on the hearts and minds of Palestinians—and indeed is picking up the slack by emulating some of Hamas’s tactics against its own populace. In many northern towns (Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus), local armed groups — mostly aligned with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad — hold more sway than PA security forces.
Israeli intelligence recently uncovered a new terror infrastructure in Tulkarm linked to multiple attacks, highlighting that militant recruitment continues despite the PA’s nominal presence. Israel is essentially operating alone to keep a lid on violence here. Coordination with PA security exists but is minimal and fraught with mistrust—the PA is a terrorist organization, albeit a sometimes pragmatic one.
A disturbing trend is the uptick in Israeli extremist vigilantism in parts of Judea and Samaria. A fringe group, the “Hilltop Youth” falsely considered part of the “settler community” (they’re by and large comprised of disaffected youths from places like Haifa—in essence a youth gang), has been emboldened by a sense of impunity and ongoing Palestinian terror attacks have perpetrated revenge assaults on Palestinian civilians. It is important to note that while this is concerning, it’s some few dozen actors in response to literally thousands of Palestinians attacking Jews—something they commit at a rate some twenty times more frequently than their gang activity. Fortunately, Israeli security forces are cracking down on them and have started to use electronic monitoring more effectively to clamp down on it. Such violence is a double-edged strategic liability: it diverts Israeli forces and undermines Israel on the world stage.
Looking ahead, the Palestinian areas of Judea and Samaria face a crisis of governance. The PA is effectively a bystander, and whispers of its collapse or Abbas’s departure are growing. Israel is war-gaming scenarios of the PA’s sudden failure.
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has authorized contingency plans for a “Day After Abbas” — which could involve Israel moving forces into key areas to prevent Hamas from filling any vacuum. Meanwhile, major swathes of the public are calling for a more permanent Israeli presence.
Outsiders often misread the area’s quiet as stability. In truth, it’s a tense quiet enforced by Israeli vigilance. The absence of mass uprisings in support of Gaza was a relief, but it took extraordinary measures — including deploying additional brigades to calm flashpoints and carrot-and-stick management of the PA. With Gaza’s war seemingly paused, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria are growing more restless, not less.
Israel’s best play is to keep a firm security grip while quietly reinforcing administration. Judea and Samaria could explode with little warning if we see a full or partial PA collapse along with opportunistic incitement by Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel must continue proactive counterterrorism and disciplined policing to navigate this minefield.
Red Sea and Maritime Arena
Israel’s adversaries have repeatedly tried to expand the conflict to the Red Sea and broader maritime domain, with mixed success. The Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s southern proxy, engaged in several high-profile attacks on shipping recently, aiming to disrupt global (and, of course, Israel’s) trade lanes and U.S. naval movements. However, a combination of American military pressure and Israeli long-range strikes has tempered the Houthi threat. The U.S. Navy’s Task Force 59, bolstered by European allies, began “Operation Prosperity Guardian” a few months ago in a concerted effort to escort vessels and neutralize Yemeni missile launchers. Israeli airstrikes, some covert, hit Houthi drone workshops and arms convoys. For now, an uneasy U.S.-Houthi ceasefire has reduced the frequency of missile attacks in the Red Sea corridor.
Still, the threat has not vanished. Intelligence indicated the Houthis even considered a ground operation — a wild card notion of sending fighters towards Israel’s southern border, perhaps via a smuggling route or by infiltrating Jordan from Saudi Arabia. While that sounds far-fetched, it is illustrative of their overall posture. More concretely, the Houthis (and Iran’s naval units) maintain the ability to launch one-off surprise attacks: say, a drone swarm at Eilat port or mining a busy Red Sea strait. Israel’s Navy and Air Force remain on high alert around the Bab al-Mandab choke point. In one incident last month, unidentified drones approached an Israeli cargo ship off Eritrea’s coast — they were shot down by a U.S. destroyer escorting the convoy, illustrating close U.S.-Israel coordination at sea. Maritime security around Israel has effectively become a joint mission with Western allies, as global commerce demands these sea lanes stay open.
Beyond Yemen, Israel is watching the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.
In the Mediterranean, Turkey’s erratic stance and the presence of Hamas operatives in Lebanon and Syria pose risks to Israeli maritime targets (whether cargo or cruise ships or gas rigs). So far there have been no successful attacks in those areas, but some cargo ships bound for Israel were harassed (one Greek vessel reported warning shots off Lebanon’s coast just a few weeks ago). Israel has quietly armed its gas rigs and even civilian vessels with counter-drone and CIWS systems.
In the Persian Gulf, Israel doesn’t have an open presence, but it benefits from the Abraham Accords navies (Bahrain, UAE) which monitor Iranian naval movements closely. A notable development is the redeployment of an Israeli-owned but foreign-flagged fleet of tankers that now route via the Cape of Good Hope, avoiding Suez and Red Sea chokepoints altogether — a costly but telling adjustment to the threat.
Strategically, Israel has hardened its maritime defenses, and its adversaries have been unable to score a significant hit on Israeli assets at sea. However, the maritime domain remains a space where Iran and its proxies will look for asymmetric opportunities. The IDF has issued public warnings to shipping about potential mines or explosives-laden boats, trying to deny the enemy any easy targets. France and the UK have naval elements in the Red Sea, and even traditionally neutral states have condemned Houthi attacks on civilian shipping as piracy. This broad support gives Israel diplomatic cover to act robustly against maritime threats.
Global Jihadist & Diaspora Threat Network
Jewish communities abroad are facing a security reality not seen in decades, effectively normalizing a constant threat level.
The most gruesome example came just weeks ago in Australia. A mass-casualty terrorist attack at a Hanukkah celebration at Sydney beach. Two attackers, motivated by online jihadist propaganda, killed 15 people and wounded some 40 others. They had improvised explosive devices, but were neutralized before they could be detonated. Australian authorities admitted that years of escalating anti-Israel agitation — replete with chants of incitement — preceded this attack. In other words, the warning signs were there, but were insufficiently acted upon. Jewish institutions worldwide are ramping up their guards, drills, and vigilance.
Similar, if less deadly, incidents have proliferated: A synagogue bombing plot was foiled in France. An attempted shooting at a Jewish school in Florida was averted by an armed guard. Pro-Hamas rallies in European cities have turned violent, requiring police to rescue threatened Jewish motorists or homeowners. Israel’s security services are quietly aiding many countries with threat intelligence to preempt attacks. The “diaspora front” has thus become an extension of Israel’s — though it is one Israel must wage delicately, respecting sovereign governments even as it protects its people abroad. Notably, the Mossad and Shin Bet have reportedly dispatched liaisons to Europe and North America to assist local law enforcement in monitoring extremist cells.
Far from cowed, Jewish communities are organizing self-defense training, enhancing community alert systems, and publicly voicing support for Israel’s right to self-defense. The outpouring of diaspora volunteers — whether in IDF reserve service, emergency fundraising, or political advocacy — has been immense. Thousands of dual citizens flew to Israel to serve when the war began. This has not gone unnoticed by jihadist propagandists, who paint Jewish civilians abroad as “legitimate targets” due to their connection to Israel. This vile narrative echoes the darkest chapters of history, and yet it has gained alarming traction online. The normalization of antisemitic rhetoric (sometimes disguised, thinly, as “anti-Zionism”) in Western discourse over the past two years has created cover for violent actors to justify their deeds.
Israel is warning its partners that the terror threat to Jews abroad is a harbinger of broader security erosion. Today it’s synagogues and Jewish events. Tomorrow it will be Western interests at large. Radical Islamist networks often test their tactics on Israeli/Jewish targets first, then expand the target list. The wave of violence has pushed some allied governments to get off the fence. European governments are also (belatedly) increasing surveillance on returnees from Syria and on Iran-backed cultural centers that were previously tolerated. Israel would like to see a more concerted international crackdown on the sources of incitement — namely, certain Hamas-affiliated charities and Iranian propaganda outlets that operate freely in the West. There are signs of progress, but, currently, it seems to be more for optics than for effect.
United States Posture
The United States under the Trump administration is delivering a masterclass in alignment with Israel — albeit with occasional tempering advice (read: demands) behind closed doors (generally). Over the past month, Washington’s support for Israel’s security objectives has been full-throated. President Donald Trump frames the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and peace plan as a signature achievement, and he is deeply invested in seeing it succeed (or at least not publicly fail). Notably, the U.S. steered a UN Security Council resolution in November endorsing the Gaza peace framework, giving international legal weight to Israel’s demands for Hamas demilitarization and an international force in Gaza.
On the military front, U.S. posture is one of forward-leaning deterrence to guard against escalation. American fighter jets are still patrolling over Syria and Iraq, ostensibly targeting ISIS but implicitly warning Iran and its proxies. After the October 2023 Hamas onslaught, the U.S. surged naval assets (two carrier strike groups) to the Eastern Med and the Gulf. Those deployments have since drawn down slightly, but a robust presence remains. U.S. Central Command is closely coordinating with the IDF — whether it’s intelligence sharing on Hezbollah’s movements or expediting delivery of critical munitions. Indeed, American military resupply to Israel has been impressive.
However, U.S. support is not unconditional. President Trump — while sympathetic to Israeli aims — is highly attuned to American public optics and the need to avoid quagmires. The White House has privately urged Israel to calibrate its Syria approach. Trump told Netanyahu to “take it easy” in Syria and not provoke the new government there. The U.S. has invested in Syria’s post-Assad transition and does not want Israel stirring that pot too much. In response, Netanyahu essentially thumbed his nose by declaring a new ultimatum to Damascus about buffer zones. This indicates a minor rift — Israel pursuing maximal security demands, and the U.S. counseling a bit of restraint where its own diplomatic efforts are at play — not a breakdown in relations. At the macro level, Washington and Jerusalem are in lockstep that Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah must emerge from this period decisively weakened.
Domestic U.S. politics also factor in. Trump is undoubtedly eyeing the 2026 midterms. If images of renewed urban warfare in Gaza or a “humanitarian catastrophe” reappear, it will sour segments of U.S. public opinion. The administration is thus simultaneously boosting Israel and managing Israel.
In terms of U.S. alignment vs pressure, right now alignment dominates. The only notable pressures from the U.S. side are cautionary: don’t embarrass us by overreach. For example, if Israel were to strike Iran openly, the U.S. would prefer it be framed as last resort and ideally after consultation (even if just a heads-up). Likewise on Palestinian issues. Washington still wants to see the PA empowered eventually in Gaza, and frowns on any Israeli moves that look like they’re taking over. But these differences are mostly managed behind closed doors.
One must note, though: American strategic patience is not infinite. Trump and his hawkish advisors revel in Israel’s tough approach, but they also need results. If by the Spring Hamas is still armed in Gaza or Hezbollah is lobbing rockets again, even this White House will get frustrated. Moreover, as the U.S. gears up for confrontation with China, there’s an undercurrent in the Pentagon worried about overfixation on Mideast theaters. So Israel should seize this moment of maximal U.S. support to achieve irreversible gains.
Europe and International Institutions
While the U.S. tightens its embrace of Israel, much of Europe and the international institutional milieu is drifting into a more adversarial stance toward Jerusalem’s wartime conduct. European leaders continue to profess Israel’s right to self-defense, but their tone on Gaza has grown increasingly critical with each passing month of conflict.
So far, the EU as a body has stopped short of sanctions or suspension of agreements. Divisions among member states (with Germany, Hungary, others blocking extreme steps) mean that Europe’s response remains more rhetoric than substance. However, the diplomatic temperature is unmistakably cooler. At the UN Human Rights Council and in the General Assembly, European countries have increasingly abstained or even voted for resolutions censuring Israel’s military tactics. The term “disproportionate” is back in European statements, and at the extreme, officials from Ireland, Spain, and Belgium have alleged Israel has committed war crimes — regardless of lack of merit to these claims — in reference to Gaza. Israel doesn’t enjoy (if it ever has) the benefit of the doubt in many international fora.
The UN’s commission of inquiry on the Gaza conflict is collecting evidence and will likely produce a scathing report in 2026, potentially accusing Israel of grave breaches. The ICC (International Criminal Court) has also signaled renewed interest in targeting Israel’s legitimacy on the world stage.
Thus, Israel is bracing for another wave of lawfare. Dozens of NGOs, some with EU funding, are preparing lawsuits in various jurisdictions against Israeli officials and military officers for alleged war crimes. The Israeli government’s stance is rightfully defiant. It refuses any cooperation with the UN inquiry or the ICC on these matters, calling them biased. Israel’s allies are working to block or delay such efforts — for instance, the U.S. quietly lobbied key ICC member states to oppose any fast-tracking of a Gaza case. Nonetheless, the legal and PR battle will intensify.
European public opinion, influenced by relentless media focus on Palestinian civilian suffering, has shifted significantly. The public has become embolden by the “anti-Zionism” fig leaf to embrace full-on Jew-hate. Large protests in London, Paris, and Berlin have put pressure on European governments to distance themselves from Israel’s campaign. We see tangible effects: the UK and France paused some arms exports to Israel pending “reviews” (a symbolic gesture, as most big-ticket deliveries had already been made). The EU is leveraging aid promises for Gaza as a way to gain political say, occasionally irking Israel by insisting on frameworks that involve the PA or UN oversight.
At the same time, not all international trends are against Israel. In an interesting twist, several countries in the Global South (e.g. India, Brazil) have kept strong ties with Israel throughout, eyeing its counter-terror experience and defense tech. And a new phenomenon: some Muslim-majority nations quietly appreciate Israel’s stance against Iran. The Abraham Accords countries (UAE, Bahrain, etc.) haven’t publicly cheered Israel on, but behind closed doors they understand Israel’s objectives align with their interest in a weakened Hamas (which they correctly see as Iranian/Turkish/Qatari-backed Islamists).
That said, Europe’s drift is more problematic because of Europe’s influence in international bodies. Israel’s strategists are concerned about a long-term erosion of legitimacy on the European front — today it might be hostile rhetoric, tomorrow? Well, there are lots of things on that table.
As for the United Nations and other institutions: the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon stands as a bystander while Israel and Hezbollah shadow-box. When/if war resumes, expect UN peacekeepers to evacuate rather than impede the IDF. The UNRWA (UN agency in Gaza) is desperately trying to remain relevant in relief distribution, but Israel has sidelined it in favor of direct aid via the UN Security Council mechanism. The World Bank and IMF are readying Gaza reconstruction fund plans, but those are frozen until security parameters are met. Israel’s diplomacy in these corridors is focused on one goal — delay and dilute any hostile action until the conflict’s outcome is irreversible. So far, that strategy is working. Talk is cheap, and Israel can weather verbal storms.
Domestic: Coalition Politics, Conscription, and Judicial Overhang
On the home front, Israel’s wartime unity gave way to familiar schisms and political jockeying, even as the external war smolders on. In the initial phase of the conflict, a broad sense of national unity and purpose muted internal disputes — opposition protests paused, and a national emergency government was formed. However, that was short lived and signs of domestic fractures are evident—no x-ray needed. The unity government arrangement unraveled as opposition figures peeled away over disagreements on the Gaza ceasefire terms and the handling of hostages. Prime Minister Netanyahu is once again helming a narrow coalition, and its inherent contradictions are on full display.
One critical flashpoint is the conscription law for the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi). This long-simmering issue has reemerged with a vengeance. During the war, while hundreds of thousands of both secular and religious reservists have been serving continuously, the vast majority of Haredi men remained exempt from military service — a fact not lost on the public. Netanyahu’s coalition promised the Haredi parties a new law cementing their exemptions, but doing so in the current climate is like pouring fuel on a fire.
In early December, Netanyahu planned to announce his conscription bill; instead he abruptly canceled the address due to security developments in Lebanon — a convenient way to dodge the issue for the moment. Behind closed doors, his partners are haggling. Neither Likud nor the opposition will accept a blanket exemption enshrined in law. Any compromise granting Haredim more leniency infuriates secular Israelis, while any tougher stance risks the coalition’s collapse. We are seeing mass protests flaring up again, this time with reservists and their families leading the charge, demanding equality in sacrifice.
Another domestic pressure point, quieter but structurally unresolved, is the judicial reform confrontation that the war merely paused. Netanyahu’s pre-October 7 push to recalibrate the balance between the elected branches and the High Court was frozen under emergency conditions, not abandoned. Elements of that struggle are now resurfacing indirectly and awkwardly.
The High Court is again positioning itself to rule on the legality of wartime emergency measures. That posture reinforces the core grievance of reform advocates: a Court that has claimed authority to review not only ordinary legislation, but even amendments to Basic Laws, in a system that never defined such power through a completed constitutional framework. What supporters call “guardrails,” critics increasingly see as judicial self-expansion into political terrain that was never formally delegated.
At the same time, Netanyahu’s corruption trial (dragging on for over five years now) continues in fragmented fashion, adding a personal layer to an already distorted institutional fight. The Prime Minister’s request to postpone testimony on security grounds sparked predictable outrage, but it also underscored an unresolved tension: a legal system that insists on treating an incumbent wartime prime minister as an ordinary defendant, while simultaneously demanding deference to its own authority in reviewing government action during war. The spectacle of judges being asked—explicitly—to weigh national security considerations against procedural rigidity only deepens public skepticism about whether Israel’s current legal order is fit for purpose.
President Isaac Herzog is considering a discreet escape hatch: a pardon arrangement that would end the trial. Reports suggest Herzog is exploring a narrowly tailored “yes, but” framework, aimed less at personal absolution than at defusing a trial that many Israelis—rightly or wrongly—now view as emblematic of a broader system that overreached.
The backlash from governance NGOs has been fierce, with accusations of “backroom deals” and institutional corruption. Yet that reaction itself reveals the depth of the crisis: a legal and political ecosystem so brittle that even discussing constitutional safety valves is treated as illegitimate. Beneath the noise, the issue is not Netanyahu’s fate alone, but a growing sense that Israel is still operating without agreed rules for how courts, executives, and emergencies coexist.
This drama is unfolding largely beneath the war headlines, but it feeds a wider perception problem. Not that Israel’s leadership is merely distracted by survival—but that the state is still paying the price for an unfinished constitutional order, in which judicial power expanded by precedent rather than consent, and reform arrived clumsily, under the shadow of personal litigation and national trauma. Until that structure is clarified, neither trials nor reforms will command full legitimacy, and every crisis will reopen the same fault lines.
Social cohesion in Israel is strained but more or less holding. The public’s tolerance for wartime footing remains remarkably strong. Protests against the war are minimal outside of fringe far-left-wing circles. However, the unity that prevailed right after the October 2023 horror has inevitably frayed at the edges. Military families are exhausted and some are vocal — not against the war aims, but against perceived government incompetence or lack of transparency. The economy’s squeeze (cost of living, reserve duty keeping people from jobs) is starting to bite even middle-income communities, which could translate to domestic unrest if not addressed. Yet, Israelis by and large understand that as long as the external threat remains, internal squabbles must not break the nation’s resolve. There is talk that after the northern front is concluded, Gantz might push for a renewed unity government to guide the post-war phase, possibly easing Netanyahu out in the process. Such talk is speculative but significant.
Civilian institutions have functioned throughout the war (the Knesset passed budgets and war powers; the courts continued operating). The IDF remains a highly respected common denominator — one of the few institutions still broadly trusted across society. But the specter of the judicial overhaul and deep ideological divides (secular vs religious, hawks vs pragmatists) looms large. When the guns go relatively quiet, those issues will roar back. Israel must be careful that victory on the battlefield is not undermined by self-inflicted wounds at home. Netanyahu’s political instincts for survival are strong and we can expect him to tread carefully enough to survive until he can claim some form of win.
Strategic Outlook: Key Judgments and Warnings
Recent developments that solidified trends
Israeli Resolve and Initiative: Israel’s determination to neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah once and for all has only hardened. Neither international hand-wringing nor two-year war fatigue has softened Jerusalem’s stance.
U.S.-Israel Strategic Sync: The U.S. alignment with Israel is strong, with Washington providing diplomatic cover and military largesse. Trump’s White House and Netanyahu’s government operate in near-lockstep, emboldening Israel to press forward (e.g. U.S. warnings to Iran’s proxies on Israel’s behalf ).
Hamas Intransigence: Hamas’s refusal to countenance genuine disarmament or political diminishment has become ever more obvious, validating Israel’s skepticism.
Diaspora Vigilance: The Jewish diaspora’s awakening to a normalized threat environment has hardened community defenses and unity. After incidents like the Sydney attack, Jewish communities worldwide are more mobilized, security-conscious, and outspoken. What was once complacency in safe havens has hardened into alert vigilance.
Areas where control, advantage, or cohesion have deteriorated
Hezbollah Deterrence (for Hezbollah): Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israeli action has slipped badly. A year of relative quiet didn’t translate to safety. Israel is now striking Lebanese soil at will. The aura of Hezbollah as untouchable or as Lebanon’s protector has evaporated.
International Sympathy for Israel: In Europe and UN institutions, focus has shifted almost entirely to Palestinian suffering and legal accusations. Israel’s narrative of moral high ground is falling on deaf ears in those arenas, complicating Israeli diplomacy.
Palestinian Authority: The PA’s already tenuous control in its areas of Judea and Samaria has further eroded. Militants operate with growing impunity in northern Samaria, and Israel is forced to fill the security vacuum. Whatever legitimacy or relevance the PA had has slipped; Palestinians increasingly see it as irrelevant, raising the risk of chaos if Israel doesn’t prop it up.
Coalition Solidarity: The unity within Israel’s governing coalition has slipped as the immediate war emergency abates. Fissures over issues like Haredi conscription and handling of Gaza funds have resurfaced. While the coalition still agrees on core security policy, its internal consensus on domestic policy is fraying, which will weaken focus and decision-making if not managed.
Emerging pressures and likely next moves to watch
Northern Escalation Imminent: All signals point to a controlled Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in the very near term. Watch for Israel expanding airstrikes and possibly a ground push to enforce the Litani line (evacuation orders and strikes have already began). The timing will align with Israel’s choosing — likely sooner rather than later, to preempt Hezbollah rearmament. This will be the next major phase of conflict.
Phase 2 Gaza Gambit: The transition to Phase 2 in Gaza — with an international force deployment and technocratic administration — will collapse in effect if not in branding in the coming weeks. As Hamas inevitably continues to obstruct disarmament, expect Israel to unilaterally enforce security (no-go zones, targeted raids) and delay reconstruction.
Iranian Dilemma Point: Iran faces a decision on whether to actively open its front with Israel or hunker down. Indicators to watch: any resumption of proxy drone/missile strikes on U.S. or Israeli targets, or provocative nuclear steps. Should Iran test Israel’s red lines, the next move could be further Israeli strikes on Iranian soil. Conversely, Iran might lie low to regroup — a quiet period from Tehran now likely means it’s saving its powder for later.
Domestic Turning Point: Domestically, as external threats are handled one by one, Israel will reach a turning point where internal issues demand attention. The next few months will see a resurgence of mass protests (over conscription equity or judicial matters) when the security situation is stable enough to allow it.
This month’s picture is clear. Israel is managing strain, but not surrendering initiative. The pause is tactical, not transformative.
— Uri Zehavi · Intelligence Editor, Israel Brief